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 Abstract 
Caribbean states have been trying to reposition themselves in the changing 
international relations sphere by reorienting their foreign policy strategies in order to 
develop their relationships with China and Japan. Since the beginning of the 2000s, 
Caribbean states have been experiencing several challenges to economic growth and 
development such as the loss of this preferential market access, reduction in US aid, 
decline in the number of visitor arrivals, and threats from hurricanes. This 
dissertation argues that the Caribbean’s growing relations with China and Japan is 
integral to its economic adjustment strategy as they have been providing the region 
with much needed economic assistance. Economic development has consistently 
been the main goal behind the foreign policy strategies of Caribbean states and this 
is also the case, in their relationships with China and Japan. 
Caribbean states have been pursuing “unorthodox” foreign policies strategies 
towards China and Japan. Due to their limited resource base, they have been 
creatively using their value-based resources such as votes and quality advocacy in 
international fora, in exchange for economic assistance. In the context of small states 
in the international system, having acknowledged their vulnerabilities due to their 
smallness, Caribbean states have shown resilience and resourcefulness in crafting 
these foreign policies as they seek to reposition themselves in the international 
system.   
China and Japan’s motivations towards the region are related to the pursuit 
of their economic development, political security and global status. China and Japan 
have been trying to garner votes and support in international bodies and developing 
 countries. The global status dimension is particularly interesting as China continues 
to rise to power and Japan struggles to hold on regionally and internationally.  
The levels of analysis framework is used to help explain the foreign policy 
behaviour of these Caribbean small states. This dissertation argues that the system, 
state and individual level are useful in explaining the Caribbean’s foreign policy 
behavior and decision-making process. Moreover, there is an interplay among the 
levels whereby the changes in the international system affect the domestic economic 
conditions of the state; and the political system of the state awards power and 
importance to the leader. 
This dissertation concludes that in order to maximize the benefits to be 
gained from the increased engagement with China and Japan and moreover, to 
ensure that it remains mutually beneficial, Caribbean states need to strengthen 
regional integration and work more actively as CARICOM rather than as members 
of CARICOM. 
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CHAPTER 1 
Introduction 
 
 
1.1. The Caribbean’s Economic Predicament in the New Millennium 
 
Since the beginning of the 1990s, there have been profound economic, 
political and geostrategic changes in the international system which were triggered 
by the end of the Cold War and the collapse of bipolarity.  The international system 
was thrust into a post-Cold War era in which “the old assumptions, the seemingly 
immutable structures and intellectual constructs which underpinned the functioning 
of the international system since the end of the second World War have been 
shattered and swept away by the tidal wave of far-reaching changes, political and 
economic.”1 Moreover, the economic changes wrought by globalisation have left 
Caribbean countries in the process of reorienting their foreign policy and 
repositioning themselves in the present configuration of the international system.  
Caribbean states2 have over the years practiced foreign policy strategies 
pursuant to the premise that due to their small size, they are in a disadvantaged 
position in the international system and as a result, need special consideration. One 
primary change that has affected Caribbean countries in the new millennium is the 
loss of preferential treatment from great powers such as Britain and the United 
States of America (US)
3
.  Moreover, there has been a notable decline in the strategic 
                                                          
1Anthony T. Bryan, “Caribbean International Relations: A Retrospect and Outlook for a New 
Millennium,” in Contending with Destiny: The Caribbean in the 21st Century, eds. Dennis Benn and 
Kenneth Hall (Kingston: Ian Randle Publishers, 2000), 347. 
2For the purposes of this dissertation, “Caribbean” or “Caribbean states” refers to the English-
speaking Caribbean countries. These are Antigua and Barbuda, the Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, 
Dominica, Grenada, Guyana, Jamaica, St. Kitts and Nevis, St. Lucia, St. Vincent and the Grenadines, 
and Trinidad and Tobago. The definition of the Caribbean is discussed later in this chapter. 
3
Throughout the dissertation, the United States of America will be referred to as the US. 
2 
 
importance of Caribbean states since the beginning of the 1990s, particularly with 
the end of the Cold War, as security concerns about the threat of communism within 
the Caribbean region are no longer of primary concern to the US. Additionally, 
Caribbean agricultural products and raw materials traditionally exported to Britain 
and the US, began facing competition from other regions which offered cheaper 
prices. 
Stemming from their history of colonialism, the economic survival of the 
Caribbean had been typically associated with Britain and the US. Caribbean states 
share a long history of British rule, under which they specialized in the production 
of sugar and bananas for export primarily to the European markets. Even after 
decolonisation, Caribbean states remained heavily dependent on their agricultural 
sectors despite their numerous attempts to diversify their economies and the steep 
competition they faced from producers in Central American countries.  
Over the years, Caribbean states have relied on major powers as sources of 
aid, investments and special concessions. Under the Lomé Conventions,
4
 for 
example, Caribbean states used to enjoy preferential treatment and access to the 
European Economic Community (EEC) markets for most of their exports, as well as 
various development aid programs. This one-way preferential system, however, was 
gradually replaced by two-way free trade agreements which resulted in a loss of 
preferential market access treatment for Caribbean states. Consequently, they have 
faced some difficulties in readjusting themselves into the current international 
economic arena compounded by the fact that most of their economies have been 
                                                          
4
Chapter 3 provides a more detailed discussion of the Lomé Conventions. 
3 
 
heavily dependent on the agricultural sector and their products lack competitiveness 
in an open market.  
During the Cold War period, the Caribbean region marked an area of great 
geopolitical importance to the US, who feared “growing leftist” threats5 to the 
prevailing pro-Western ideological order in the region at that time. In an effort to 
counter and contain this growing threat, the Caribbean Basin Initiative (CBI) was 
conceived by the US administration in 1983. Under the CBI, there was an increased 
flow of development aid from the US government, a 12 year guarantee of duty free 
status for most Caribbean exports to the US market, and the establishment of 
arrangements such as tax incentives and protection against nationalism designed to 
promote private investments in the region.6 However, with the end of the Cold War, 
the Caribbean region seemingly lost its once important strategic value to the US as 
security concerns have changed dramatically to focus on countries in the Middle 
East, for example. This dwindling lack of attention and interest from the US and 
other traditional trading partners has left Caribbean states facing harsher economic 
realities and with a void to be filled.  
Within the past two decades, Caribbean states have not only seen a loss of 
preferential access to European and US markets but also a sharp decline in 
development assistance. In particular, there has been a significant reduction in 
development assistance from the US to the Caribbean region, which has traditionally 
been perceived as the “US backyard”. The aid trajectory has changed as historical 
ties have been downplayed. During the 1980s, US aid to the region amounted to 
                                                          
5
The armed coup led by Maurice Bishop in Grenada, 1979 as well as other leftist insurgencies in 
Latin America were perceived by the US as threats to American influence in the region. 
6H. Michael Erisman, “CARICOM: The Pursuit of Economic Security,” in Latin America and 
Caribbean Foreign Policy, eds. Frank O. Mora and Jeanne A.K. Hey (NY: Rowman and Littlefield, 
2003). 
4 
 
US$5.5 billion but by the 1990s declined to about US$3 billion.7 Economic 
assistance from the US continued to decline throughout the 1990s to 2000s but 
increased significantly in 2010 to US$1.7 billion which was almost three times the 
amount given the previous year (US$586 million in 2009).8 This increase was, 
however, as a result of the devastating earthquake that Haiti suffered that year.9 
Since then, over two-thirds of US aid to the Caribbean region has been allocated to 
Haiti’s relief and reconstruction efforts. In 2012, aid to the region was US$522.7 
million with Haiti receiving approximately US$357.2 million.10 The other remaining 
Caribbean countries are therefore left with the task of finding alternative sources of 
economic assistance.   
Another factor that Caribbean states have been arguing that is a hindrance to 
the development is the classification of Caribbean states as middle-income 
countries. This classification has rendered the region relatively stable and not poor 
enough in terms of gross domestic product (GDP) per capita when compared to 
other developing countries.
11
 As a result of this, Caribbean countries have seen a 
reduction in the allocation of aid which is mostly directed to low income countries 
and increased stringent conditions attached to loans from international funding 
agencies. This has also prevented them from benefitting from international debt 
                                                          
7
Peter J. Meyer and Mark P. Sullivan, U.S. Foreign Assistance to Latin America and the Caribbean: 
Recent Trends and FY2013 Appropriations, CRS Report R42582 (Washington, DC: Library of 
Congress, Congressional Research Service, June 26, 2012), accessed August 20, 2012, 
https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R42582.pdf. 
8
Ibid. 
9
On January 12, 2010, Haiti suffered a devastating earthquake which claimed the lives of an 
estimated 316,000 people. More than one third of Haiti’s population suffered from the 7.0 magnitude 
earthquake.  
10
Meyer and Sullivan, CRS Report R42582. 
11
Antigua and Barbuda, Barbados, the Bahamas and Trinidad and Tobago are considered high-
income countries.  
5 
 
relief.
12
 Caribbean leaders have argued that “per capita income was the wrong way 
to measure development” as it obscures the many challenges faced by Caribbean 
small states.
13
Among these challenges is the decline in the number of tourist arrivals 
due to the global economic recession as well as the frequent threats from the 
hurricane season.  
Caribbean states have been grappling with these challenges to economic 
development in the 21
st
 century, and are burdened by heavy debt, a struggling tourist 
industry, and the reduction of aid and preferential trade treatment. Richard Bernal 
argues that, in order to cope with these challenges, Caribbean states should 
undertake Strategic Global Repositioning (SGR) and that foreign policy plays a 
crucial function in achieving competitiveness in the new era. SGR, he argues is  
a process of repositioning a country in the global economy and world affairs 
by implementing a strategic medium to long-term plan formulated from 
continuous dialogue of the public sector, the private sector…It involves 
proactive, structural and institutional transformation (not adjustment) 
focused on improvement and diversification of exports and international 
economic and political relations. Achieving SGR requires changes in both 
internal and external relations. The external relations are of paramount 
importance because of the highly open and vulnerable nature of these small 
developing economies.14 
This dissertation argues that the Caribbean’s growing relations with China 
and Japan since the beginning of the 2000s is integral to the Caribbean’s economic 
adjustment strategy as the region copes with the changes in the international 
economic system. Economic assistance represents the main foreign policy strategy 
employed by China and Japan towards Caribbean states and manifests itself in 
                                                          
12
UN General Assembly, GA/EF/3375, “New Approach needed to Address Vulnerabilities of 
Middle-Income Countries,” October 23, 2013, accessed December 5, 2013, 
http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2013/gaef3375.doc.htm. 
13
Ibid. 
14Richard Bernal, “The Caribbean in the International System: Outlook for the First Twenty Years of 
the 21st Century,” in Contending with Destiny: The Caribbean in the 21st Century, eds. Dennis Benn 
and Kenneth Hall (Kingston: Ian Randle Publishers, 2000), 311. 
6 
 
grants, loans and technical assistance. As a result of this, Caribbean states have 
begun the process of repositioning themselves in the changing international relations 
sphere by reorienting their foreign policy strategies towards strengthening and 
expanding their relationship with the Asia-Pacific region. 
China and Japan have stepped in to fill the void left by the shrinking of aid 
from the Caribbean’s traditional sources, providing them with assistance for 
infrastructural and other development projects. The second and third largest 
economies in the world have shown interest in the Caribbean, giving them much 
needed economic assistance, and in the case of China, seemingly without any strict 
conditionalities as those usually associated with help from international financial 
institutions. Caribbean heads of governments are therefore welcoming of this 
growing relationship and are being encouraged to maximize the opportunities to be 
gained. Economic survival has been the basis of Caribbean foreign policy over the 
years, and as such, provides a good explanation for the increasing economic and 
diplomatic activities between the Caribbean region and these Asian powers. 
Caribbean foreign policy has typically been focused on receiving 
concessions or economic preferences on account of their smallness and thus, 
highlights their dependence on outside assistance. Economic growth in the region 
has been slow over the last two decades averaging just 1.8 per cent in comparison to 
an annual growth rate of 3.5 per cent in the world economy.
15
 Moreover, the 
economic situation of Caribbean states is further exacerbated as many of them 
struggle with high levels of debt. The economic climate across the region is 
therefore quite unstable and in attempting to understand the reasons for trying to 
                                                          
15
Institute for the Integration of Latin America and the Caribbean IDB-Intal, CARICOM Report No.2, 
August 2005, accessed May 27, 2014, http://ctrc.sice.oas.org/trc/Articles/CARICOM_Report_2.pdf. 
7 
 
attract Chinese and Japanese aid and investments, the current economic situation 
facing Caribbean states must be taken into consideration. The Caribbean’s current 
economic situation is discussed further in Chapter 3. 
This dissertation examines the Caribbean’s relationships with China and 
Japan. China and Japan’s presence in the Caribbean has been steadily expanding 
since the beginning of the new millennium, with both countries publishing 
documents to formally highlight their commitment towards deepening the 
relationship with the Latin America and Caribbean region.16 This has manifested 
itself through their active engagement with the Caribbean especially with regards to 
the significant amount of economic assistance being rendered. China and Japan have 
been filling the vacuum left by the Caribbean’s traditional partners, providing them 
with the much needed assistance that they require due to their precarious economic 
situation.  
As mentioned previously, the Caribbean’s trading and economic relations 
have traditionally been with the US and the EU. However, Caribbean states have 
been attempting to diversify their trading relations with other players such as China 
and Japan (see Figure 1.1. and Figure 1.2.). It should be noted that the US and EU 
are still the Caribbean’s dominant trading partners but the point to be highlighted 
here is the diversification of trade partners, which therefore provides Caribbean 
states with access to new markets and choice of cheaper products. The value of 
imports from China and Japan in 2010 begins to increase relative to that of the EU.  
                                                          
16
 The Central People’s Government of the People’s Republic of China, “China’s Policy Paper on 
Latin America and the Caribbean (full text),” November 5, 2008, accessed November 20, 2010, 
http://english.gov.cn/official/2008-11/05/content_1140347.htm, see Appendix A; Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs, Japan, “A New Framework for Japan-CARICOM Cooperation for the Twenty-first Century,” 
November 8, 2000, accessed November 20, 2010, 
http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/latin/latin_e/caricom0011.html, See Appendix B. 
8 
 
Figure 1.1. CARICOM Imports from the US, EU, China and Japan, 2001-2012 
 
Source: Compiled by author based on data collected from CARICOM Regional 
Trading Information System, accessed June 27, 2014, 
http://www.caricomstats.info/tradsysonline. 
 
Figure 1.2. CARICOM Exports to the US, EU, China and Japan, 2001-2012 
            
Source: Compiled by author based on data collected from CARICOM Regional 
Trading Information System, accessed June 27, 2014, 
http://www.caricomstats.info/tradsysonline. 
 
The Caribbean’s engagement with China and Japan have and still continue to 
grow with an increase in the value of trade and development assistance and a 
widening of economic interaction in services and investments and an escalation of 
diplomatic relations. 
9 
 
1.2. Defining the Caribbean 
Definitions of the Caribbean are many and varied; based on geopolitics, 
history and culture, language and identity, organizations and geography. The notion 
of the Caribbean is “continuously being reinterpreted in response both to external 
influences and internal currents”.17 The most commonly used definition of the 
“Caribbean” is one based on geography which defines the region as the island chain 
in the Caribbean Sea.18  However, this definition does not include countries such as 
Guyana and Belize and consequently, does not prove useful for this research. The 
geographical definition has been expanded in reference to the Caribbean as a basin 
which includes not only countries lying in the Caribbean Sea but also those around 
it.19 The notion of a Caribbean Basin may be considered as geopolitical and 
hegemonic as the Caribbean Basin Initiative (CBI) was developed by the US Reagan 
administration.  This definition is not a practicable one for this research based on the 
fact that some of the countries included in the Caribbean Basin do not identify 
themselves as a part of the Caribbean.20 
A cultural definition of the Caribbean relates to “the indigenous Amerindian 
cultural roots and strong cultural ties with Europe, Africa and Asia” shared by these 
                                                          
17Norman Girvan, “Creating and Recreating the Caribbean,” in Contending with Destiny: The 
Caribbean in the 21
st
 Century, eds. Dennis Benn and Kenneth Hall, (Kingston: Ian Randle 
Publishers, 2000), 34.  
18
Ibid  
19
Ibid  
20
The Caribbean Basin refers to countries within and around the Caribbean Sea. This definition would 
therefore include countries such as Costa Rica, Honduras, Guatemala, Nicaragua, Panama which do 
not identify themselves as Caribbean and which have vast differences in the history and culture. This 
definition also excludes the three Guianas which identify themselves as a part of the Caribbean. The 
three Guianas are Guyana (former British colony), Suriname (former Dutch colony), and Guiana 
(former French colony). Despite being located in South America and washed by the Atlantic Ocean, 
they have often identified themselves as a part of the Caribbean. 
10 
 
countries.21 Girvan describes the Caribbean as an “ethno-historic zone which 
comprises the islands and the adjacent coastal communities in South and Central 
America sharing a similar history, culture and ethnicity”.22 These countries share a 
similar history based on the sugar and plantation system, the genocide of the pre-
Colombian population, slavery and indentureship. The drawbacks to a cultural 
definition, however, are that the boundaries of a cultural Caribbean cannot be easily 
demarcated and that it includes countries which have only a relatively small part of 
their perimeter being washed by the Caribbean Sea.23 
Payne and Sutton define the Caribbean as a region characterized by a 
combination of geography and history, closely linked to the US by geography, 
language and culture while still being tied to European history and sentiment.24 This 
definition is most practicable and will be used for this research to define the 
Caribbean as the islands in the Caribbean Sea as well as Guyana and Belize which 
share a similar political and economic history under British colonialism.25 
Based on this definition, for the purposes of the research, “Caribbean” or 
“Caribbean states” will be used in reference to the English-speaking countries.  
However, this research will focus only on sovereign countries within the region and 
therefore excludes the dependent colonies of the United Kingdom (UK) and US.26   
                                                          
21Byron Blake, “The Caribbean-Geography, Culture, History and Identity: Assets for Economic 
Integration and Development,” in Contending with Destiny: The Caribbean in the 21st Century, ed. 
Dennis Benn and Kenneth Hall, (Kingston: Ian Randle Publishers, 2000), 47.  
22
Girvan, “Creating & Recreating the Caribbean,” 31.  
23Girvan’s definition includes Puerto Limon of Costa Rica which is washed by the Caribbean Sea but 
does not include other areas of the country.   
24
Anthony Payne and Paul Sutton, Modern Caribbean Politics (London: Johns Hopkins University 
Press, 1993).  
25
Guyana and Belize have traditionally identified themselves as being a part of the Caribbean, despite 
being located in South and Central America respectively. 
26
Anguilla, British Virgin Islands, Cayman Islands, Montserrat, Turks and Caicos Islands are 
dependencies of the UK; while Puerto Rico and US Virgin Islands are dependencies of the US. 
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Therefore, the countries which will be examined are those which have a similar 
history, culture, political system, identity, and population size. These countries are 
also members of the regional organization representing the Caribbean Community 
(CARICOM) and the Organization of Eastern Caribbean States (OECS).27 Whenever 
the terms “Caribbean” and “Caribbean states” are used in this study, it is therefore 
only in reference to these English-speaking independent states (see Figure 1.3.) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
27
CARICOM comprises of fifteen members - Antigua and Barbuda, the Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, 
Dominica, Grenada, Guyana, Jamaica, St. Lucia, St. Kitts and Nevis, St. Vincent and the Grenadines, 
and Trinidad and Tobago; as well as Haiti and Suriname which will not be included in this analysis 
since they are not English-speaking countries. Montserrat will also be excluded since it is a 
dependency of the UK.  
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Figure 1.3.  Map of Caribbean States 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: Countries that are highlighted represent the group under study. They are referred to as 
“Caribbean states” or “the Caribbean” throughout the dissertation. 
 
For the purposes of this research, it is important to distinguish between Latin 
America and the Caribbean, as much of the existing literature on the foreign policy 
of Latin America and the Caribbean focuses mainly on Latin America, with often 
times just a passing mention of the Caribbean.28 Despite geographical proximity and 
the norm to label both areas as one region, as in the case of policy papers and 
academic discourse, there are in fact major differences between the two areas. The 
small developing economies of the Caribbean differ from those of Latin America in 
size or level of development or both. For example, Latin American economies are 
richer in natural resources than Caribbean countries (this is discussed in subsequent 
chapters) and as such, China and Japan’s resource-driven motivations towards Latin 
                                                          
28
For example, Latin America and Caribbean Foreign Policy, eds. Frank O. Mora and Jeanne A.K. 
Hey (NY: Rowman and Littlefield, 2003).  Of the 17 chapters, only one chapter addresses the 
Caribbean.  See Erisman, “CARICOM: The Pursuit of Economic Security”, in Latin America and 
Caribbean Foreign Policy, eds. Frank O. Mora and Jeanne A.K. Hey (NY: Rowman and Littlefield, 
2003). 
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American are much stronger than towards the Caribbean. It is therefore important to 
make a distinction between Latin America and the Caribbean, in order to yield a 
deeper analysis of those factors behind China and Japan’s interest in the Caribbean. 
In doing so, it is my hope that this research will contribute to the limited existing 
body of academic work on Caribbean foreign policy.  
Though this study focuses on the relationship Caribbean states share with 
China and Japan; Chapters 5 and 6 focus on the relationships of two countries in 
particular – Jamaica and Grenada- with the two Asian powers in detail. These were 
chosen mainly because one of the main objectives of this dissertation is to show that 
there are differences in the foreign policies that Caribbean states pursue towards 
China and Japan. These case studies show that the differences in their foreign policy 
strategies are related to the attributes possessed by each country. 
Another point to be highlighted is the fact that while Japan shares a 
relationship with CARICOM; China does not, as not all member states recognise the 
“One China” policy.29 Hence, in discussing relations with China, the terms 
“Caribbean” or “Caribbean states” are used instead. This is also related to a larger 
issue regarding the ineffectiveness of regionalisation in the Caribbean. Both issues 
are discussed later in subsequent chapters. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
29
Belize, St. Kitts and Nevis, St. Lucia, and St. Vincent and the Grenadines do not recognize the One 
China policy.   
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1.3. Overview of Caribbean Relations with China and Japan since the 2000s. 
China and Japan’s engagement with the Caribbean has been expanding since the 
2000s with an increase in the number of high-level visits from Caribbean 
governments to China and Japan and vice versa. In the case of China, Caribbean 
countries have been the recipients of loans provided at low rates of interest and 
prima facie without any conditionalities that have been the subject of much 
discontent in loans obtained from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) or World 
Bank. They have also been given numerous grants and technical assistance in areas 
of infrastructure. In the areas of education and culture, the governments of China 
and Japan offer scholarships at the tertiary level for study in China and Japan. 
Additionally, a number of individuals from the Caribbean trek to Asia-pacific region 
yearly as assistant language teachers (ALTS).30 
 
1.3.1 Present Day Caribbean - China Relations 
On November 5, 2008, China issued its first policy paper on Latin America 
and the Caribbean which, inter alia, reflected the importance of China-Caribbean 
relations. According to Yang Wanming, Director-General of the Department of 
Latin America and Caribbean Affairs of the Foreign Ministry, the policy paper was 
formulated with an aim to further clarify the goals of China's policy in this region 
                                                          
30
Japan Exchange and Teaching (JET) program is one such cultural exchange initiative.  Participating 
countries from the Caribbean include Antigua and Barbuda, Barbados, Jamaica, St. Lucia, St. 
Vincent and the Grenadines, and Trinidad and Tobago. In 2000, Jamaica was the first Caribbean 
country to begin participating in the programme and since then over 200 Jamaicans have been sent to 
Japan. See http://www.jetprogramme.org. 
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and outline guiding principles for future cooperation.31 The four main goals 
highlighted in the policy paper are  
1. to promote mutual respect and trust between China and the Latin American 
and the Caribbean region, based on the Five Principles of Peaceful Co-
existence and by strengthening dialogue and communication and enhancing 
mutual trust; 
2. to deepen cooperation and achieve win-win relations by becoming partners 
in economic cooperation and trade, among other things;  
3. to draw on each other’s strengths in order to boost common progress and 
intensify exchanges via cultural diplomacy and people-to-people 
exchanges; and 
4. to establish and develop state-to-state relations with all countries in the 
region based on the One China principle.
32
 
Similarly, the report produced from the National Congress of the Communist 
Party of China (CPC) held during the period of November 8-14, 2012, presented a 
congress-approved plan for “completing the building of a moderately prosperous 
society in all respects and accelerating socialist modernisation” stating that it is of 
great importance to China's on-going development.33  This report reiterates China’s 
proclamation of assisting other developing countries and purports that the principles 
                                                          
31
The Central People’s Government of the People’s Republic of China, “China’s Policy Paper on 
Latin America and the Caribbean,” November 5, 2008, accessed December 20, 2010,    
http://www.english.gov.cn/pfficial/2008-11/05/content_114-347.htm. See Appendix A. 
32The Central People’s Government of the People’s Republic of China, “China’s Policy Paper on 
Latin America and the Caribbean,” November 5, 2008, accessed December 20, 2010,    
http://www.english.gov.cn/pfficial/2008-11/05/content_114-347.htm. 
33Zheng Qingdian, “New Opportunity to Strengthen China-Jamaica Relations,” Jamaica Gleaner, 
January 2, 2013, accessed January 4, 2013,        
http://jamaica-gleaner.com/gleaner/20130102/cleisure/cleisure2.html/ 
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highlighted in the policy paper and from this report have “established a stable 
foundation for China, Latin American and Caribbean relationships”.34 
The China-Caribbean Economic and Trade Cooperation Forum was 
inaugurated in Jamaica in 2005, with the aim to enhance cooperation and common 
development between China and the Caribbean region. Its mission is to discuss how 
to promote China-Caribbean economic and trade exchanges and cooperation; and 
will be held every three to four years.  In addition, many practical cooperation 
programs and development projects have been executed over the last decade as well 
as there have been many exchanges of high level visits such as that of  Premier Wen 
Jiabao to the Caribbean region in June 2012.  
More recently in June 2013, President Xi Jinping visited Trinidad and 
Tobago35 on the first leg of his tour to the Latin America and Caribbean Region. 
During his visit to Trinidad, President Xi met and had bilateral talks with Caribbean 
heads of government from CARICOM countries that share diplomatic ties with 
China and not Taiwan. He announced that a US$3 billion concessionary facility 
would be given to eight Caribbean countries. Prime Minister Kamla Persad-
Bissessar of Trinidad and Tobago stressed that this concessional financing would be 
limited to those CARICOM members states that support the One China policy.36  
Caribbean leaders have openly expressed their recognition of the One China 
policy which plays an important role in China’s engagement with the Caribbean 
                                                          
34
Ibid 
35
According to Chinese officials, Trinidad and Tobago was selected because of its powerful 
economic status in the Caribbean region and for the traditional friendship shared. Trinidad and 
Tobago cast its vote in favour of restoring the seat of China in the UN. See “Foreign Minister Wang 
Yi on President Xi Jinping's State Visit to Trinidad and Tobago, Costa Rica and Mexico”, June 7, 
2013, accessed June 10, 2013, http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/topics/xjpttcrmux/t1049938.shtml. 
36
Prime Minister Kamla Bissesar-Persaud stated that the loan would be used for mostly for 
infrastructural development.  See Juhel Browne,” US $3b for region : No $$ for St Lucia, St Kitts, 3 
others”, Trinidad Express, June 3, 2013, accessed June 10, 2013, 
http://www.trinidadexpress.com/news/US-3b-for-region-209876301.html 
17 
 
region. This is discussed in Chapter 4 as one of the motivations behind China’s 
interest in Caribbean states. The One China policy rhetoric has been echoed in 
statements made by Caribbean leaders as in the case of Prime Minister Roosevelt 
Skerrit of Dominica, who has expressed that China’s constructive engagement 
signals to the Caribbean that China has been taking the region seriously, responding 
to the long-standing solidarity which they have expressed to China over an extended 
period of time, particularly with regards to the One China policy and also the 
peaceful reunification of the whole of China.37 
 China came to the assistance of Caribbean countries in 2007 by providing the 
necessary funds to build new stadiums.38  Caribbean states had been delegated to 
host the International Cricket Council (ICC) Cricket World Cup for the first time. 
However, most of the Caribbean countries sharing the hosting rights for the event 
did not have acceptable venues at that time, so it was necessary for them to build 
new stadiums and to refurbish old ones. This “stadium” diplomacy was integral in 
China’s quest to isolate Taiwan in the Caribbean, for example in the case of Grenada 
which will be discussed further in Chapter 6.  
China’s economic relations with the Caribbean are largely bilateral in nature 
due to the divide among CARICOM member states over diplomatic recognition of 
China. Initiatives such as the China-Caribbean Economic and Trade Cooperation 
forum may be considered as an attempt though limited at a regional approach.39 At 
                                                          
37
Prime Minister Roosevelt Skerritt in Jamaica Observer, “China offers US$3-billion concessionary 
facility to CARICOM,” June 04, 2013, accessed June 10, 2013, 
http://www.jamaicaobserver.com/news/China-offers-US-3-billion-concessionary-facility-to-
Caricom_14412491. 
38
China provided economic assistance for the building of stadiums in Antigua and Barbuda, Grenada 
and Jamaica.   
39
Relations are largely bilateral due to the fact that some CARICOM member states have diplomatic 
ties with Taiwan and not China. 
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this forum, China promised $1 billion in preferential loans for Caribbean economic 
development; US$1 billion from the China Development Bank for special 
commercial loans towards infrastructural development; a donation of $1 million to 
the CARICOM Development Fund; approximately 2,500 training opportunities and 
30 opportunities for studies for master's degrees in China; support and training for 
natural disaster mitigation and prevention and support for increasing and 
diversification of export.40  
China’s presence in the region is also visible in its membership in the 
region’s development bank - Caribbean Development Bank (CDB).  China has also 
provided support for the Confucius Institute at the University of the West Indies 
(UWI) at the Mona campus in Jamaica and is currently, constructing another in 
Trinidad and Tobago. The Chinese have granted assistance across the Caribbean for 
infrastructure and development programs such as the Palisadoes Shoreline 
Protection works and the Jamaica Development Infrastructure Programme in 
Jamaica; and the construction of Couva Children’s Hospital in Trinidad and 
Tobago.
41
According to Ambassador Qingdian, the 18
th
 CPC National Congress 
makes a clear signal of actively developing relations with Caribbean countries at this 
stage.42 
 
 
 
                                                          
40Annita Montoute, “Caribbean-China Economic Relations: What are the Implications?” Caribbean 
Journal of International Relations & Diplomacy 1, No. 1 (February 2013): 114, 
http://journals.sta.uwi.edu/iir/index.asp?action=fullTextPermaLink&articleId=344&galleyId=304. 
41
Jamaica Observer, “China Generous Despite Its Own Problems,” October 5, 2010, accessed 
November 20, 2010, https://www.jamaicaobserver.com/news/China-generous-despite-its-
own_problems_8016805. 
42Qingdian, “New Opportunity to Strengthen China-Jamaica Relations.”   
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1.3.2. Present Day CARICOM - Japan Relations 
Japan, like China, has shown similar commitment to the cooperation and 
development of its relationship with the Caribbean region; insofar as designating the 
year 2014 as “Japan-CARICOM year” to celebrate the 20th anniversary of Japan-
CARICOM consultations.43 Moreover, Prime Minister Abe visited Trinidad and 
Tobago in July 2014 during his tour of Latin America and the Caribbean. During his 
visit, the first Japan-CARICOM Summit Meeting was held with other Caribbean 
leaders.
44
 Abe’s visit to the Caribbean signals an important step in highlighting the 
importance of the region to Japan. 
In the year 2000, “A New Framework for Japan-CARICOM Cooperation for 
the Twenty-first Century” was adopted, which outlined a number of political, 
economic and social areas of collaboration, placing emphasis on cooperation   
1. for the economic and social development of CARICOM member states, 
2. for integration into the global economy; active economic interaction and 
exchanges between member states and Japan, and 
3.  in international fora such as the UN and the WTO45  
In 2004, during his visit to Latin America, Japan’s Prime Minister Junichiro 
Koizumi proposed a “Vision for a New Japan-Latin America and Caribbean 
Partnership (the Koizumi Vision)”, which called for the creation of new, future-
                                                          
43
It should be noted that Japan, unlike in the case of China, shares a relationship with all CARICOM 
member states. Hence, the framework speaks of Japan-CARICOM relations. Note the use of 
“CARICOM” referring to the regional organization of the Caribbean states as opposed to use of 
“Caribbean states”.  
44
MOFA, “Prime Minister Abe's Visit to Latin America and the Caribbean (July 25 - August 2, 
2014),” August 11, 2014, accessed November 28, 2014, 
http://www.mofa.go.jp/la_c/sa/page3e_000199.html. 
45MOFA, Japan, “A New Framework for Japan-CARICOM Cooperation for the Twenty-first 
Century,” November 8, 2000, accessed November 20, 2010, 
http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/latin/latin_e/caricom0011.html, see Appendix B. 
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oriented relationship between Japan and the countries of Latin America and the 
Caribbean.
46
 Additionally, it called for enhanced cooperation in tackling a variety of 
issues in the international community, including reform of the United Nations and 
the Security Council.
47
 This address marks a key moment in the reactivation of 
Japan’s foreign policy with Latin America, and the deepening of ties with Caribbean 
states. 
In keeping with the Japan-CARICOM framework, a “Partnership for Peace, 
Development and Prosperity between Japan and the Member States of the Caribbean 
Community (CARICOM)” document was prepared in September 2010, which is 
purported to give further direction to future Japan-CARICOM relations.
48
 
Additionally, the Japan-CARICOM Friendship Cooperation Fund was established to 
strengthen friendly and cooperative relations between Japan and the CARICOM 
countries. It is made up of a contribution from the Government of Japan’s fiscal 
budget as well as donations from the private sector.
49
 A scheme for the management 
and operation of the Fund was proposed to the CARICOM Secretariat, for which all 
CARICOM member countries were consulted, and the proposal was accepted in 
November 2001. Table 1.1. shows some of the projects in the areas of tourism, 
environment and energy that have been implemented by way of this fund.  
 
 
                                                          
46MOFA, Japan, “Address by Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi on the Latin American and 
Caribbean Policies - Toward a New Japan-Latin America and Caribbean Partnership,” September 15, 
2004, accessed February 20, 2014, http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/latin/pmv0409/adress.html. 
47
Official Wwebsite of the Prime Minister of Japan and His Cabinet, “The Second Day of Prime 
Minister's Visit to Brazil,” September 15, 2004, accessed February 20, 2014, 
http://japan.kantei.go.jp/koizumiphoto/2004/09/15brazil_e.html. 
48
MOFA, Japan, “The Second Japan-CARICOM Ministerial-level Conference,” September 2010, 
accessed December 20, 2010, http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/latin/caricom/mc_1009/index.html.   
49
The contribution from the 2001 fiscal budget amounted to US$100,000. 
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Table 1.1.   Projects implemented under the Japan-CARICOM Friendship  
         and Cooperation Fund 
Tourism 
- The Caribbean Music Fair  
- The Symposium on Caribbean History and Culture 
Environment 
- Caribbean Community Environmental Policy and Action Programme (2013) 
- Training in Coastal Zone Management and Environmental Monitoring of Industrial 
Waste in the Caribbean (2006) 
- Real-time Flood Forecasting for the Caribbean (2008) 
- Invitation Program on Environment and Climate Change 
Energy 
- Establishment of Regional Capacity and Expertise for addressing the Impacts of Future 
Climate Change on Energy Demand in CARICOM countries 
Capacity Building in the Area 
- Support for Participation of Caribbean Companies in FOODEX 
- Support for the Second Round Table on the Development of Small and Micro 
Enterprise 
- Post –Disaster Restoration for Farmers’ Seed Supply in Small Island Member Countries 
of the Caribbean Community  
Source: Information taken from handout prepared by the Caribbean Division, Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs, Japan 
 
Since 2001, under the Japan–CARICOM cooperation programme, Japan has 
contributed over US$500 million in technical assistance and Official Development 
Assistance (ODA).
50
  Moreover since 2012, some 55 regional projects in thematic 
areas of poverty reduction, disaster management, information technology, trade and 
investment promotion, development of small and medium enterprises, agriculture 
and fisheries, and tourism and culture have been implemented. Support was also 
given for the establishment of the Caribbean Court of Justice (CCJ) and the 
construction of the headquarters of the CARICOM Secretariat in Georgetown, 
Guyana.51 
                                                          
50
Caribbean Division, MOFA. Hand-out prepared on Japan-CARICOM Relationship. December 
2012.   
51
CARICOM Secretariat,  “Joint Communiqué issued at the Conclusion of the Eight CARICOM-
Japan Consultation, 4-5 March 2002, St. John’s, Antigua and Barbuda,” Press Release 38/2002, 
March 8, 2002, accessed November 20, 2010,   
http://www.caricom.org/jsp/pressreleases/pres38_02.jsp. 
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Under the Grassroots and Human Security Grants, Japan has, since 1995, 
provided US$3.9 million to over 63 local projects in Jamaica.
52
 In Trinidad and 
Tobago, under the same grant, US$87,076 was granted in March 2012 for the 
Project of Greenhouse Farming at primary and secondary schools.
53
 The Japan 
Exchange and Teaching Program (JET) continues to be an exceedingly popular 
program which many Caribbean citizens enrol and are sent to Japan for teaching 
assignments each year.  
The staging of the third Japan-CARICOM Ministerial-Level Conference 
with CARICOM member states in September 2013 reaffirms Japan’s commitment 
to deepen its relationship with the Caribbean region. This is discussed in greater 
detail in the following chapters. 
 
1.4. Research Questions 
There are four main research questions driving this dissertation which 
explores the reorientation of the foreign policy direction of the Caribbean from 
traditional partners in the western hemisphere towards partners in the Asia-Pacific 
region, and examines the Caribbean’s interest in increasing its engagement with 
China and Japan.  In Chapter 3, it is seen that the main priority of Caribbean states 
has been economic development and since they have been losing the special 
consideration they once had with Europe and the US, they have to find new ways of 
attracting aid and investments. Hence, the primary objective of their foreign policies 
                                                          
52Embassy of Japan in Jamaica. “Bilateral Relations – Japan’s Economic Assistance to Jamaica,” 
accessed  December 20, 2010,                        
http://www.jamaica.emb-japan.go.jp/en/bilateral/economicassistance.html . 
53
Embassy of Japan in Trinidad and Tobago. “Press Release: Japanese Government Assist in the 
Greenhouse Farming at Primary and Secondary Schools,” March 26, 2012, accessed December 20, 
2010, http://www.tt.emb-japan.go.jp/press%20release_29.03.12.htm. 
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towards China and Japan are rooted in economic survival.  Having acknowledged 
the reason behind their interest in diversifying their relations, the dissertation goes 
on to highlight that along with the perceived benefits of these relationships, are 
certain drawbacks such as an overwhelming trade surplus. The first research 
question is as follows: 
What are the opportunities and challenges for Caribbean states to deepen relations 
with China and Japan?  
This dissertation focuses on the foreign policy strategies of Caribbean states 
towards China and Japan, arguing that there is not one generic Caribbean foreign 
policy. Though they have a similar objective of achieving economic development 
and face similar predicaments due to their smallness, this dissertation proposes that 
there are in fact differences in their foreign policy strategies pursued toward China 
and Japan. Hence, the next research question enquires: 
To what extent do the attributes of Caribbean countries influence the different 
foreign policy strategies pursued towards China and Japan?  
The argument made centres on the resilience of small states and how in order to 
overcome their shared vulnerabilities; they have been using their positive features 
such as their resources as a foreign policy tool.  
Resource endowment here refers to those natural resources such as minerals, 
oil and natural gas, sun, sand and sea as well as land space which provides for 
economies based on tourist, agricultural and in the case of Trinidad and Tobago, 
manufacturing industries. Depending on the resources they possess, Caribbean 
countries devise their foreign policy strategies accordingly. For example, Chapter 5 
shows the case of Jamaica which has an economy focused on bauxite, tourism and 
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agricultural products such as coffee, and hence, its foreign policy towards China and 
Japan is geared towards utilising these resources. Those smaller Caribbean states in 
the Eastern Caribbean which do not possess natural resources, and have limited 
tourist and agricultural industries, have been using their value-based resources to 
craft ingenious foreign policy strategies.  Value-based resources is an argument 
proposed by Braveboy-Wagner who argues that Caribbean states use their normative 
power such as  their votes in international bodies and support in international fora.  
Chapter 3 discusses the use of value-based resources in more detail in 
discussion with arguments put forward by Palan and Prashad about the Caribbean’s 
use of sovereignty in exchange for economic assistance. Caribbean states have 
traditionally been seen by the international community as having a consistent record 
of democracy and are well respected in international organizations such as the 
United Nations (UN). Despite their small size, they have positioned themselves 
proactively in international organizations and as a result, this has allowed them to 
have some influence on relevant aspects of the global agenda. Chapter 6’s case 
studies of Grenada show how a small state without natural resources, creatively uses 
its value-based resources to craft its foreign policies with China and Japan. With 
regards to the One China policy, Grenada uses its recognition of China to capitalise 
on benefits to be had from the relationship; whereas, votes in international 
organizations such as the UN and International Whaling Commission (IWC) plays a 
key role in the relationship with Japan.  
Archibold’s article had hit the nail on the head, when he spoke about China 
(in particular) setting up shop in the US’ “backyard” and the red flags that it brought 
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up for many concerned with this interest with the Caribbean region.54 Although, this 
dissertation will not focus on the US security concerns, an investigation of these two 
Asian powers’ interest in the region will help to provide a better understanding of 
the nature of this relationship. The third research question is therefore: 
What are the primary motivations behind China and Japan’s interest in the 
Caribbean region?  
This dissertation argues that the motivations are based on economic 
development, political security and global status. With regards to economic 
development, both China and Japan are searching for access to markets for their 
exports as well as transportation routes, and for natural resources to secure. On a 
political level, China’s motivation may be to a greater extent than that of Japan’s in 
terms of the One China policy. China’s desire to isolate Taiwan in the Caribbean 
region is an important aspect of its foreign policy with Caribbean states and will be 
discussed later in subsequent chapters. In terms of global status, China and Japan 
have been trying to garner votes and support in international bodies and developing 
countries. As China continues to rise to power, Japan has been increasing its 
activities in a bid to stay relevant regionally and internationally. 
The final research question relates directly to the theoretical discussion of 
this dissertation which is: 
How can the Caribbean’s foreign policies towards China and Japan help to explain 
and develop the study of small states in international relations? 
In explaining their behaviour towards China and Japan, the aim of this dissertation is 
to build on the existing academic work on the study of small states by highlighting 
                                                          
54
Randall Archibold, “China Buys Inroads in the Caribbean, Catching U.S. Notice,” New York Times, 
April 7, 2012, accessed April 30, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/04/08/world/americas/us-
alert-as-chinas-cash-buys-inroads-in-caribbean.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0. 
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important aspects of small states and their foreign policy behaviour. This 
dissertation employs the level of analysis approach, which is discussed further in 
Chapter 2, to explain the foreign policy behaviour of Caribbean states and explores 
the interplay between the levels.  It proposes that all three levels of analysis – 
system, state and domestic - are important in explaining the Caribbean’s foreign 
policies towards China and Japan and in analyses of small state foreign policy 
behaviour on a whole.  
 
1.5.    Methodology 
While China and Japan’s economic and political interactions with the 
developing world have been attracting attention in the media, there still remains a 
limited output of information in academic discourse. In particular, their engagement 
with Caribbean states is a fairly new area of research and as such, there has been 
little scholarly work on this subject matter. In general, academic literature on 
Caribbean states is limited but growing. The literature that does exist with regards to 
China and Japan, discusses the relationship with Latin America and the Caribbean as 
a whole with only minor references to Caribbean states.
55
 As was mentioned 
previously, the relationship with Latin America is vastly different from that with the 
Caribbean. Hence, this dissertation intends to help fill the void on the subject matter 
of the Caribbean’s involvement with China and Japan in the new millennium and in 
                                                          
55
For literature on Caribbean- China relations, see Richard Bernal, Dragon in the Caribbean: China’s 
Global Re-Dimensioning Challenges and Opportunities for the Caribbean, (Kingston, Jamaica: Ian 
Randle Publishers, 2014). Bernal’s book is the first to provide a study exclusively on China’s 
relationship with the Caribbean.  R. Evan Ellis also includes the Caribbean in his study on China- 
Latin America relations; see R. Evan Ellis, China on the Ground in Latin America: Challenges for 
the Chinese and Impacts on the Region (NY: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014).   
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effect, contribute to the existing body of academic work on Caribbean foreign policy 
analysis. 
In examining the Caribbean’s engagement with China and Japan, a 
principally qualitative approach is employed by using case studies which entails the 
in-depth exploration of events, activities and processes.
56
 Case studies of two 
Caribbean countries – Jamaica and Grenada – and their engagement with China and 
Japan are presented. These two Caribbean countries were chosen because of their 
differences in attributes. Despite both countries facing similar economic and 
environmental vulnerabilities, Jamaica is rich in bauxite and has a larger land area 
for agriculture and tourism than Grenada. Grenada has been known for its use of 
value-based resources in exchange for economic gain in establishing offshore 
financial centres for example. Chapter 6 shows how the country creatively uses 
these value-based resources in it foreign policies towards China and Japan. Rowley 
argues that one of the main advantages of a case study is the “ability to undertake an 
investigation into a phenomenon in its context, it is not necessary to replicate the 
phenomenon in a laboratory or experimental setting in order to better understand the 
phenomenon”.57    
The methods of data collection used include the consultation of government 
documents, various newspaper articles and interviews with individuals close to the 
foreign policy decision-making process from previous and current government 
administrations. Interviews were conducted between September 20, 2012 and June 
27, 2013. It should be noted that due to the nature of this subject matter, the names 
                                                          
56
John W. Cresswell, Research Design: Qualitative. Quantitative and Mixed Methods Approaches, 
(Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications, 2003). 
57
Jennifer Rowley, “Using Case Studies in Research,” Management Research News 25, no. 1 (2002), 
18. 
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of interviewees will not be provided in this dissertation as the interviews conducted 
are confidential.
58
 
In order to explore China and Japan’s motivation to foster relations with the 
Caribbean, primary data detailing aid and loans received from these countries were 
analysed to determine general trends. With regards to Japan, data on its economic 
assistance to region was readily available and easily accessible from Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs (MOFA) ODA White Papers and Japan International Cooperation 
Agency (JICA) reports. However, with regards to China’s economic assistance, 
reliable primary data is limited. Secondary literature on the general foreign policies 
of China and Japan was also used in an attempt to better understand their foreign 
policy stance towards Caribbean states. These sources were limited to those written 
in English but this limitation, however, should not prove worrisome, as the aim of 
this dissertation is to provide a discussion and explanation of foreign policy 
behaviour from the Caribbean’s perspective. 
It should also be noted that the statements of interviewees were checked 
against newspaper articles reports and used available statistics and agreements to 
corroborate newspaper reports and interviewee statements. This process of 
triangulating the different data sources of information by examining evidence from 
the sources and using it to build a coherent justification was used to ensure the 
reliability and validity of the research findings.
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1.6. Structure of Dissertation 
Having introduced the research questions driving this research, the 
dissertation continues in Chapter 2 with a review of the existing literature of small 
states and small state foreign policy behaviour. This dissertation is grounded in the 
theoretical discussions on small states in the international system and as such, 
Chapter 2 presents previous academic work highlighting the features of small states 
and the foreign policy strategies of small states.  One of the aims of this research is 
to build on the existing literature on small state foreign policy behaviour by 
attempting to not only explain the foreign behaviour of Caribbean small states but to 
also highlight that there are differences in the foreign policies pursued by small 
states.   
Chapter 3 provides a trajectory of Caribbean foreign policy since the 1960s 
and highlights the behaviour of Caribbean states today in the changing international 
sphere. In exploring the history of the foreign policies of Caribbean states, Chapter 3 
highlights that the pursuit of economic development has always been the primary 
motivation behind their foreign policy strategies. Furthermore, as presented in the 
literature reviewed in Chapter 2, small states have argued that their economic 
survival is dependent on larger powers. In this current changing international 
relations sphere, Caribbean states are repositioning themselves and reorienting their 
foreign policies towards China and Japan, the newest providers of aid and 
investment to the region.   
Chapter 4 of this dissertation gives a brief overview of China and Japan’s 
general foreign policies towards developing countries. The similarities and 
differences between Chinese and Japanese foreign policy strategies are also 
30 
 
highlighted. It should be noted, that while this research is focused on Caribbean 
foreign policy, it is still necessary to explore the general foreign policies of these 
Asian powers with other developing countries in order to ascertain their interest in 
Caribbean states. The discussion presents the pursuit of economic development, 
political security and global status as factors behind their interest in these small 
states.  
The relationships Jamaica share with China and Jamaica are explored in the 
case studies presented in Chapter 5. The foreign policy behaviour of Jamaica since 
its independence is first highlighted in an effort to show the changes in the country’s 
foreign policy ideology and strategies. In the current international system, Jamaica 
has been using both its natural and value-based resources to gain the maximum 
benefits from its growing relationships with China and Japan.   
Chapter 6 similarly presents the relationships that Grenada has with China 
and Japan. These cases show that Grenada, because of its limited resource base, has 
been actively using its value-based resources to pursue its foreign policies with 
China and Japan. In the Chinese context, Grenada leverages its value-based 
resources for economic benefits as evidenced in its switching diplomatic recognition 
from China to Taiwan, and vice versa. In the Grenada-Japan relationship, Grenada 
creatively uses its value-based resources such as votes in international fora such as 
the International Whaling Commission.  
Chapter 7 reviews and summarises the main arguments of the dissertation 
and addresses how it contributes to the development of the literature on small state 
foreign policy behaviour. This chapter also highlights the fact that economic 
development is prime motivation for small state international relations and that they 
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pursue different foreign policies based on the attributes they possess. Moreover, it 
emphasises the role of the system, state and individual levels of analysis in 
explaining the Caribbean’s foreign policies towards China and Japan and thus, that 
the domestic level should be considered as an important factor in the foreign policy 
decision-making of Caribbean states. 
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CHAPTER 2  
Small State Foreign Policy Behaviour and  
Levels of Analysis Framework 
 
2.1.   Overview of Chapter 
Most of the earlier literature on small states is preoccupied with 
conceptualising ―smallness‖, though seemingly there is still no widely accepted 
definition of a small state. Despite the ambiguity in the definition of a small state, 
Caribbean states have unanimously and consistently identified themselves as 
―small‖. As such, their foreign policy strategies have been based on the inherent 
vulnerabilities that exist as a result of their smallness. This chapter reviews the 
literature on the study of small states and focuses especially on their foreign policy 
behaviour. Beginning with a presentation of the definitions and special features of a 
small state, the chapter continues with a discussion on the impact of ―smallness‖. In 
presenting the special characteristics of small states, some authors have argued that 
small size hampers their development while others have argued that despite their 
vulnerabilities, many small states have fared quite well.  
The literature relating to the foreign policies of small states is also reviewed 
with a discussion on the earlier works of Annette Baker-Fox, Maurice East, Peter 
Katzenstein and more recently, of Jeanne Hey and Jacqueline Braveboy-Wagner. 
These scholars have greatly contributed to the development of the scholarship on 
small states and specifically, their foreign policy behaviour. Braveboy-Wagner, in 
particular, is a pioneer and one of few scholars to discuss Caribbean foreign policy 
in general, and within the context of small states in international relations. 
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2.2. Definitions of a Small State 
A considerable amount of the existing literature on small states is primarily 
focused on the definition or conceptualisation of ―smallness‖. Authors have utilised 
a series of definitions which have included geographical size, population size, and a 
state‘s degree of influence in the international system. In spite of this, there is still 
no widely accepted definition of a small state. According to Crowards, definitions 
previously utilised have been based upon ―arbitrarily cut off values of selected 
criteria‖.1 
Most of the definitions used in the literature have been based on population 
size as authors like Streeten, opine that it is the ―best simple measure‖.2 However, 
there still seems to be no general agreement on what limits of population size can be 
used to identify a small state. According to Streeten, what is considered a small 
country today is much smaller than what was considered a small country ―a hundred 
years ago‖.3  Similarly, Crowards addresses this by positing that there has been an 
evolution of the definition of the population size of small states.  He purports that 
during the 1950s and 1960s, a state was considered small if it had a population of 
under 10 or 15 million, whereas, in the 1970s and 1980s, it was small if the 
population was under 5 million; and in the 1990s, if it was between 1 and 1.5 
million.4 
 
                                                          
1Tom Crowards, ―Defining the Category of "Small‖ States,‖ Journal of International Development 
14, no. 2 (March 2002), 143. 
2Paul Streeten, ―The Special Problems of Small Countries,‖ World Development 21, no.2 (1993), 197. 
3
Ibid, 197 
4Crowards, ―Defining the Category of 'Small' States,‖ 143. 
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The 1985 Vulnerability Report prepared by the Commonwealth Consultative 
Group on Small States, defines a small state as ―one with a population of around one 
million or less‖.5 This same defining criterion was used in the updated version of the 
report in 1997 but to include an upper limit of 1.5 million people. If we are to 
strictly adhere to this limit, then it would not be possible to include Jamaica in this 
category of small states, since its population exceeds this upper limit of 1.5 million 
(see Table 2.1). However, the report addresses this by stating that in addition to 
population size, the importance of region should also be taken into consideration. 
Hence, countries such as Jamaica in the Caribbean, Papua New Guinea in the South 
Pacific and Lesotho in Southern Africa, which have many physical and economic 
characteristics in common with all the other states in their region, should be included 
in the list of small states, despite their greater population size.6 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
5
Commonwealth Secretariat, A Future for Small States: Overcoming Vulnerability, (London: 
Commonwealth Secretariat, 1997), 9. 
6
Commonwealth Secretariat, Small States: Meeting Challenges in the Global Economy, Report of the 
Commonwealth Secretariat/ World Bank Joint Task Force on Small States, April 2000. 
http://www.cpahq.org/cpahq/cpadocs/meetingchallengeinglobaleconomyl.pdf 
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Table 2.1.  Demographic Statistics of Caribbean Small States, 2013 
 
Country 
 
Land  
(sq km) 
 
Population 
(inhab.) 
GDP per 
capita 
(current US$ 
mil) 
 
HDI 
Index* 
 
HDI 
Rank^ 
Antigua and 
Barbuda 
 
440 
 
89,069 
 
12,733 
 
0.760 
 
         High 
The Bahamas 10,010 371,960 21,908 0.794 High 
Barbados 430 283,221 21,908 0.825 Very High 
Belize 22,800 324,060 4,721 0.702  Medium 
Dominica 750 71,684 6,692 0.745 High 
Grenada 340 105,483 7,267 0.770      High 
Guyana 196,850 795,369 3,584 0.636  Medium 
Jamaica 10,830 2,712,100 5,440 0.730   High 
St.Kitts and 
Nevis 
260 53,584 14,314 0.745      High 
St. Lucia 610 180,870 6,848 0.725      High 
St. Vincent 
and 
Grenadines 
390 109,373 6,515 0.733 High 
Trinidad and 
Tobago 
5,130 1,337,439 17,437 0.760 High 
Source: Data collected from the World Bank Database, http://data.worldbank.org/ and
 UNDP Human Development Index Report, 2013,
 http://hdr.undp.org/sites/default/files/reports/14/hdr2013_en_complete.pdf. 
Note:   *HDI Index refers to the UNDP‘s Human Development Index which  measures  a
 country's development by combining indicators of life expectancy, educational
 attainment and income.        
^HDI classifications are relative—based on quartiles of HDI distribution across
 187 countries. Countries ranked 1-47 are denoted as ―very high‖, 48-94 as ―high‖,
 95-141 as ―medium‖ and 142-185 as ―low‖.  
 
 
Caribbean states are considered to be small states by any of these and other 
definitions employed. However, this research, as supported by Hey‘s proclamation, 
will not focus on proposing a definition of small states but will rather, direct 
attention to the foreign policy behaviour of small states.  Hey argues that no strict 
definition is necessary either to employ ―smallness‖ as an analytical device or to 
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collect findings about foreign policy behaviour from it.
7
 She instead adopts Vital‘s 
position that a concept is preferable to a definition when discussing small states.
8
  
This ―concept‖, Vital refers to as a loosely defined notion of small states that 
eschews rigid specifications.
9
 Moreover, Hey opines that her concept is one based 
on the idea of perceptions, that is, if the people and institutions of a country 
generally perceive themselves as small, then it shall be considered as small.
10
 This 
approach is considered to be more consistent with that of the early writings of 
Rothstein, who argued that ―a small power is a state which recognizes that it cannot 
obtain security primarily by use of its own capabilities and that it must rely 
fundamentally on the aid of others‖.11 
 
2.3. Features of Small States 
The Commonwealth Secretariat identifies remoteness and isolation, 
openness, susceptibility to natural disasters and environmental change, limited 
diversification, poverty, and limited capacity as the main features of small states.12 
Earlier writings on the features of small states include Maurice East‘s classification 
which consists of small land area, small total population, small total gross national 
product (GNP), and a low level of military capabilities.13  Percy Selwyn‘s list of 
                                                          
7
Jeanne A. K Hey, Small States in World Politics: Explaining Foreign Policy Behaviour (Boulder: 
Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2003), 3. 
8
Ibid. 
9David Vital, ―The Inequality of States: A Study of the Small Power in International Relations", in 
Small States in International Relations, eds. Christine Ingebritsen, Iver Neuman, Sieglinde Gstohl 
and Jessica Beyer, (Seattle, USA: University of Washington Press, 2006). 
10
Hey, Small States in World Politics. 
11
Robert L. Rothstein, Alliances and Small Powers, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1968). 
12
Commonwealth Secretariat , Small States: Meeting Challenges in the Global Economy. 
13Maurice A. East, ―Size and Foreign Policy Behaviour: A Test of Two Models,‖ World Politics 25, 
no. 04 (July 18, 1973). 
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features is broader than East‘s, as he puts forward seven attributes of small states. 
He positions that small states: 
1. are more dependent on  foreign trade that larger states; 
2. have a narrow range of resources, and hence, a specialised economy; 
3. are heavily dependent on one large foreign company;  
4. are dependent on external institutions;  
5. have a narrow range of local skills; 
6. have diseconomies of scale; and  
7. face difficulties in their import substitution industries. 14  
Streeten, similarly identifies the possession of a small land area, diseconomies of 
scale, and concentration of production in one or few areas as three main features of 
small states.
15
 These features are all characteristic of Caribbean states and as we will 
see in Chapter 3, may be considered as factors which contribute to the economic 
climate in the region. 
The concept of vulnerability is pervasive throughout the literature, and arose 
out of a study published by the Commonwealth Secretariat. The concept was later 
developed extensively by Lino Briguglio, who also published a vulnerability index.  
According to Brigulio, small states are more likely to be vulnerable to exogenous 
economic, political, strategic, as well as ecological, environmental and 
meteorological factors.
16
 This feature is often used by Caribbean states to lobby 
international support for special economic privileges to be given to countries with 
small economies.  
Briguglio has also argued that a small state that is also an island is expected 
to be even more vulnerable and disadvantaged as they are more susceptible to 
                                                          
14Percy Selwyn, ―Smallness and Islandness,‖ World Development 8 (1980).  
15Streeten, ―The Special Problems of Small Countries.‖ 
16
See Lino Briguglio, ―Small Island Developing States and Their Economic Vulnerabilities,‖ World 
Development 23, no. 9 (1995). 
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ecological problems.
17
 The discourse on Small Island Developing States (SIDS) was 
largely explored and advanced by the Commonwealth Secretariat and Briguglio. The 
discussion on SIDS is centred around their susceptibility to be affected by 
environmental factors.18 Selwyn, however, argues that the ―island‖ category in the 
small state discussion is not useful in the context of social analysis and policy.
19
 
As mentioned earlier, the literature on small states previously focused on and 
highlighted the negative features of small states. However, there has been a notable 
shift in the literature to include positive features as well. Payne and Sutton are 
among the scholars who have presented a more balanced list of features by adding 
―resilience‖ which is interesting because prior to this, features highlighted 
throughout the literature, were usually of a negative nature and have been attributed 
as important factors leading to the economic disadvantages faced by small states.20  
The literature thus far highlights that due to their small markets, small land 
area, limited natural resources, openness to international trade and susceptibility to 
ecological factors, small states are left environmentally and economically 
vulnerable. However, there are other scholars who argue that small states are not as 
disadvantaged as they perceive themselves to be and that in many cases, they have 
performed quite well.  
Easterly and Kraay provide empirical data arguing that despite the ―good 
theoretical reasons‖ regarding the limitations of small size, small states are not as 
                                                          
17
Ibid. 
18
Briguglio, ―Small Island Developing States and their Economic Vulnerabilities.‖ 
19
Selwyn, ―Smallness and Islandness.‖ 
20Anthony Payne and Paul K Sutton, ―Lilliput under Threat: The Security Problems of Small Island 
and Enclave Developing States,‖ Political Studies 41, no. 4 (December 1993).  
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disadvantaged as the literature posits.
21
 Easterly and Kraay argue that there is no 
significant difference in growth performance between large and small states.  They 
examined the per capita income level of 157 countries over a 10 year period and 
found that small states actually had the same range of per capita incomes with the 
other countries in the study.
22
 Similarly, Streeten found in his study on European 
small states, that there were many instances when they out-performed larger states.23 
Moreover, Easterly and Kraay‘s study showed that the life expectancy rate in 
small states was about four years higher than that in larger states.
24
 Thus, 
highlighting that small states had better human development indicators and as such, 
are not at a development disadvantage. This is seen across the Caribbean with 
regards to the ranking of Caribbean states on the UNDP‘s Human Development 
Index.
25
 As highlighted in Table 2.1., some small Caribbean states such as Barbados 
and Trinidad and Tobago have performed quite well. Therefore, discrediting earlier 
studies that presented small size does as inevitably resulting in poor economic 
performance.   
Armstrong and Read continue this line of argument, opining that small states 
have the ability and potential to gain economic prosperity.26 They argue that rather 
than focusing on conceptualizing small size or on the features of smallness, scholars 
should instead examine ―the extent to which small size affects fundamental 
                                                          
21William Easterly and Aart Kraay, ―Small States, Small Problems? Income, Growth, and Volatility 
in Small States,‖ World Development 28 no. 11 (2000). 
22
Ibid. 
23Streeten, ―The Special Problems of Small Countries.‖ 
24Easterly and Kraay, ―Small States, Small Problems?‖ 
25
The HDI ranks human development for 177 countries with the country ranked number 1 having the 
highest level of human development and the country ranked number 177 having the lowest level of 
human development.   
26
Harvey Armstrong and Robert Read, ―The Phantom of Liberty?: Economic Growth and the 
Vulnerability of Small States,‖ Journal of International Development 14 (2002). 
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economic ‗givens‘ and so constrain domestic economic activity in small states and 
adversely affects their growth performance.‖27 Armstrong and Read found that the 
most successful micro-states and autonomous regions were those that had a well-
developed financial sector, or were endowed with natural resources, or had a strong 
tourism sector.  
Armstrong and Read further examined the vulnerability of small states and 
found that vulnerability has a long term impact on their growth performance. 
However, they further explained that this was ―insignificant as a determinant of 
cross-section levels of income per capita.‖28 Like Armstrong and Read, Easterly and 
Kraay argue that the vulnerability feature does not affect the economic performance 
of small states in the short run and that there is no significant difference in growth 
performance between large and small states.  
Seemingly, the evidence by Easterly and Kraay and Armstrong and Read, 
does not support the theoretical claims that small states are by virtue of being small, 
or even small islands, at a long run disadvantage. Despite this, subsequent chapters 
will illustrate that actual small state foreign policies in the Caribbean still reflect the 
limitations and constraints posed by their smallness.  
Wint, in acknowledging the vulnerability of small states, also contends that 
for those small Caribbean countries that have demonstrated a relatively good 
economic performance, the significant factors have been the maintenance of 
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macro-economic, political and social stability, good infrastructure, and a high level 
of integration into the world economy.29 
Scholars have begun to include resourcefulness and resilience in the 
discussion regarding the special features of small states. Resilience, according to 
Brigulio, is defined as ―the ability to recover from or adjust to change‖.30 Brigulio 
asserted that the concept of resilience should replace vulnerability as the focus on 
analysis in the small state literature. However, Payne argues though that despite the 
ability of small states to perform well, the argument can still be made that the 
concept of vulnerability effectively describes the structural conditions of small 
states.
31
  He notes that small states have consistently practiced the ―diplomacy of 
wallowing in vulnerability‖.32 In subsequent Chapters, we will see that Caribbean 
states have also practiced this, arguing that the vulnerabilities associated with their 
small size warrant some special considerations so that they can be treated more 
fairly in the international system. 
Baldacchino, for example, argues that small states use their power of 
jurisdiction to advance their development cause.33 He argues that based on the 
statistics, small states have been characterised by relatively good socio-economic 
performance. In other words, despite being highly vulnerable, small states are able 
to design ingenious strategies to cope with their inherent vulnerability. As a result 
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Alvin Wint in Jessica Byron, ―Strategic Repositioning: Foreign Policy Shifts in Barbados and 
Trinidad and Tobago, 1990 - 2000.‖ Social and Economic Studies 56, no. 1/2 (2007). 
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Lino Briguglio, ―Economic Vulnerability and Resilience: Concepts and Measurements,‖ 
in Eliawony Kisanga and Sarah Jane Danchie, (eds) Commonwealth Small States: Issues and 
Prospects (London: ComSec & CPA, 2007): 105. 
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Timothy Shaw (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009). 
32
Ibid, 282. 
33Godfrey Baldacchino, ―The Contribution of Social Capital to Economic Growth: Lessons from 
Island Jurisdictions,‖ Round Table 94, no.378 (2005). 
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these countries have developed ‗economic resilience‘, defined as a state‘s ―ability 
to economically cope with or withstand its inherent vulnerability as a result of 
some deliberate policy‖.34 Briguglio also argues that small states have exhibited 
resilience given the numerous opportunities and challenges of globalisation. He 
affords considerable onus to the ―meshing of the operationalisation of resilience‖ 
and the means by which diplomacies are used.35 The case studies provided in 
Chapters 5 and 6 help to illustrate how despite the vulnerabilities of Caribbean 
states (discussed in the next chapter), they have managed to craft strategies to 
pursue foreign policies with China and Japan. Thus, highlighting their 
resourcefulness and resilience. 
The budding literature on the resilience of small states asserts that scholars 
should recognize the multiple natures of small states and the variations in their 
practices. One of the main objectives of this dissertation is to contribute to this 
lacuna in the literature and to show that there are variations in the foreign policies of 
small states which can be seen in those pursued by Caribbean states towards China 
and Japan.  The differences are determined by the attributes that Caribbean states 
possess. 
The earlier literature on small states is preoccupied with discussions on the 
definitions and features of small states. The rest of this chapter will review the 
literature focused on the foreign policy behaviour of small states. 
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2.4. Small State Foreign Policy Behaviour 
Fox‘s work on the diplomacy of small states in World War II was among the 
earliest writings to highlight the success of unique foreign policies of small 
European states.36 In it, she speaks about the general existing belief that the Great 
Powers are the ones who determine the course of world politics and that the small 
powers can only submit to their decisions. She argues, however, that there are other 
means apart from military strength that can be used to exercise influence. These 
include employing economic, ideological and diplomatic measures. Explaining that, 
both great and small states may instead ―consent with goods and services, win 
friends and influence people with psychological manoeuvres, bargain for the 
exchange of advantages, and gain strength through appropriate alliances‖.37 Fox 
highlights the granting of concessions for the exploitation of natural resources as one 
of the claims made by the Great Powers on smaller states.38 This bears a striking 
resemblance to the situation which exists in the Caribbean region, as in subsequent 
chapters, one of the arguments made is that Caribbean states use their resources to 
help gain economic assistance from China and Japan.   
Fox‘s discussion focuses on the alliances formed during the war, postulating 
that ―Sweden, Spain, Turkey, Switzerland, Eire and Portugal, all avoided being 
drawn into the war and emerged from it unwounded and, if anything, stronger than 
before‖.39 This successful alliance is deemed by Fox as their diplomatic prowess of 
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Annette Baker- Fox, ―The Power of Small States: Diplomacy in World War II,‖ in Small States in 
International Relations, eds. Christine Ingebritsen, Iver Neuman, Sieglinde Gstohl and Jessica Beyer 
(Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2006). 
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Ibid, 40. 
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small states and as such, illustrates the potential of small states and their unique 
foreign policies.  
The focus of East‘s study on ―Size and Foreign Policy Behaviour‖ is on the 
similarities and differences in the foreign policy behaviour of both small and large 
states.40  He examines the conventional model of small state behaviour based on the 
defining characteristics of small size and the projection of a rational decision-
making model into the situation facing small states.  Based on the characteristics of 
small states that he presents (highlighted previously), East postulates that small 
states, in comparison to large states, display the following patterns of foreign policy 
behaviour:  
1. Low levels of participation in world affairs. 
2.  High levels of activity in international governmental organizations. 
3. High levels of support for international legal norms. 
4. Avoidance to the use of force as a technique of statecraft. 
5. Avoidance of the behaviour and policies which tend to alienate the 
more powerful states in the system. 
6. A narrow functional and geographic range of concern in foreign 
policy activities. 
7. Frequent utilization of moral and normative positions on international 
issues.41 
He states that underlying these patterns, is a general assumption that small 
state behaviour is the result of the same general processes of decision-making that 
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are found in larger states.  East proposes an opposite assumption that there is a 
fundamental difference between the foreign policy decision making processes of 
small and large states and hypothesizes that there are likely to be some important 
differences between large and small states in the style and techniques used when 
processing and reacting to foreign policy issues. An alternative model is, as such, 
proposed by East. This model is based on a communications perspective which 
outlines that small states will act as they do precisely because of limitations on their 
organizational capacity and ability to monitor international affairs adequately.42 
East‘s ―Test of Two Models‖ demonstrates the importance of economic 
factors in the foreign policies of small states.43 He concludes that the involvement of 
economic bureaucracies and utilization of economic techniques of statecraft are 
more frequent in small state foreign policies than in those of larger states. According 
to East, economic considerations are a key component of the foreign policies of 
small states. Similarly, it is the aim of dissertation to show that economic motivators 
are pivotal for Caribbean states in their heightened pursuance of foreign policies 
with China and Japan.  
Katzenstein, like East, also discusses the economic adjustment strategies of 
small states and posits that small states with open and vulnerable economies do in 
fact, have the ability ―to respond effectively to changes in the global economy‖.44 In 
his analysis, he argues that during the oil shocks and economic downturn of the 
1970s and 1980s, small European states were able to adapt more than larger 
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industrial states.45 Katzenstein accounts for this by emphasizing the role of domestic 
factors; arguing that these states ―adapt domestically to economic change imposed 
by an international economy they cannot control‖.46 
The democratic corporatism of these small European states, according to 
Katzenstein, contributed to their ability to adjust to the economic conditions during 
that time.  Democratic corporatism, Katzenstein posits, is a mixture of ideological 
consensus, centralized politics, and complex bargaining among politicians, various 
interest groups, and bureaucracies.47 These components, he further argues, account 
for the high level of performance of these even during the international economic 
turmoil of the 1970s. The stable domestic environment of these states, he argues was 
in large part due to the continuous bargaining that took place between the various 
groups. Katzenstein‘s approach thus, emphasizes the importance of domestic 
political structures in explaining the adjustment strategies of these European states 
and as a result, may be used to help explain the behaviour of Caribbean small states. 
Though the political and economic structures of the Caribbean are different from 
that of the European small states, the general premise that political structures and 
economic structures determine adjustment strategies is generalizable and as such, 
may be applied to the Caribbean context.  
More recent scholars like Jeanne Hey argue that small states have a foreign 
policy that is, among other things, limited in scope, principled, non-conflictual and 
dependent on external powers.
48
  She builds on the literature on small state foreign 
                                                          
45
Ibid. 
46
Ibid.  
47
Ibid. 
48
Hey, Small States in World Politics. 
47 
 
policy behaviour, by adding a list of the commonly cited foreign policy attributes of 
small state behaviour, such as: 
1. Low levels of participation in world affairs; addresses a narrow scope 
of foreign policy issues. 
2. Limits behaviour to close geographical area.  
3. Employs diplomatic and economic foreign policy instruments, as 
opposed to military instruments.  
4. Emphasizes internationalist principles, international law, and other 
―morally minded‖ ideals. 
5. Chooses neutral positions; relies on superpowers for protection, 
partnerships and resources. 
6. Aims to cooperate and avoid conflict with others. 
7. Spends a disproportionate amount of foreign policy resources on 
ensuring physical and political security. 
 
Jacqueline Braveboy-Wagner, a pioneering researcher in the foreign policies 
of Caribbean states, examines how these small states have managed to employ their 
foreign policies to overcome their vulnerabilities.
49
 She argues that Caribbean states 
have also found that along with their vulnerabilities, they also possess positive 
features, and that they have the ability to contribute at the regional and international 
level. Braveboy-Wagner posits that their foreign policy is derived from the 
perception of these vulnerabilities and attributes, and focused on finding ways of 
overcoming these vulnerabilities while taking advantage of the positive attributes.  
She argues that the leadership variable plays an integral role in devising and 
executing these strategies.
50
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According to Braveboy-Wagner, while small states do share similar features 
and vulnerabilities, there is ―no blanket prescription‖ for small states in crafting their 
foreign policies, arguing that this is so because they are devised to suit domestic 
priorities.
51
 This dissertation proposes that this is the case in the foreign policies of 
Caribbean states towards China and Japan. At the helm of their foreign policies, are 
national priorities such as the objective of achieving economic development. The 
literature on small states thus far has tended to put small states in one category 
practicing one generic foreign policy. However, as prompted in Braveboy-Wagner‘s 
assertion, there are differences in how foreign policy is devised among the states. As 
such, this dissertation aims to fill the gap in the literature by arguing that while there 
are commonalities in the issues facing Caribbean states, there are also differences in 
the foreign policies pursued towards China and Japan.   
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2.5. Theoretical Framework: Levels of Analysis 
This dissertation is a study about the foreign policy behaviour of Caribbean 
states within the context of small states in the international system. It argues that 
despite their inherent vulnerabilities due to their small size, they have shown 
resilience in devising their foreign policies so as to adapt to the challenges posed by 
globalisation and trade liberalisation. 
The study of foreign policy is driven, according to Breuning, by the quest to 
understand why leaders make the choices they do, and also how and why domestic 
and international constraints and opportunities affect these choices.
52
 Hence, in 
analysing the foreign policies of Caribbean states towards China and Japan, I have 
chosen the levels of analysis approach to do so. In order to understand and further 
explain the foreign policy behaviour of these Caribbean states under study, it is 
necessary to consider the role of the problems and opportunities existing in the 
international environment as well as their effect on the domestic environment, the 
role of political institutions and the personality and perception of leaders.  
This approach is seemingly the most practicable in providing answers to the 
research questions driving this study. There are generally three broad levels of 
analysis identified in the foreign policy literature for considering the foreign policy 
process and these will be used in this dissertation. These are the systemic level 
which considers the impact of international factors upon state behaviour; the 
domestic or state level which looks at factors within the national polity and 
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economy; and the individual level which considers the perceptions and personalities 
of leaders and decision-makers.53 
The levels of analysis framework has been gaining prominence and 
credibility in studies of small state foreign policy as traditional theories of 
international relations have fallen short in accounting for the behaviour of these 
small states. Theories have typically been preoccupied with state behaviour and 
argued that their foreign policy behaviour was ―exclusively‖ in response to external 
stimuli.54 However, after the end of World War II, studies began to emphasise that 
other events and factors have to be considered and as such, as was the tendency 
before, domestic variables should not be ignored.55  Instead, foreign policy analysts 
contend that foreign policy behaviour is shaped by internal and external factors and 
as such the study of foreign policy connects the study of international relations with 
the study of domestic politics. Critiques of foreign policy research have argued that 
studies tend to overlook the developing or third world in particular, and that they 
rely on theoretical models which are not usually applicable to underdeveloped or 
developing regions.  
 The levels of analysis approach was first introduced by Kenneth Waltz in his 
study of the causes of war, in which he located the causes at three different levels of 
analysis – the system, state and individual. Singer, in discussing the levels of 
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analysis problem, makes the argument that the system level and the state level are 
the two possible levels of analysis in international relations.56 
 James Rosenau‘s work, similarly, argues that factors at various levels of 
analysis can influence the foreign policy making process and subsequent external 
behaviour. He argued that explanatory factors of foreign policy behaviour were 
based on the size, level of development and political system of a state and presented 
five levels of analysis - system, role, government, society and individual.57 
Rosenau‘s conceptual work has been a starting point for scholars in examining small 
state foreign policy behaviour.  
 Hey adopts Roseanu‘s framework and combines role, government and 
society as the state level to provide the system, state and individual levels. The 
system level of analysis studies macro or international variables such as the structure 
of the international system, interstate conflict, role of international governmental and 
non-governmental actors and dominant values of norms of the international system 
to distinguish the key determining factors shaping foreign policy.58 The state level, 
looks at the role of domestic political institutions, such as legislatures, political 
parties, and civil society organizations and examines them to discern the impact of 
state or societal institutions in the formulation of foreign policy; whereas, the 
individual level of analysis focuses on the importance or weight of the personality of 
individual leaders in foreign policy as well as political culture.59 
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Hey argues that analyses of small state foreign policy have typically placed 
the usual explanatory variable at systems level; arguing that small states are even 
more constrained by the international system due primarily to their lack of 
diplomatic, military or economic resources.60 As a result of this, they find 
themselves in a position whereby they are unable to dictate the rules of the 
international game.61 Fox similarly points out the influence of the international 
system, positing that small states have to submit to the decisions made by larger 
states.62  
In later studies, however, scholars began to find that it was simply 
insufficient to explain the behaviour of small states as solely a consequence of 
events in the international system. As academic discourse on small states developed, 
scholars moved away from the tendency to associate smallness with weakness and in 
the case of Armstrong and Read, for example, started to argue that small states do 
have the ability to perform.
63
 Similarly, Katzenstein argues that small states have the 
ability to adapt to changes in the international system and that domestic political 
structures may be considered as an important variable to explain this behaviour.
64
 
Therefore, making the case that is it is necessary to consider other explanatory 
factors along with systemic ones. Braveboy-Wagner argues that in analysing 
Caribbean foreign policy, domestic economic policies are key as they have tended to 
reflect changes elsewhere in the international system.65 
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The individual level of analysis has also been used an explanation for the 
foreign policies of individual countries.66 Foreign policy decisions, in these cases, 
are attributed to the leader that is in power at any particular time. In explaining 
Caribbean foreign policy behaviour, scholars have tended to use the individual level 
of analysis. This is because of the important role played by the leader in decision-
making. Chapter 3 highlights the importance of the leader in Caribbean‘s political 
and economic history. Braveboy-Wagner, in analysing the foreign policy behaviour 
of small states, ranks systemic and individual variables as being more influential 
than domestic variables.
67
  
Development and economic security goals are an important state-level 
variable for Latin American and Caribbean foreign policies.68 Erisman points out an 
additional variable in the specific case of Commonwealth Caribbean states, arguing 
that to the domestic level of analysis must be added the intermestic factor of 
multilateral foreign policy formulation and implementation within the CARICOM 
framework. 69 
While previous studies have ranked the system and individual level of 
analysis as more important in explaining the foreign policies of small states, some 
have argued that the state level has gained significance.
70
 Braveboy-Wagner argues 
that ―foreign policy analysis really begins with the domestic level since foreign 
policy is a tool to achieve domestic interests‖.71 This dissertation in employing the 
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levels of analysis approach to explain the foreign policy behaviour of Caribbean 
states towards China and Japan, proposes that all three levels are important and 
moreover, there is interplay among them.  
 
 
Figure 2.1.  Levels of Analysis Framework used to explain Caribbean 
Foreign Policy Behaviour 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Levels of Analysis
System
explores bilateral (state-to-
state) relations, regional issues
and interactions, and global 
issues and multilateral 
interactions between
states. 
State or Domestic
examines those societal
and governmental factors that 
contribute to the making of 
foreign
policy in a particular state
Individual 
focuses on individual decision 
makers, how they
make decisions, what 
perceptions and 
misperceptions they hold, the 
ways key decision makers 
interact in small, top-level 
groups, and so on
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The system level is used to explain how the international system poses 
constraints on, and further influences the behaviour of Caribbean states. Chapter 3 
shows that changes in the international system have had direct effects on the 
economies of all the Caribbean states. While the state level is used to explain the 
influence of the existing economic conditions and the political system of Caribbean 
states on foreign policy decision-making. The individual level of analysis explains 
the important role played by Caribbean leaders.   
The discourse on small states in the international system is still developing 
with gaps in the discussion relating to their foreign policy behaviour. One of the 
objectives of this research is to contribute to the literature by highlighting that there 
are differences in the foreign policy strategies pursued by small states and that the 
role of the system, state and individual are important in explaining their foreign 
policy behaviour. In analysing and understanding Caribbean foreign policy 
behaviour towards China and Japan, we cannot, as was the previous tendency, look 
solely at the system level for explanations. Instead, it is necessary to consider the 
role of the state and individual and the interplay among all three levels.  
In addition, the research will reiterate East‘s premise that one key component 
of small state foreign policy is economic development and that the same may be true 
for Caribbean states. Despite constraints posed by the international system on the 
actions of Caribbean states, the main goal of their foreign policy is to achieve higher 
levels of economic development. The next chapter gives an insight into the foreign 
policy history of Caribbean states since their independence as well as their political 
system. This is done in an effort to show how the domestic economic and political 
conditions of a state influences the foreign policies pursued. It also highlights how 
56 
 
the international system has in effect caused the constraints facing Caribbean states, 
placing them in an unstable economic situation and also how their political system 
has facilitated the important role of the leader in foreign policy decision- making.  
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CHAPTER 3 
Caribbean States in Changing International Relations 
 
3.1. Overview of Chapter 
Analyses of Caribbean foreign policy have placed external factors as well as 
internal economic and political weaknesses at the centre.
1
 This chapter shows that 
throughout their economic and political history, Caribbean states have used their 
status as small states as a basis for the region‟s dependence on external powers. 
Their economic survival has always linked to great powers in terms of trade, direct 
foreign investment, technology, and aid. Caribbean states share a history of 
colonisation and as such, even after decolonization, the UK remained a dominant 
power.   
The structure of Caribbean economies in the 1960s is reminiscent of their 
history of colonisation as the Caribbean was, at that time, set-up as a supply of raw 
materials such as sugar to the „mother country‟, Britain. Following their 
decolonization, several new states emerged and were eager to be noticed and heard 
in the international community. These newly independent small states argued that 
they had been in a disadvantaged position because of the prolonged system of 
dependence on Britain and moreover, due to their small size could not keep up with 
the international economic system. Later on due mainly to geographical proximity 
and the Cold War, the US eventually surpassed Britain as the major power in the 
region.   
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In the post-Cold War era, the emphasis shifted to the US solely, but since the 
beginning of the 2000s, new players such as China and Japan have emerged in the 
Caribbean arena.  Due to the physical distance between the Asia-Pacific region and 
the Caribbean region, the increased engagement of China and Japan has generated 
much attention. However, this discussion argues that the Caribbean‟s economic 
survival has always been dependent on larger states and in this new international 
relations sphere, it still continues to be at the helm of their foreign policy.  
This chapter ties in the previous discussion on small states, arguing that 
Caribbean states rely on external players to enhance their foreign policy and as a 
result, their economic development. China and Japan are the current players that 
Caribbean states have been associating with as they continue to opine that because 
of their small size they are dependent on larger powers for economic survival. Payne 
argues that this “diplomacy of wallowing in vulnerability” has been a consistent 
basis for the foreign policies pursued by Caribbean states throughout their history.
2
 
This chapter gives an overview of the foreign policies of Caribbean states 
since their independence and shows that despite changes in foreign policies and 
ideologies, the focus has always been to achieve economic development. It also 
highlights how the political system plays an integral role in the Caribbean‟s foreign 
policy behaviour. Thus, placing emphasis on furthering domestic interests through 
their foreign policies.  
The chapter concludes with a theoretical discussion about the Caribbean´s 
use of unorthodox strategies for economic attainment, such as sales of flags of 
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convenience3, economic citizenship and establishment of offshore financial centres 
and tax havens. This dissertation argues that in a similar manner, Caribbean states 
have been using their value-based resources such as their votes and quality advocacy 
in international fora to pursue foreign policies toward China and Japan.  
 
3.2. The Foreign Policies of Caribbean States since the 1960s 
 
The Caribbean, throughout its foreign policy history has been strongly 
influenced by great powers. According to Braveboy-Wagner, since colonialism, “the 
region has been buffeted by powerful external economic and political forces”.4 The 
importance of these powers is depicted in the political system, the economic 
structure and the foreign policy objectives of Caribbean states. However, as outlined 
previously in Chapter 1, the historical geostrategic and economic significance of the 
region has given way to its marginalization in affairs with Western powers. 
Caribbean states have therefore been expanding their regional and global 
collaborative strategies in order to effectively address the challenges to their 
economic development. In order to understand the Caribbean‟s relations with China 
and Japan in the new millennium, it is therefore important to briefly discuss both the 
Caribbean‟s economic and political history.                                                                                                                                                           
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During the early 1960s, Britain‟s status in the Caribbean region had begun to 
decline as US influence began to increase. Caribbean states having recently gained 
their independence and being cognizant of the fact that the US was becoming the 
hegemon in the region, ensured that they declared their alignment with “the West”. 
This was against the backdrop of the ongoing power struggle of the Cold War 
between the “East” and “West”.  The events in Cuba had caused paranoia across the 
region and generated a need for Caribbean states to clearly define where they stood. 
The prevailing ideology during this time was supported by Jamaica‟s Prime Minister 
Alexander Bustamante‟s famous declaration “We‟re with the West” in 1962.5  This 
was a necessary move by Jamaica and other Caribbean states to show their support 
at the helm of the Cold War and to reassure not only its citizens but also the US 
government where they stood.  This highlights the extent to which the international 
system has influenced the foreign policies of Caribbean states since its formulative 
years.  
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3.2.1. Non-Alignment and Third World Activism  
The decade of 1970 marked a notable period in the overall economic and 
political history of Caribbean states. It is during this period that these newly 
independent states attempted to shape their own foreign policy which espoused 
solidarity with developing countries and a rejection of interference by industrialized 
countries. Third World and nonaligned ideas and concerns permeated the 
Caribbean‟s foreign policy during this period, whereby Caribbean nations took a 
leading role in the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), Group-77 and advocacy for a 
New International Economic Order (NIEO).  
The NAM was formed in 1961 and was aimed at promoting the principles of 
self-determination and sovereignty of third world countries.
6
 Caribbean political 
leaders such as Michael Manley of Jamaica, Eric Williams of Trinidad and Tobago, 
Forbes Burnham and Cheddi Jagan of Guyana had a “strong sense of a Caribbean 
destiny and argued their right to shape their own foreign policy”.7 Caribbean leaders, 
after a long period of interventions from Western powers, became intrigued by the 
activism of the developing world. Despite the size of their countries, these leaders 
commanded great respect in the NAM and the wider developing world because of 
their strong representation in these fora.  
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In 1972, the Non-Aligned Meeting of Foreign Ministers was held in Guyana, 
thus highlighting Guyana‟s active and leading role in the movement.8 Guyana‟s 
membership in the NAM was primarily motivated by the desire to be economically 
and politically independent, and to develop a common economic strategy with other 
developing countries. According to Forbes Burnham,   
Our central philosophy of self-reliance and our dedication to self-reliance… 
largely inspires our membership in the Non-Aligned Movement… 
we aim at owning, controlling and developing our resources for our own 
benefit.
9
 
After hosting the Foreign Ministers‟ Meeting, Guyana assumed an even more high-
profile in the NAM when it was appointed to serve as the principal coordinator 
country in the critical areas of trade, transportation and industry.
10
 It is in this regard 
that Guyana emerged as a leading advocate not only in NAM but in the wider Third 
World Movement. 
In 1973, Caribbean leaders led the call for a New International Economic 
Order (NIEO) which would transform the structure of international economic 
relations in such a way that economically disadvantaged states could get a fairer deal 
in the international system.11 The role of CARICOM countries in the negotiations on 
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the NIEO represents an interesting example of the capacity of small developing 
states to influence and shape international politics and to make a contribution to the 
dialogue on change in the international system. Michael Manley‟s leadership in 
promoting this radical international proposal was particularly outstanding and would 
help to solidify his stature as an international statesman. Manley was unequivocal in 
his lobby for the NIEO, arguing that  
the fact of the matter is that the Third World has come to freedom and 
discovered that it is a rich man‟s world. It has discovered that its newly 
acquired independence is subject not only to the constraints that are imposed 
by deficiencies in its own development but also by other, and equally 
inhibiting, factors that inhere in the world system itself… 
The NIEO is at once the battlecry, the set of concepts and, latterly, the 
specifics of the alternative which we propose.
12
 
 
 
The leadership of Manley and his counterparts on the international stage 
reflects the importance of the leadership variable in Caribbean foreign policy. 
Domestic sources such as the role of the leader are important in understanding the 
foreign policy of Caribbean small states. Later on in the chapter, it is shown how the 
state and individual levels of analysis interplay – as the influence of the leader is 
derived from the power afforded by the existing political system and political culture 
in the Caribbean. 
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3.2.2. Preferential Treatment: Lomé Conventions  
Despite their strong calls for Third World solidarity and changes in the 
economic system during this time period, Caribbean states simultaneously continued 
to argue that they needed development assistance and increased access to the 
markets of developed countries on preferential terms. They teamed their efforts with 
other African and Pacific countries in the African-Pacific-Caribbean (ACP) 
grouping to successfully negotiate and enter a series of development arrangements 
with the EU. The Lomé Conventions were essentially comprised of a succession of 
agreements which covered aid and trade on the basis on non-reciprocity.
13
  
The Lomé Conventions were borne out of Britain‟s decision to join the 
European Community. Its former colonies had feared that this move would endanger 
the special access that they had to British markets. Consequently, in 1972 when the 
opportunity to establish an institutionalised association with the entire EC rather 
than just Britain, these states formed the Africa, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) 
group.
14
 The Lomé Conventions were designed to facilitate preferential European 
market access by exports from ACP state. In essence, they were development 
cooperation agreements covering trade, aid and political dialogue and gave ACP 
countries market access to EC countries in a one way free trade area.
15
  
Development aid from the Lomé Conventions was distributed through the 
European Development Fund (EDF), and investment assistance through the 
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European Investment Bank.
16
 The Conventions also had the Stabex and Symin 
provisions which gave compensatory finance to ACP countries for fluctuations in 
the world prices of key agricultural and mineral exports.  
The first Lomé Convention, Lomé I was signed in 1975 and allowed most 
agricultural goods from ACP countries to enter the EC market free of duty. 
However, those goods that would compete with European goods would be given 
preferential treatment such as access based on a quota system and lower tariff rates 
than those levied on goods from non-ACP countries.
17
 
The Lomé Conventions were renewed three times and each time, the number 
of ACP countries expanded and their benefits increased. Lomé II was in effect from 
January 1981 to February 1985 and reflected an increase in aid and investments. 
Lomé III was signed in 1984 and it shifted some focus from industrial development 
to the development of industries that would prove to be self-sufficient. Lomé IV was 
signed in December 1989 with its trade provisions covering a 10-year period.  
Caribbean states played an active role in the negotiations of the Lomé 
Conventions which highlighted the important leadership role played by Caribbean 
leaders in the international arena. The Lomé Conventions may be considered as a 
successful attempt at that time by Caribbean states in their pursuit of economic 
development and security.  
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3.2.3. Regional Integration 
Caribbean states have recognized the need for regional integration and its 
importance due to their status as small states.  The first attempt at integration was 
seen in 1958 by the creation of the West Indies Federation to facilitate the transition 
to independence for a number of British colonies. Federation was, however, short 
lived and failed in 1961 when Jamaica opted not to become a part of the movement. 
After the results of referendum held on September 19, 1961, Jamaica voted to 
refrain from any form of Caribbean Federation.
18
 One reason for this was the view 
held by Jamaicans that the country‟s progress would be hindered by the smaller and 
poorer countries in the region. Following Jamaica‟s decision to refrain, Trinidad and 
Tobago also followed suit. The failure of Federation is marked by Trinidad‟s Prime 
Minster, Dr. Eric Williams‟ who made the proclamation that “ten minus one equals 
zero”, thereby signalling Trinidad‟s withdrawal from, and the effective end of, the 
federation.
19
 The sentiment behind the statement was that if Jamaica which was at 
that time, the most developed and of the ten Caribbean was withdrawing, then it was 
highly unlikely that a federation would succeed. Williams felt that Trinidad had the 
resources to stand on its own, and if all the islands were not committed to 
regionalism, there was no need for Trinidad to sacrifice its sovereignty.20 The 
demise of Federation set the pace of regional integration in the Caribbean as Randall 
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opines that “the failure of Federation was an early indication of the obstacles to 
political change that might address historical inequities in the Caribbean”.21  
After the collapse of the West Indies Federation, activities for regional 
integration were placed on the bottom of the agenda for a period of time.  This 
period witnessed the “very tentative beginnings of a process of rebuilding the 
regional community in a less formal and structured manner”.22 On December 15, 
1965, an agreement to establish the Caribbean Free Trade Area (CARIFTA) was 
signed.
23
 The free trade area was chosen by member countries as this would 
eliminate allow them tariffs and quota systems on their imports.
24
  
The Caribbean Community (CARICOM) was established in 1973 primarily 
under the Treaty of Chaguaramas. This move was borne out of Caribbean states 
desire to deepen the attempt at integration in CARIFTA. CARICOM was therefore 
established as a regional cooperation and integration organization serving mainly the 
English-speaking Caribbean states. CARICOM widened the remit of regional 
cooperation to embrace three goals which were:  
1. the establishment of a common market 
2. the coordination of foreign policies, in order to strengthen their 
position in the international system, and 
3. combining limited resources through functional cooperation in areas 
such as health, education, environment.
25
 
 
CARIFTA had been created primarily as a means of “economic salvation” 
according to Payne, as Caribbean governments were became concerned about the 
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region‟s lack of economic development.26 Moreover, Britain‟s entry into the EEC 
caused anxiety about the future prospects for their exports which had been enjoying 
duty-free access to the British market. They feared the loss of this access when 
Britain gained membership, it would eliminate the preferential treatment they were 
being given and as such, decided that it was better to work together to lobby for 
lobby for maintaining these preferences. 
The attempts at regional integration in the Caribbean have not been as 
successful as expected. While CARICOM is functional, the institution‟s efficacy in 
establishing a common market is unsatisfactory and still remains to be done. The 
national interests of member states still trump those that would benefit the region as 
whole. Payne contends that CARICOM is simply “a structure created by national 
governments to make nationalist policies more effective by pursuing them within a 
regional framework”.27 Obstacles faced during the creation of Federation still seem 
applicable in strengthening CARICOM as there is a weak sense of regional identity 
among the states. However, for these small states, the strengthening of CARICOM 
is imperative in enhancing the Caribbean‟s foreign policy with China and Japan on a 
whole. 
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3.2.4. US Influence in the Caribbean during the 1980s  
The Caribbean‟s importance to the US continued through to the 1980s. The 
political climate within the Caribbean had, however, changed somewhat as a result 
of the end of the socialist experiment in Jamaica. Manley‟s regime had dire 
consequences on the Jamaican economy as a result of a decline in tourism and 
foreign investments. Grenada‟s socialist regime was, however, still growing with a 
strengthening of military and economic ties with Cuba and other socialist countries. 
When the opportunity arose in 1983, the US launched a military intervention in 
Grenada in order to contain the spread of communism throughout the region and to 
“restore democracy”.28  
Caribbean states realised the benefits of the ideological rivalry between the 
US and the Soviet bloc during this period and as such, made sure to declare their 
allegiance with the US. In doing so, they also saw the opportunity to deepen their 
trade relations with the US and actively lobbied for a preferential trade agreement. 
In 1981, the CBI was enacted through the Caribbean Basin Economic Recovery Act 
(CBERA) and provided preferential treatment for Caribbean products to the US 
market.  
Another noteworthy occurrence during this time is the establishment of the 
Organization of the Eastern Caribbean States (OECS) in 1981.
29
 The OECS is 
comprised of eastern Caribbean states who are also members of CARICOM – 
Antigua and Barbuda, Dominica, Grenada, St. Lucia, St. Vincent, St. Kitts and 
Nevis and Montserrat. The organization was formed when these smaller Caribbean 
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states argued that their “rewards from CARICOM‟s common market arrangements 
were insufficient”. 30  
The Caribbean‟s geopolitical significance was heightened during this period 
as the rivalry between the two powers for the Caribbean‟s allegiance ensued. As 
such, with the end of the Cold War, was the reduced interest in the region. This 
subsequently led to a decrease in economic aid.  
Moreover, it marked an end of the concessions that they received based on 
their perceived disadvantaged position in the international economic system and the 
beginning of reciprocity in international trade.  As noted earlier, one of the major 
foreign policy successes of the Caribbean was the negotiation of the Lomé 
Convention.  However, the formation of the World Trade Organization (WTO) 
promoted the notion of liberalization which helped to change the international trade 
environment. Subsequently in the mid-1990s, the European Commission embarked 
on a consultation process designed to define options for EU relations with the ACP 
countries for 2000 and beyond. 
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3.2.5.  Changes in Preferential Treatment and Current Economic Climate in 
the Caribbean: 1990s to 2000s 
In the 1990s, members of the WTO began to voice their dissenting views on 
the EU non reciprocal trade agreements which they considered as unfair to other 
developing countries who were not members of the ACP.  Consequently, in 2000, 
the Cotonou Agreement
31
 was signed and it was agreed that the Lomé preferential 
arrangements would continue until 2008 with the approval of the WTO. It was 
agreed that Least Developed Countries (LDC) would continue to get preferential 
treatment after 2008. At the end of 2007, the trade section of the Cotonou agreement 
expired, and as such, the Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA) would replace 
this part of the agreement. The Lomé Conventions and the Cotonou Agreement 
share similar objectives as they both ostensibly aim to reduce poverty, conflict and 
create economic opportunities. 
The EPA signed in 2008 signalled a new era of trade relations between the 
EU and the Caribbean Forum of African, Caribbean and Pacific States 
(CARIFORUM). Caribbean exporters previously had greater duty-free access to the 
EU market than European exporters enjoyed in the Caribbean, along with quotas 
that enabled them to avoid price competition with rivals from outside the Lomé ACP 
bloc. The EPA was intended to replace the trade arrangement for goods and services 
under the Cotonou Agreement and grants “duty free, quota free access, and a 
number of financing and technical assistance measures”.32 It did not reformulate the 
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Cotonou Agreement‟s provisions for socio-economic development and the 
incorporation of civil society in the process of institutional strengthening.  
Essentially, the EPA was intended to provide improved, long term and more secure 
market access for CARIFORUM counties into the EU on a reciprocal basis. An 
issue of concern for CARIFORUM countries was the increased competition from 
EU goods and services which could result in the displacement of their goods and 
service providers. 
Caribbean states have been increasingly experiencing difficulties towards 
achieving economic prosperity in recent times. During colonialism, they specialized 
in the production of sugar and bananas for export primarily to the European markets. 
Even after decolonisation, Caribbean states remained heavily dependent on their 
agricultural sectors despite their numerous attempts to diversify their economies and 
the steep competition they faced from producers in Central American countries.  
This gradual replacement of one-way preferential by two-way free trade 
agreements resulted in a loss of preferential market access treatment for Caribbean 
states. Consequently, they have faced some difficulties in readjusting themselves 
into the current international economic arena compounded by the fact that most of 
their economies have been heavily dependent on the agricultural sector and their 
products lack competitiveness in an open market.  
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3.2.6. Engagement with Latin American Powers 
Though this discussion explores the influence of great powers in the foreign 
policy of the Caribbean, it is also noteworthy to include the role of regional powers. 
Venezuela, for example, has sought to play a more active role in the Caribbean 
region and have provided assistance through the financing of joint ventures and the 
creation of a trust fund within the Caribbean Development Bank (CDB), and 
concessionary loans through the PetroCaribe Agreement
33
 and the San Jose Accords 
respectively. The San Jose Accord is a joint initiative undertaken by Venezuela with 
Mexico in 1980, which stipulates that Central America and the Caribbean would 
receive oil at subsidized prices and access to loans for sports and cultural activities 
that will enhance cross-cultural understanding in the Caribbean basin.34  
Added to the struggle to develop social and economic transition programmes 
following the fallout of traditional preferential markets for commodities such as 
sugar and bananas, Caribbean states were faced with the task of finding ways to 
respond to their energy-related financial problems. With the exception of Trinidad 
and Tobago, crude oil and refined petroleum make up the bulk of Caribbean import 
needs. The most notable show of Venezuela‟s growing interest in the Caribbean was 
manifested in the PetroCaribe Agreement, which provided budgetary and 
development options for some of the countries in the region currently suffering from 
the loss of traditional preferential export markets and desperately searching for 
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measures to resolve their energy needs.35 The agreement was signed in 2005 and 
affords Caribbean states access to Venezuelan oil at preferential rates. Payment for 
the oil accessed under the agreement can be deferred for 25 years at an interest rate 
of per cent for every year. 
The issues surrounding PetroCaribe have posed diplomatic challenges for the 
CARICOM region as an entity as both Trinidad and Tobago and Barbados have 
declined to sign the PetroCaribe agreement. This reflects yet again another weakness 
in the Caribbean‟s ability to advance a regional identity and common agenda. 
Trinidad and Tobago was concerned that its state-owned Petrotrin refinery stood to 
lose about 30 per cent of its sales of petroleum products, fuel oil, diesel, and 
gasoline to the Caribbean.
36
 The government of Trinidad and Tobago criticized the 
way in which its fellow Caribbean states dealt with the Agreement by signing 
without reservations. They argued that the initiative had serious implications as it 
would leave the region dependent on a single state-run supplier – Venezuela‟s 
PDVSA (Petróleos de Venezuela, S.A.), and moreover, Trinidad would be forced to 
seek a new market for the energy supplies it previously provided to its CARICOM 
neighbours. The PetroCaribe initiative has also disrupted Trinidad and Tobago‟s 
regional initiatives such as an oil facility to CARICOM countries including a loan 
initiative to finance the purchases of petroleum products above the price of $30 a 
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barrel of oil; and a Petroleum Fund of US$50 million which was to be used for 
poverty alleviation and disaster recovery in the region.
37
  
 The government of Barbados argued that considering the fact that crude oil 
was already being refined in Trinidad, it was not necessary to embark on this 
initiative with Venezuela. However, the package being offered by Venezuela was far 
more enticing to its other Caribbean countries and would address their energy 
related needs. Caribbean governments were quick to focus on the short-term effects 
of PetroCaribe, however, and seemingly did not consider how this initiative would 
play out in the long run.
38
 
 
3.3. The Caribbean Political System and its Influence in Foreign Policy
 Decision-Making 
This section of the discussion explores the political system and political 
culture of Caribbean states. The theoretical discussion of this dissertation argues that 
the state level of analysis should be included in analyses of Caribbean foreign policy 
behaviour. Hence, it is necessary to include an analysis of the institutional 
framework of the state such as the relationship between the executive and legislative 
branches of government, as well as the country‟s political culture. The discussion 
also elucidates the interplay among the levels of analysis as we see (1) how changes 
in the international system affect the domestic economic conditions of the state; and 
(2) how the political system of the state awards power and importance to the leader. 
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Breuning argues that depending on the political system of a specific society, the 
leader may have more or less leeway in structuring the advisory system and 
choosing advisors.
39
 The more a leader has the ability to place his stamp on the 
organization of the executive the more his or her personality will factor into the 
organization structure.   
The prevailing political system used by the Caribbean is based on the 
Westminster Parliamentary system of government which was modelled off the 
British Parliamentary system.
40
 Among the reasons for adopting this type of system 
is the fact that it was the type of system that the leaders were accustomed to during 
the process of decolonization.41 In the Westminster Parliamentary system, the 
Executive branch of government is made up of the Prime Minister and his Cabinet 
members; who are responsible for the coordination of the entire government. The 
members of the Cabinet are, however, directly chosen from the Legislative branch. 
As a result, there is no real separation of powers between the two branches. Barrow 
argues that this is exacerbated by the „first-past-the-post‟ or „winner-takes-all-
approach‟ in small societies of the Caribbean.42 Stress on the democratic institution 
often develops when a party secures the majority of Parliamentary seats who will 
make up the government and reduces the role of formal opposition.  
Critics of the Westminster system in the Caribbean argue that the lack of a 
separation of power between the Executive and the Legislative branches of 
government is a significant hindrance to democracy. This is due to the fact that such 
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a system allows for a concentration of power in the Prime Minister and members of 
the Cabinet.43 Moreover, the main decision-making body, the Cabinet is responsible 
to Parliament and due to the strong Parliamentary majority; the role of the 
Opposition is in fact, quite limited.
44
  The Opposition‟s rule is reduced to merely 
keeping the government in check. 
Another problem associated with this concentration of power in the 
Executive is the lack of transparency. In the case studies with China, we see how 
often times, agreements are not debated in Parliament before hand. Moreover, in the 
case where Ministers are also from the House of Representatives, they often times 
push the agenda of their particular constituency rather than that of the Ministry as a 
whole.
45
 
The lack of public awareness and discussion about agreements being entered 
into by the government is another side effect of the political system and culture. 
Often times, the details of agreements are disclosed only after they had already been 
signed. This was evident in the signing of the EU-ACP Economic Partnership 
Agreement, in which Caribbean heads had signed the agreement without prior public 
notification or awareness. Moreover, in the case of Jamaica, the agreement was 
initialled before being tabled in Parliament. Additionally, the Parliamentary 
committee which is mandated to examine the details of foreign policy decisions and 
provide recommendations to Parliament did this only after the Agreement had 
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already been sign. This highlights inherent weaknesses in the system of 
governance.
46
 
The structure of the Westminster system of government strengthens the 
leader‟s dominance in decision-making matters, thereby making the effect more 
profound in Caribbean states.  Braveboy-Wagner asserts that the danger in this lies 
in very small countries where “personal networking is the norm and in former 
colonies where a tradition of looking up to the leadership developed during colonial 
times and evolved further during the post- colonial nationalist era”.47 Therefore, the 
values and norms embedded in the country‟s political culture exacerbate the flaws in 
the nature of the political system.  
The foreign policy trajectory presented above, shows how Caribbean politics 
has been characterised by post-colonial leaders and thus the importance of the 
individual level of analysis in foreign policy. While charismatic leadership has 
weakened, the political system is such that the influence of the leader remains at 
least as strong as that of the various institutions of government. 
   
3.4.  Caribbean Interest in “Non-Western” Powers 
The Caribbean‟s interest in developing its relationships with China and 
Japan is tied to the economic downturn being experienced. The Caribbean‟s 
relations with other powers has always stemmed from the pursuit of economic 
development and security. As discussed earlier in this chapter, Caribbean states have 
consistently argued that due to the economic challenges as a result of their 
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smallness, they require some concessions from external governments and 
institutions. As such, due to loss of preferential treatment, Caribbean states continue 
to search for other means of attracting aids and investments.  
Added to economic motivations, is the potential increase in Chinese and 
Japanese visitors to the region. As Caribbean countries with large tourism industries 
seek to recover from slow or negative growth after the global financial crisis, they 
increasingly are looking for new markets as a source of growth for their tourism 
industries. During his June 2013 trip to the region, President Xi emphasized tourism 
as an area of cooperation with Antigua and Barbuda, the Bahamas, Barbados, and 
Jamaica. In the case of Japan, efforts to increase tourist arrivals to region are seen in 
initiatives such as the Japan Tourism Fair in Tokyo. 
China‟s and Japan‟s interest in the region is welcomed not only because of 
the economic benefits it affords, but also because Caribbean states can also use their 
value-based resources especially as budding rivalry between China and Japan 
emerges. As noted before, the argument to be made in this dissertation is that due to 
their limited resource base, Caribbean states have been using their value-based 
resources as a strategy to gain economic assistance and to position themselves as 
important players in the international arena.  
From the literature reviewed in Chapter 2, the most recent discussions on 
small states in the international system are centred on their resourcefulness and 
resilience. The argument made is that small states have proven to be resourceful and 
resilient in their use of ingenious development strategies. Nared Prasad opines that 
despite their vulnerabilities, small states have developed a set of unique strategies to 
cope with their inherent vulnerability which involve a mixture of economic and 
80 
 
political approaches.
48
 Prasad argues that economic activities in the service sector 
such as offshore financial centres and in light manufacturing such as export 
processing zones, have led to better economic growth in small islands compared 
with strategies relying on agriculture and remittances.49 
 
Figure 3.1.            Caribbean Resource Base 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 Source: Compiled by author 
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Prasad advances the work of Ronen Palan the establishment of offshore 
financial centres and tax havens to elucidate his discussion on the unorthodox 
strategies of small states.
50
 Palan‟s argues that small states use the establishment of 
the offshore financial industry and tax havens as an innovative strategy to overcome 
the challenges to their economic development.
51
 According to Palan, this strategy is 
a “commercialization of sovereignty”, that is, small states have been selling their 
sovereignty in the form of offshore financial centres, tax havens, flags of 
convenience and export processing zones.
52
  
Prasad reiterates Palan‟s “commercialization of sovereignty”, arguing that 
small states have resorted to selling their sovereignty to other countries in order to 
finance their budgets and receive foreign aid.
53
  He asserts that small states have 
been selling their votes in international arena for economic gain and puts forward 
the case of small island states selling their votes to China and Taiwan in the battle 
for diplomatic recognition. Morris similarly, employs Palan‟s argument, positing  
that Caribbean states have been selling their sovereign rights as commodity to 
China.
54
  
This dissertation extends these analyses, by arguing that Caribbean states 
have been using their natural and value-based resources in their foreign policies 
toward China and Japan. However, I do not propose that they are selling or trading 
their sovereignty. The argument made is that their votes in international bodies and 
                                                          
50
See Ronen Palan, “Tax Havens and the Commercialization of State Sovereignty,” 
International Organization 56, no.1 (2003). 
51Palan, “Tax Havens and the Commercialization of State Sovereignty.” 
52
Ibid. 
53Prasad, “Small but Smart: Small States in the Global System.” 
54
Dana Morris, “The Commodification of Sovereignty: The Caribbean‟s Relations with China,” 
Presentation at Ace Conference, accessed September 9, 2011, 
http://www.mona.uwi.edu/economics/notices/Presentations/Ms%20Dana%20Morris.pdf   
54Prasad, “Small but Smart: Small States in the Global System.” 
82 
 
quality support and advocacy in international fora may be considered as resources 
being used in their foreign policies strategies.  
Chapters 5 and 6 discuss the Caribbean‟s relationships with China and Japan 
and how Caribbean states have been using their foreign policies as a tool for 
economic attainment. In the case of Japan, Caribbean officials assert that “Japan is a 
very important county in terms of now and the future...in the direction in which we 
would like to go Japan could be a great help”.55 Moreover, Caribbean states are 
interested in exploring more markets, and based on Japan‟s relationship with 
ASEAN and African countries; they are interested in undertaking similar 
initiatives.
56
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CHAPTER 4 
China and Japan in the Developing World:  
Growing Interest in Caribbean States 
 
 
4.1. Overview of Chapter  
China and Japan‘s presence in the Caribbean has been steadily expanding 
since the beginning of the new millennium, with both countries publishing 
documents to formally highlight their commitment towards deepening the 
relationship with the Latin America and Caribbean region. This has manifested itself 
through their active engagement with the Caribbean particularly with regards to the 
significant amount of economic assistance being rendered and the increase in the 
number of high level exchange visits.  
The visits from Chinese President XI Jinping in 2013 and Japanese Prime 
Minister Shinzo Abe in July 2014 have stressed the importance of Caribbean states 
to the two powers. The visits have also generated much discussion in the media and 
academic environment as to the interest of both countries in maintaining a presence 
in the region. China and Japan have been filling the vacuum left by the Caribbean‘s 
traditional partners and moreover, have provided these small states with the much 
needed assistance that they require. The economic relations between these two Asian 
powers and the Caribbean region have been growing with an increase in the value of 
trade and development assistance and a widening of economic interaction in services 
and investments. For example, since 2005 China had provided countries in Latin 
America and the Caribbean with approximately US$86 billion.
1
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The discussion has so far been preoccupied with the Caribbean‘s perspective. 
However, in order to fully discuss and understand the Caribbean‘s foreign policy 
towards China and Japan, it may prove useful to also examine China and Japan‘s 
interests in the Caribbean region. Hence, this chapter explores the possible 
motivations driving China and Japan‘s engagement with Caribbean states. 
The first half of this chapter briefly discusses China and Japan‘s engagement 
with other developing countries, in order to assess whether it is consistent with their 
foreign policy towards Caribbean states. From this discussion, we can argue that 
while both China and Japan have similar motivations towards the Caribbean, there 
are also notable differences in their foreign policy motives and practices.  
The discussion then continues by proposing that the motivations behind 
China and Japan‘s engagement with Caribbean states are related to the pursuit of 
their economic development, political security and global status. The interests rooted 
in economic development, for example, relate to China and Japan´s need to secure 
natural resources as well as markets for their products.  
 
4.2. Foreign Policy Behaviour towards Developing Countries  
Over the years, China and Japan‘s multi-faceted relationship with developing 
countries has been an important component of their foreign policy. In order to 
examine their agenda in the Caribbean, this section first explores China and Japan‘s 
foreign policies towards other developing countries so as to determine whether or 
not they are consistent with their foreign policy towards the Caribbean. The 
similarities and differences between China and Japan‘s foreign policy strategies are 
also highlighted.  
85 
 
4.2.1. China’s Use of Soft Power in Developing Countries  
China‘s relations with developing countries have been an important 
component of the foreign policy of China since the forming of the People‘s Republic 
of China (PRC) in October 1949. China placed great emphasis on developing its 
relations with other developing countries. This was seen during the Cold War for 
example, when China showed support for countries such as those in Latin America 
that had confronted the US. China‘s desire to cultivate ties with other developing 
countries was also seen as it sought support in gaining its UN seat in the 1970s.  
China‘s foreign policy is undoubtedly linked to its rapid rise in the changing 
international sphere since the beginning of the 2000s. The ―dragon‖ has assumed an 
active role in the developing world on its quest to become a leading global power. 
Seemingly, China‘s dynamic foreign policy strategy is two-fold, whereby as Deng 
and Wang opine, while embracing ideas of multilateralism, win-win cooperative 
approach and peaceful ascent, China has equally stressed the need to protect its 
national interests and to remould the international environment in line with its 
preferences.
2
 
In becoming a more influential actor in the diplomatic arena, China has 
forged and secured partnerships by promoting South-South cooperation in 
multilateral fora. For example, Africa represents a large single bloc of votes in 
multilateral organizations and these votes have been crucial in several areas of 
interest, for example in securing votes for China to host the 2008 Olympics.
3
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China‘s diplomatic influence is categorized by humanitarian aid, foreign 
direct investments, soft power, and a foreign policy free of conditionalities. 
Brautigam argues that China, in an attempt to portray itself as a politically attractive 
power, has packaged its soft power to publicly frame their growing ties with 
developing countries as ―win-win‖ rather than zero-sum.4 This has manifested itself 
in the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) model which framed aid 
within a broad set of economic cooperation policies and allowed for regular dialogue 
and high level meetings.
5
 This is similar to the regional cooperative framework 
attempted with Caribbean states in the form of the China-Caribbean Economic 
Forum. Moreover, China‘s conditionality-free approach, according to Alden, is a 
foreign policy model based on non-interference in the domestic affairs of states and 
the promotion of sovereign integrity which is appealing to developing countries.
6
 
In academic discourse, China‘s activities in the developing world have been 
described according to a use of soft power. ―Soft power‖ was originally 
conceptualised by Joseph Nye in 1990.
7
  Nye made a distinction between hard 
power and soft power, arguing that the latter refers to a country‘s ability to achieve 
its goals through means of attraction rather than coercion.
8
 Hard power refers to 
military and economic might which can be exercised by way of inducements 
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(carrots) or threats (sticks). However, it is possible to get the desired outcome 
without the use of such tangible threats in a more indirect way which, according to 
Nye, is sometimes called the ―second face of power‖.9 He purports that  
a country may obtain the outcomes it wants in world politics because other 
countries—admiring its values, emulating its example, aspiring to its level of 
prosperity and openness—want to follow it…soft power rests on the ability 
to shape the preferences of others...it is leading by example and attracting 
others to do what you want.
10
  
Nye posits that soft power rests in a country‘s culture, political values and foreign 
policies and that this was an important way of acquiring international support. 
Kurlantzick expands Nye‘s description on the use of soft power, applying it 
to the Chinese context whereas Nye had restricted his definition to a strictly US 
context. Chinese soft power, he defines as things outside of the military and security 
realm including not only cultural and public diplomacy but also more coercive 
economic and diplomatic measures such as aid and investment as well as 
participation in multilateral organizations.
11
 Soft power, Kurlantzick argues, can be 
directed towards the elites in a country (high soft power) or can be directed at the 
wider public (low soft power).
12
  
Cultural diplomacy has been a major tool used by China in its low soft power 
strategy. China has been actively promoting cultural exchange programs, festivals, 
movies, sports and tourism with the rest of the world in the new millennium.  
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According to Lai, 
Chinese leaders have been aware of the growing relevance and importance of 
cultural diplomacy and have made extensive use of cultural platforms to 
project China‘s peaceful rise, image and soft power.13 
This is evident in its promotion of Chinese language and studies globally through 
the establishment of Confucius Institutes and by hosting major international events 
such as the Shanghai World Expo in 2010, to showcase its image.  The first 
Confucius Institute was set up in South Korea in November 2004, with the aim to 
promote the learning of Chinese language and culture to the world. Confucius 
Institutes are partly funded by China National Office for Teaching Chinese as a 
Foreign Language (NOCFL or Hanban), and are jointly managed by Chinese 
universities and foreign parties.
14
 As of May 2014, there are 1089 institutes and 
classrooms worldwide and of which there are four in the Caribbean region- one in 
the Bahamas, Jamaica, Guyana and Trinidad and Tobago (see Table 4.1.). This is 
noteworthy considering the fact that only eight Caribbean countries have diplomatic 
relations with China. 
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Table 4.1. Confucius Institutes and Classrooms, 2014 
Region Number of Confucius 
Institutes and Classrooms 
Africa 
 
  48 
Asia 
 
147 
 
America 
 Caribbean 
 Jamaica 
 The Bahamas 
 Trinidad and Tobago 
 Guyana 
 Latin America 
 USA 
 Canada 
528 
     4 
      
   
 
 
   39 
 454 
   31 
Europe 
 
302 
Oceania 
 
  66 
            Source: Report on www.english.hanban.edu.cn, accessed May 1, 2014.  
Like Kurtlanzick, Naidu posits that China‘s soft power strategies 
incorporates ―the use of political non-interference and economic incentives coupled 
with the rhetoric of non-alignment and comforting words like historical friendship, 
equality, common development, mutual support and mutually beneficial co-
operation‖.15 Alden argues that China‘s foreign policy model based on the principles 
of ―noninterference in domestic affairs of state and the promotion of sovereign 
integrity‖ is particularly appealing to developing states.16 He asserts that in the case 
of Africa, for example, China‘s willingness to provide assistance without any 
political strings is more alluring to African leaders who dislike the conditionalities 
associated with Western aid. 
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The discourse on China‘s foreign policy with the developing world is centred 
on a combination of economic and political issues such as trade and investments, 
resource needs and geopolitical interests.
17
 Economically, China‘s rapid growth is 
outpacing their natural resource base and hence, a growing attraction toward Africa 
and Latin America has ensued. China needs natural resources and markets which is 
largely the motivation behind their agenda in the developing world. In return, 
developing countries stand to benefit from trade diversification, foreign direct 
investments, among other attractive opportunities.
18
  
On a political level, China has actively campaigned to displace official 
recognition of Taiwan. In 1997, eight African countries still had diplomatic ties with 
Taiwan and as such, the region has been a battleground for recognition of the One 
China Policy.
19
 This was demonstrated in 2005 when Senegal and Chad notably 
switched diplomatic relations to China. Moreover, China is interested in cultivating 
more friendly relations with states so as to garner support in international bodies.  
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4.2.1.1. “Soft Use of Power” Approach 
Chinese scholars have offered further perspectives on soft power which 
largely adopts but also expands the scope of Nye‘s conceptual framework of soft 
power.
20
  Zheng and Zhang put forward a critique Nye‘s discussion, positing that the 
policies and behaviours of soft power and hard power overlap.
 21
 Nye argues that the 
policies and actions of military and economic include, inter alia, coercive 
diplomacy, war, alliance, aid and sanctions; whereas those of soft power include 
public diplomacy and bilateral and multilateral diplomacy. However, Zheng and 
Zhang refute this; arguing that coercive diplomacy, alliance, aid and sanctions are 
largely implemented through bilateral and multilateral diplomacy and as such, Nye‘s 
concept of soft and hard power is self-contradictory.
22
 Chinese soft power has 
largely been demonstrated in their foreign policy and international behaviour which 
are characterised by multilateralism, economic diplomacy and the good neighbour 
policy and in their external influence of the Chinese model on the developing world.  
Li extends Nye‘s conceptualization of soft power to include a domestic 
context, arguing that whereas Nye‘s primary focus is on the efficacy of soft power in 
achieving foreign policy goals.
23
 Chinese discourse, he posits, frequently refers to a 
notable domestic context such as the need to strengthen national cohesion.
24
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Chinese scholars and officials enunciate a broader view of soft power and propose 
that in the Chinese context, soft power refers to a ―soft use of power‖.25 Essentially, 
rather than distinguishing sources of power as hard or soft, it is better to consider 
how these sources of power are used to increase a state‘s attraction and persuasion.26  
 
4.2.2. Japan’s Economic Assistance to Developing Countries  
Studies of Japan‘s foreign policy have contended over the years that, among 
other things, Japan‘s aid is a response to international pressure to contribute more to 
international order. Moreover, that Japan‘s aid policy is an instrument of its foreign 
economic policies, and that it is a function of domestic bureaucratic politics. Japan‘s 
foreign policy after World War II, shaped by then Prime Minister Yoshida Shigeru, 
was considered to be a reactive one based on response to external pressures 
emanating mostly from the US.
27
  The Yoshida doctrine had seen Japan focusing its 
efforts on economic reconstruction and development and a minimal defence policy 
which relied on the US for national security.  According to Mochizuki, Japan had 
evolved into an industrial and technological powerhouse and had ―refrained from 
vigorously seeking the international prestige and national security autonomy that 
would have been more commensurate with its economic capabilities‖.28  
Scholars have argued that Japan, during this time, pursued a foreign policy 
based on its own security and economic interests rather than one which tried to 
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shape the international environment.
29
 However, to the Japanese, their behaviour 
was one of ―modesty and realism based on historical realism‖. According to Taichi 
Sakaiya, the Japanese had ―learned the importance of using the world structures and 
international order and the danger of trying to change it‖.30 
Japan‘s growth in the 1950s necessitated its search for natural resources and 
as a result, Japan‘s diplomacy seemingly favoured Asian developing countries 
which were endowed with oil, natural gas and other critical raw materials. 
According to Kawashima, following the Meiji restoration period and the quest to 
―catch up with the West‖, Japan‘s ―obsession about the scarcity of key natural 
resources in Japan seems to have been deeply embedded the national psyche‖.31 This 
―obsession‖ continued through to modern day Japan, with its aid being linked 
closely to areas of national interest, such as the security of oil supplies from the 
Middle East or the expansion of production networks in Asia.
32
 
Additionally, Japan‘s aid in the 1950s began as post-war reparations to 
payments to Southeast Asian countries and facilitated Japanese trade and 
investments with its neighbours.  In 1954, Japan joined the Colombo Plan which 
was an international organization established to promote economic and development 
mainly through technical cooperation in countries of the Asia Pacific region.
33
 Thus, 
allowing Japan to provide aid through technical assistance to Asian counties. In 
1964, Japan became a member of the Organization for Economic Co-operation and 
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Development (OECD) and as a result, its aid would from hereafter be characterized 
by institutional structure of an Official Development Assistance (ODA) program. 
The Japanese government considered this membership as an opportunity to improve 
its image in the international arena. 
Japanese foreign policy was based on three major assumptions that its 
external policies had previously been formulated on which are as follows:  
1. US military protection and its reliable commitments to Asia 
2. Free access to raw materials and export markets abroad in order to 
accelerate the Japanese economy and  
3. A stable political framework in which a dominant Liberal Democratic 
Party (LDP) with the support of big businesses can pursue a consistent 
economic foreign policy.
34
 
After the first oil crisis in October 1973, Japan began a new phase of altering 
these assumptions by broadening its geographic horizons and its assistance 
objectives to include humanitarian assistance. According to Mochizoki, Japan 
realised it could help to alleviate world poverty by ―recycling its burgeoning trade 
surplus through its aid programs‖ rather than pursuing commercial interests in a 
narrow sense.
35
 Japan embarked on this capital recycling program following the 
disruption of its relations with Latin America due to the debt crisis in the 1980s. 
This entailed transferring part of the country‘s balance of payments surpluses to help 
finance the deficits of Latin America.
36
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During the 1970s, the Latin America region had become increasingly 
important in Japan‘s foreign policy pursuit not only because of the many Japanese 
immigrants who resided there but also because the region possessed an abundance of 
undeveloped natural resources. With the oil crisis and subsequent global energy 
problem, the potential for Latin American countries to become a stable supplier of 
industrial raw materials and an area for investments was evident and thus, Japan 
pursued resource diplomacy towards the region.
37
 
Japan‘s relationship with Latin American countries was significant during 
this period and was characterised by a high level of trade, private investments and 
government exchanges. The Japanese government and private sector participated in 
large-scale national projects which were aimed at the joint development of resources 
and production of items such as petroleum, iron ore and aluminium.
38
  Many of the 
largest projects were concentrated in Brazil but other countries such as Mexico, Peru 
and Venezuela were of particular interest to Japan as well.
39
 Japanese banks also 
began to supply loans to Latin American governments. In 1979, Foreign Minister 
Sunao Sonada visited six countries in the region; Mexico, Brazil, Peru, Chile, 
Argentina and Venezuela and held negotiations for the purchase of Mexican crude 
oil.
40
 This same year, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs would make an addition to its 
organizational structure by opening the Latin America and Caribbean Affairs Bureau 
which had previously been housed under the North America Division.  
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By the late 1980s, Japan‘s rising economy had positioned the country at the 
helm of international politics but would later receive much international criticism 
after it failed to send troops to the 1991 Gulf War.  In response, Japan established 
the ODA Charter in June 1992 to emphasize the country‘s contribution to 
international peace via economic means. The 1992 ODA Charter was established to 
―garner broader support for Japan‘s ODA through better understanding both at home 
and abroad and to implement it more effectively and efficiently‖.41 It embodied four 
core principles 
1. Compatibility between preservation of the environment and development 
2. Avoidance of the use of ODA funds for military purposes and for purposes 
liable to inflame international conflicts 
3. Monitoring of military spending of developing countries, their activities of 
developing and producing weapons of mass destruction, and the export or 
import of weapons 
4. Monitoring of activities for the promotion of democratization in developing 
countries, and their efforts to introduce a market-oriented economy and 
protect basic human rights and freedoms of their citizens.
42
 
Humanitarian and environmental considerations were added to Japan‘s criteria for 
aid decisions. Japan also began to place democratic norms into the core of its aid 
policy. Moreover, as Western allies expected Japan to enhance its international 
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contributions outside East Asia, Japan‘s expanding aid programs in Africa and Latin 
America began to receive scholarly attention.43 
Japan‘s ODA spending increased as it grew into an economic superpower 
then, becoming the world‘s largest bilateral ODA donor by the 1990s.44 The 
leadership demonstrated Japan‘s role in making a contribution to global peace and 
prosperity and signalled their intention to remain a non-military power. Arase argues 
that Japan‘s ODA model is dichotomous, whereby its motivations, from the 1970s 
until present, have been categorized by Kokueki (national interest) and Tsukiai 
(membership obligations).
45
 These motivations, he posits, were proposed by 
Sukehiro Hasegwa, who defined Japan‘s national interest at the time, in terms of the 
advancement of their own strategic economic development while simultaneously 
trying to oblige their membership in the Western alliance by adhering to altruistic 
ODA as was required.
46
 
 
4.2.2.1.   Renewal of Japan’s Diplomacy 
In 2001, under the leadership of Junichiro Koizumi, Japan sought to 
transform and revitalise its internal and foreign affairs. Additionally, it began to 
centralise the decision-making process including issues surrounding development 
aid. Prime Minister Koizumi had inherited a changing foreign policy whereby the 
ODA budget started declining following the burst of the economic bubble in the 
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1990s. Japan‘s ODA charter was consequently revised in 2003, to emphasize 
efficiency and increased national interest orientations in its aid policy. The most 
important elements of the revised Charter included supporting the self-help efforts 
of developing countries and the introduction of human security among its basic 
policies. 
In September 2004, Koizumi made a five day trip to the Latin America and 
the Caribbean region, visiting Brazil and Mexico. This was a significant event as the 
last visit by a Japanese Prime Minister to the region had been eight years prior and 
signalled the importance of the region to the Japanese government.  During his visit, 
Koizumi delivered an address on Japan‘s foreign policy toward Latin America and 
the Caribbean, proposing a ―Vision for a New Japan-Latin America and Caribbean 
Partnership‖, which would later be referred to as the ―Koizumi Vision‖.47 The 
Koizumi Vision called for the creation of a new, future-oriented relationship 
between Japan and the countries of Latin America and the Caribbean; and was 
essentially a signal of Japan‘s desire to renew its diplomacy. 
In the 1970s, Japan and Latin America had shared a stable trade and 
investment partnership; however, due to the Latin American debt crisis in the 1980s 
and Japan‘s in the 1990s, this economic relationship had subsided. Koizumi‘s Vision 
was designed to reinvigorate Japan‘s diplomacy with Latin America and stipulated 
the need to     
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1. reactivate their economic relationship, 
2. address challenges of the international community, 
3. promote mutual understanding and exchanges of people.48 
In keeping with these principles, an agreement between Japan and Mexico was 
signed on September 17, 2004 for the strengthening of economic partnership. This 
was the first EPA between Japan and a Latin American country and was designed to 
promote a freer trans-border flow of goods, persons, services and capital between 
Japan and Mexico.
49
 The EPA would, according to Koizumi, not only ―stimulate 
Japan and Mexico‘s economic exchange‖, but would also become ―a scaffold to 
strengthen the relationship between Japan and Latin America‖.50  
In essence, the Koizumi Vision signals the reactivation of Japan‘s general 
foreign policy with developing countries and the move to strengthen ties with the 
developing world and hence, with Latin America and Caribbean states. The timing 
of Koizumi‘s vision is in line with China‘s growing ascendancy not only in Asia but 
more noteworthy in Latin America and the Caribbean. Japan‘s renewal of its 
diplomacy is therefore largely rooted in its rivalry with China and in the need to 
maintain its regional and global prestige. 
The establishment of MOFA‘s International Cooperation Bureau in August 
2006 enhanced the strategic aspects of economic cooperation and also provided an 
opportunity to better integrate ODA into MOFA‘s various diplomatic tools. The 
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launch of the new Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA)
51
, which was 
merged with Japan Bank of Institutional Co-operation (JBIC)
52
 in 2008, has 
strengthened this approach.  In a January 2006 speech, then Minister of MOFA, 
Taro Aso declared ODA as a political policy measure that should also favour the 
donor nation. He opined that ―Japan‘s ODA should be used abundantly in the future 
for the objectives of enhancing and expanding ties between Japan and countries with 
the same interests and aspirations as Japan‖.53  
Bilateral ODA has been used as a critically important tool in advancing 
Japan‘s own independent political interests such as to cultivate friendly relations 
with its Asian neighbours in a bid for regional leadership.  Additionally, Japan‘s 
agenda seeks to strengthen relations and garner support from developing countries in 
international bodies. Tarte opines that ―policymakers have sought to use ODA to 
bolster diplomatic support for Japan‘s position, and thereby project its domestic 
norms as being in common interests with the interests of developing states‖.54 The 
cooperation of African countries is particularly important, in addressing Japan‘s 
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campaign on global issues such as UN Security Council Reform and climate 
change.
55
  
The export of manufactured products from Japan was considered to be 
essential in order to secure key resources and materials from abroad. Economic 
motivations therefore constitute another component to Japan‘s foreign policy, as it 
strives to further strengthen its relations with countries in the developing world that 
export natural resources including oil and natural gas so as to secure stable supplies 
of natural resources and energy.
56
 This is highlighted in the discourse of Japanese 
officials as former Prime Minister Koizumi asserted the importance of securing 
natural resources in the developing world stating that  
Energy, minerals, and edible resources are indispensable to making possible 
the sustained growth of the world economy. Endowed with energy and rich 
natural resources, Latin America continues to grow in importance. To my 
country, which has few natural resources, securing a stable supply of 
resources in the mid to long term is an issue of grave importance.
57
 
 
Added to Japan‘s preoccupation with securing natural resources, is also that of 
ensuring access to its exports market.
58
 Japan has outlined the importance it places 
on strengthening their relationship with Africa, ―a potentially huge market which 
sustains high rates of economic growth and which is endowed with abundant natural 
resources and a growing population‖.59 
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 Cultural diplomacy has also been important in Japan‘s foreign policy 
strategies as it seeks to improve its image in the world.
60
 The most visible and 
successful source is the Japan Exchange Teaching (JET) programme. The JET 
program was proposed in the 1980s to change Japan‘s global image through 
promotion of international exchange and foreign language education. Assistant 
language teachers from English-speaking countries are invited to Japan to teach 
English in secondary schools and to further promote cultural exchange. Of the 40 
participating countries, six are from the Caribbean.
61
 
 
4.2.3. Similarities and Differences between Chinese and Japanese    
Foreign Policy Behaviour in the Developing World 
 
China and Japan share some similarities in their wider foreign policies in the 
developing world as they both become an increasingly visible power in these 
countries. China‘s behaviour in regional and international affairs, as a rising power, 
is quite similar to that of Japan‘s during its high-growth era as both countries have 
prioritized modernization and adopted a more pragmatic stance on their economic 
policies.  Moreover, China and Japan have both employed economic cooperation as 
a tool to advance their economic, diplomatic and commercial interests. For example, 
in the 1960s and 1970s, Japan‘s economic assistance to its regional neighbours in 
Southeast Asia was mainly intended for enhancing market access and developing 
strategic resources to sustain its continued growth. Following the Fukuda doctrine, 
Japan adopted an aid doubling plan and used it to assist Japanese industrial 
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upgrading in East Asia in the 1980s.
62
 Meanwhile, China‘s foreign aid since the 
1990s has been used as a form of subsidy to Chinese state-owned enterprises by 
tying it to procurement of Chinese goods, contracts and services. China has also 
been using economic assistance to secure contracts for the development of resources 
in order to sustain its economic growth. 
 The rhetoric of ―win-win‖ cooperation is pervasive in China‘s foreign 
policies which largely constitutes the provision of ‗conditionality-free‘ assistance to 
developing countries. Chinese economic assistance omits the intrusive political 
governance policy conditions usually associated with aid given by Western 
multilateral institutions. This seemingly conditionality-free‘ approach associated 
with Chinese aid and loans is an important component of China‘s foreign policy 
with the developing world. However, this approach does not extend to Japan‘s 
economic assistance as Japan adheres to certain stipulations in its distribution of aid, 
as outlined in its ODA Charter.   
Japan‘s foreign policy in the new millennium has been purported to be 
premised on the idea that fostering interdependence through increased commercial 
activities and cooperation would lead to democratic peace. In contrast, however, Li 
argues that China‘s domestic concerns such as sustaining rapid economic growth, 
ensuring continued Communist Party rule, and national stability, are the main 
priorities of Chinese leadership.
63
  
Other differences in their foreign policy strategies relate to environmental 
concerns. Japan has been at the forefront in promoting environmental issues in 
international fora. This transcends the discourse and is visible in projects that are 
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funded and executed in developing countries.
64
 However, environmental concerns 
seemingly take a back-burner with regards to China‘s engagement with the 
developing world and will be discussed more in Chapter 5.   
 
4.3. China and Japan’s Interest in the Caribbean Region 
 The Caribbean stands thousands of miles from the Asiatic region, yet this 
distance has not deterred their interest in these small island states. Instead, China 
and Japan assert that this increased involvement with the Caribbean, is a move to 
further strengthen and deepen ties with the region. Chinese officials have summed 
up their interest as one pillar of China‘s foreign policy designed to increase the unity 
with fellow developing countries such as those in the Caribbean.
65
 Others simply 
argue that China‘s interest has ―good business logic‘ and is a recognition of the 
―strategic value‖ of the region.  
According to MOFA, Japan‘s interest in the region is derived from the 
existing commonalities and shared fundamental values that they have with 
Caribbean states such as democracy, market economy as well as the vulnerabilities, 
for example, natural disasters, faced by island states.
66
 Moreover, its foreign policy 
towards CARICOM member states is geared towards (1) the strengthening of 
                                                          
64
In interviews with Caribbean and Japanese officials, the discourse on environment conservation was 
noticeable. According to officials, in the case of the Nippon Light Metals project to extract rare earth 
minerals in Jamaica, a feasibility study was first done to assess the impact on the environment. If the 
impact would have been overwhelming, then the project would have been abandoned. Caribbean 
officials that were interviewed affirmed that this was the case with all projects explored with Japan.  
65
Interview with Person A, from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Foreign Trade. Kingston, 
Jamaica, September 20, 2012; Person D, formerly from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Foreign 
Trade. Kingston, Jamaica, September 27, 2012. 
66
Caribbean Division, MOFA. Hand-out prepared on Japan-CARICOM Relationship.   
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economic relations, (2) supporting the stable development of the region, and (3) 
advancing cooperation in the international arena.
67
 
 More recently in July 2014, at the first Japan-CARICOM Summit meeting, 
Prime Minister Shinzo Abe outlined the three pillars of Japan‘s CARICOM policies 
which are  
1. Cooperation towards sustainable development, including overcoming the 
vulnerabilities particular to small island states. 
2.  Deeping and expanding fraternal bonds of cooperation and friendship. 
3. Cooperation in addressing challenges of the international community.68 
This first pillar is particularly significant because in it, Prime Minister Abe proposes 
that Japan, in considering the ―vulnerabilities particular to small island states‖ that 
CARICOM member states face as well as the importance of providing support other 
than on per-capita income basis, will conduct field surveys on future cooperation. As 
discussed earlier in this dissertation, the classification of CARICOM member states 
as middle-income countries has put them in a disadvantage in receiving assistance. 
Owing to this classification, Caribbean leaders have actively argued that the 
allocation of aid should not be considered according to per capita basis. Hence, 
willingness to reconsider this shows the importance of the region to Japan. 
Despite these assurances of the motivating factors behind their increased 
involvement in the Caribbean region, there still exists a cloud of doubt as to whether 
there are other underlying factors at play. Scholars have voiced scepticism regarding 
the presence of these Asian countries, particularly China, in the US backyard; and 
                                                          
67
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Japan. Diplomatic Bluebook 2011. 
68MOFA, Japan, ―Press Release on Japan – Caribbean Community (CARICOM) Summit Meeting: 
Japan‘s CARICOM Policy,‖ July 28, 2014, accessed July 29, 2014, 
http://www.mofa.go.jp/files/000047229.pdf. See Appendix I 
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argue that it may have some implications towards US security in the region.
69
 China 
and Japan‘s interest in the Caribbean is not purely altruistic but more consistent with 
Brautigam‘s argument that foreign aid is fundamentally a tool of foreign policy and 
that all donors give aid for a variety of political, commercial and moral reasons.
70
 
This paper proposes that the primary motivations behind China and Japan‘s growing 
interaction with Caribbean states and as a result, their increased presence in the 
region; are related to the pursuit of their economic development, political security 
and global status (see Figure 4.1). The following sections will explore each 
motivation in more detail. 
 
Figure 4.1.  Motivations towards Caribbean States 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                   
Source: Compiled by author. 
 
 
 
                                                          
69See R. Evan  Ellis, ―The Strategic Dimension of Chinese Engagement with Latin America,‖ Perry 
Paper Series, no. 1. William J. Perry Center for Hemispheric Defense Studies, 2013. 
70
Brautigam. The Dragon’s Gift. 
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4.3.1. Economic Development 
China and Japan‘s economic motivation in the Caribbean is consistent with 
their wider foreign policy in the developing world, which as seen in Africa and Latin 
America, is related to their search for natural resources, and access to markets and 
transportation routes. According to Bernal, China‘s ―voracious appetite for 
resources, is one of their most compelling drivers of foreign policy‖.71 They have 
been courting the governments of Caribbean states, building goodwill by 
strengthening bilateral trade relations, awarding aid, improving infrastructure by 
helping to build roads, bridges and stadiums – seemingly, in return for access to key 
resources. Similarly, Chinese and Japanese interests at the economic level relate to 
accessing the Caribbean markets as a destination for their exports.  
Caribbean officials insist that there is nothing untoward about China‘s 
growing presence and that ―their interest is primarily economic,‖ according to 
Minister Peter Phillips, Jamaica‘s finance minister.72 Phillips opines that ―there is no 
military or strategic reach into the Caribbean...there‘s no indication that they want 
that either‖.73 
The literature on China and Japan‘s involvement with developing countries 
discusses their search for natural resources and the desire to secure them. China and 
Japan have shown their interest in accessing raw materials in the Caribbean states of 
Guyana, Jamaica and Trinidad and Tobago. It is evident that there is an interest in 
the minerals found in Jamaica and Guyana, and the oil and natural gas in Trinidad 
                                                          
71Richard Bernal, ―The Dragon in the Caribbean: China-CARICOM Economic Relations,‖ The 
Round Table 99, no. 408   
72Robin Wigglesworth, ―Caribbean in Crisis: Chequebook Diplomacy,‖ December 17, 2013, accessed 
on January 14, 2014,  http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/2/7f7b0d8e-5ea8-11e3-8621-
00144feabdc0.html#axzz33P0A5gEG. This sentiment was echoed in the interviews conducted. 
73 
Ibid. 
108 
 
and Tobago. However, while their quest for resources may indeed be a major 
motivation for their policies in Africa, as well as in Latin America, the extent to 
which this is true in Caribbean countries is much less.  
There are only three CARICOM member states which are resource endowed; 
Jamaica, Guyana and Trinidad and Tobago. Moreover, the exports of said resources 
to China and Japan are significantly lower when compared to other countries outside 
of the region. The search for resources, while visible in the Caribbean, is therefore 
not as great a source of motivation as it is in other regions. Nevertheless, both China 
and Japan have a strong desire to secure stable supplies of natural resources and as 
such, will ensure that they have access to any untapped resources in these states.  
Access to markets for a country‘s exports is a necessary strategy for 
economic growth and development. As such, Caribbean states provide another, 
though a miniscule market for Chinese and Japanese products. This has proven 
successful as demonstrated by the increase in the import of their goods and the 
subsequent widening trade surplus that they have with the Caribbean (see Figure 
4.1. and Figure 4.2.)  By 2012, Chinese imports to the region had grown by 85 per 
cent over a ten year period thus showing the China‘s role as a trading partner for 
Caribbean states as they seek to diversify trade. It also reflects China‘s economic 
performance growth during this period. While the value of imports increased, the 
value of exports from Caribbean states to China had decreased in 2012 by 82 per 
cent from that in 2006. In the case of Japan, the value of imports from Japan to the 
Caribbean was 16 times greater than the value of exports.  
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Figure 4.2. CARICOM Imports from China and Japan, 2001-2012 
 
Source: Compiled by author based on data collected from CARICOM Regional       
Trading Information System, , accessed June 27, 2014, 
http://www.caricomstats.info/tradsysonline. 
 
Figure 4.3. CARICOM Exports to China and Japan, 2001-2012 
          
Source: Compiled by author based on data collected from CARICOM Regional             
Trading Information System, accessed June 27, 2014, 
http://www.caricomstats.info/tradsysonline. 
 
In 2012, Jamaica imported approximately US$311 million worth of Chinese 
products and approximately US$209 million of Japanese; while only exporting 
US$12 million and US$ 11 million worth of goods to China and Japan respectively. 
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This pattern is the same across the region with Guyana importing approximately 
US$194 million and US$78 million of Chinese and Japanese products. Only US$20 
million worth of Guyanese products were exported to China and US$4 million to 
Japan.  
 
Table 4.2.  Trade with China and Japan in US$ Million, 2012  
 China Japan 
 Imports Exports BoT Imports Exports BoT 
Antigua and Barbuda 19 0 -19 8 0 -8 
Bahamas n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 
Barbados 74 7 -68 36 0 -36 
Belize* n/a n/a n/a 14 13 -1 
Dominica 5 0 -5 5 0 -5 
Grenada 6 0 -6 6 0 -6 
Guyana 194 20 -174 78 4 -74 
Jamaica 311 12 -299 209 11 -199 
St. Kitts and Nevis * n/a n/a n/a 5 0 -5 
St. Lucia* n/a n/a n/a 14 0 -14 
St. Vincent and 
Grenadines* 
n/a n/a n/a 5 0 -5 
Trinidad and Tobago^ ---- 35.4 --- 142 150 8 
Source: Compiled by author based on data collected from CARICOM Regional Trading 
Information System, accessed June 27, 2014, http://www.caricomstats.info/tradsysonline 
and MOFA, Japan. 
Note:  
* No data is available for these countries because they have ties with Taiwan and  
   not China. 
^ No trade data was available for trade with China.  
 
In securing export markets in the Caribbean and the Western Hemisphere at 
large, there is a need to also improve the access to transportation routes. Moreover, 
with the expansion of the Panama Canal to provide a more cost-effective transit, 
Caribbean ports are expecting a large commercial boost.  In 2013, the Jamaican 
Government announced that a Memorandum Of Understanding (MOU) was signed 
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with state-owned China Habour Engineering Company (CHEC) to explore the 
feasibility of establishing a new trans-shipment port, with a preliminary estimate of 
the investment being between US$1200 million and US$1500 million.
74
 The 
Panama Canal links the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans and as such, once ships the 
Canal from the Pacific Ocean, they must use sea passages through the Caribbean Sea 
to get to destinations in the US and Europe for example.
75
 Sata and Asano argue that 
countries on strategic sea lanes are important to Japan and are favoured in ODA loan 
and technical cooperation distributions.
76
 This sentiment was echoed in an interview 
conducted with a Japanese government official, who stressed the importance of 
securing passage through the Caribbean Sea not just for transhipment of nuclear 
waste but with regards to establishing a new sea lane for transhipment of oil.
77
   
 
4.3.2.  Political Security 
China and Japan‘s presence in the developing world is linked to the drive to 
secure natural resources. In the Caribbean context, there is interest especially in oil 
and minerals, but there are also other equally, if not more important motivating 
factors at play. While the interest in Caribbean states may not be predominantly 
focused on exploitation of its natural resources, there are other value-based 
resources that Caribbean states have to offer. Morris argues that in the absence of 
                                                          
74
See Alicia Dunkley-Willis, ―CHEC turns down Fort Augusta Development,‖ Jamaica Observer, 
May 1, 2014, accessed May 1, 2013, http://www.jamaicaobserver.com/news/CHEC-turns-down-Fort-
Augusta-development_14178090. 
75Ivelaw L. Griffith, ―Probing Security Challenge and Change in the Caribbean,‖ in Caribbean 
Security in the Age of Terror: Challenge and Change, ed. Ivelaw L. Griffith (Jamaica: Ian Randle 
Publishers, 2004). 
76Sata and Asano, ―Humanitarian and Democratic Norms in Japan‘s ODA Distributions.‖ 
77
Interview with Person F, from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Tokyo, Japan, March 22, 2013. 
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natural resources, use their sovereignty as a commodity to be traded with China.
78
 
Such may be the case for the other CARICOM member states lacking minerals and 
natural gas but that China and Japan still provide assistance to. This research builds 
on Prashad‘s arguments that Caribbean states have been using unorthodox 
development strategies and posits those countries without raw materials and 
commodities, depend on their value-based resources.
79
 Moreover, in the Caribbean 
context, due to small resource base of even those countries with resources, use of 
value-based resources are used to complement their foreign policy strategies as well.  
Both China and Japan have been practicing some form of ―checkbook 
diplomacy‖ in their foreign policy strategies towards the Caribbean. In the case of 
China, this is reflected with regards to the One China Policy – as China and Taiwan 
compete for the allegiance of Caribbean governments. China‘s interest in the region 
is driven by the need to promote the crucial ―One China‖ policy and in effect, isolate 
Taiwan in the worldwide arena. The One China principle is the political basis for the 
establishment and development of relations between China and Caribbean countries, 
whereby member states are committed to the position of supporting China‘s 
reunification and not having official ties or contacts with Taiwan. Manian, argues 
that the US government‘s distractions elsewhere in the world have helped to create 
the space that is the Caribbean region, in which this ―battle‖ can proceed.80 Of the 
23 countries that hold official relations with Taiwan, 12 are from Latin America and 
                                                          
78
Dana Morris,―The Commodification of Sovereignty: The Caribbean‘s Relations with China,‖ 
Presentation at Ace Conference, accessed September 9, 2011, 
http://www.mona.uwi.edu/economics/notices/Presentations/Ms%20Dana%20Morris.pdf   
79Prasad, ―Small but Smart: Small States in the Global System.‖ 
80Sabita Manian. ―For all the Tea in China: China and Taiwan‘s policy in the Circum- Caribbean‖ in 
Diana Thorburn‘s Remapping Caribbean Geopolitics.   
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the Caribbean.
81
 Moreover, four are CARICOM member states, thus presenting the 
Caribbean region as a competitive area in which both China and Taiwan have strong 
interests (see Table 4.3.). China, in competition with Taiwan, offers economic 
support to the Caribbean through trade, aid and investment, which returns the 
favour—for the most part—by maintaining the ―One China‖ policy.  
Table 4.3. Caribbean Countries Recognition of One China Policy 
 China Taiwan 
Antigua and 
Barbuda 
1983  
The Bahamas 1997 1989 to 1997 
Barbados 1997  
Belize 1987-1989 1989 
Dominica 2004 1983-2004 
Grenada 1985- 1989, 
2005 
1989-2005 
Guyana 1972  
Jamaica 1972  
St. Kitts and Nevis  1983 
St. Lucia 1997-2007 1984-1997 
2007 
St. Vincent  1981 
Trinidad and 
Tobago 
1974  
 
The support of these four countries, Belize, St. Lucia, St. Kitts and Nevis, 
and St. Vincent and the Grenadines, has been described as being based on financial 
incentives which is consistent with China‘s strategies to isolate Taiwan in Latin 
America and Africa.  In 2012, China completed construction on a $35 million sports 
stadium in the Bahamas, which was deemed by Bahamian officials as a reward for 
                                                          
81
Belize, St. Lucia, St. Kitts and Nevis, St. Vincent and the Grenadines, Haiti, Dominica Republic, El 
Salvador, Guatemala, Hondurus, Nicaragua, Panama, and Paraguay have diplomatic ties with 
Taiwan.  
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switching diplomatic recognition from Taiwan to China in 1997.
82
 This was also 
seen in the case of Grenada‘s switch in 2004. In December 2004,  Prime Minister 
Keith Mitchell and his foreign minister, Elvin Nimrod, made an official trip to 
China, which stirred great controversy and particular discontent with its Taiwanese 
counterparts since at that time, Grenada still officially recognized Taiwan.
83
 Taiwan, 
had offered Grenada $47 million in aid and to rebuild their national stadium but the 
government turned to China to see a better deal would be given.
84
 China provided 
Grenada with monetary assistance to expand the national stadium in time to host the 
Cricket World Cup in 2007, and the construction of 2000 housing units, thus 
resuming diplomatic relations between the two.
85
 In addition, China offered the 
Grenadian government a $6 million grant to compensate for the loss of support from 
Taiwan, $1million scholarship fund and $2.5 million financial grant.86 
Japan has also used economic assistance as a means of gaining the support of 
CARICOM members. The cultivation of more friendly relations with states in an 
attempt to garner their support, whether in domestic, regional or international 
bodies, is an active component of Japan‘s foreign policy in the Caribbean. The trans-
shipment of nuclear waste from the United Kingdom and France to Japan has also 
been a controversial issue and one of great concern for CARICOM heads of 
Government leaders. They have maintained their position that the ―economic 
                                                          
82Archibold, ―China Buys Inroads in the Caribbean, Catching U.S. Notice.‖ 
83
Ibid. 
84
Taipei Times, ―MOFA Has Pessimistic Outlook on Ties with Grenada,‖ December 22, 2004. 
http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/taiwan/archives/2004/12/22/2003216209.   
85Daniel Erikson, ―China in the Caribbean: the New Big Brother,‖ China Brief, Vol. 9, Issue: 25, 
December 16, 2000, accessed July 25, 2012, 
http://www.thedialogue.org/page.cfm?pageID=32&pubID=2204  
86
Ibid. 
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importance and ecological fragility of the Caribbean Sea must be respected‖.87 
Despite this unwavering position, shipments of radioactive waste still continue to 
traverse Caribbean waters.
88
 Interestingly, the establishment of the Japan-
CARICOM Friendship fund by the Government and Private Sector of Japan was 
done partly in the hopes of helping to compensate for this ―unfortunate situation‖.89 
However, the most controversial use of economic assistance by Japan lies in its 
stance in the International Whaling Commission (IWC) and the support given in 
exchange by CARICOM member countries.
90
 This is discussed in further detail in 
Chapter 6 which explores the foreign policy strategies of Grenada and other smaller 
Caribbean states. 
Caribbean countries represent an important voting bloc for China and Japan, 
as each country represents a sovereign entity with an independent vote in the 
international arena, which was also the case with African states, as discussed earlier. 
Both China and Japan have recognized this and is for example, outlined in the 
‗Partnership for Peace, Development and Prosperity between Japan and 
CARICOM‘. The Government of Japan has outlined their interest in working 
closely with the Latin America and Caribbean region, which due to the large number 
of countries, has a significant influence over decision making at the United Nations 
and other international fora where decisions are made by majority vote.  
                                                          
87CARICOM Secretariat. Press Release 287/2011, ―CARICOM Demands Halt to passage of 
Hazardous Waste Through Caribbean Sea,‖ July 20, 2011, 
http://www.caricom.org/jsp/pressreleases/press_releases_2011/pres287_11.jsp.   
88
Up until Dec 2012, fourteen such shipments were done.  
89
Interview with Person F, from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Tokyo, Japan, March 22, 2013. 
90See W. Andy Knight, ―The Caribbean on the World Scene: Security Regimes, Instruments and 
Actions,‖ in Caribbean Security in the Age of Terror: Challenge and Change, ed. Ivelaw L. Griffith 
(Jamaica: Ian Randle Publishers, 2004).  
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Reference is made to cooperation in International fora, by addressing issues 
such as environmental and climate change, nuclear disarmament and non-
proliferation, and reform of the UN. In this context, Japanese foreign ministers have 
given particular attention to the need for an early realization of the UN Security 
Council through expansion in both permanent and non-permanent categories of 
membership.
91
 In the fourth sitting of the Japan-CARICOM Ministerial Level 
Conference held November, 2014 in Tokyo, Japan‘s Foreign Minister Fumio 
Kishida and Caribbean agreed to strengthen cooperation for UN Security Council 
reform next year.
92
 Japan has been actively seeking support in its campaign for 
election in October 2016 to a non-permanent seat in the UN Security Council. The 
recent appointment of Jamaica‘s Permanent Representative to the UN Ambassador 
Courtenay Rattray, as chairman of the UN Intergovernmental Negotiations on 
Security Council reform has amplified the importance of Caribbean states to Japan‘s 
bid.
93
 In other international fora, both Japan and Jamaica, have for example, asserted 
their desire to be included in UNESCO‘s World Heritage site list, and are both 
looking to join forces to achieve this.
94
 
Caribbean states have over the years displayed strong diplomatic power not 
only in their numbers as a voting bloc but also in the quality of their advocacy. 
Caribbean representatives have an outstanding track record of taking leading and 
long-serving roles in international fora. This is seen from as early as during their 
                                                          
91MOFA, ―The Second Japan-CARICOM Ministerial-level Conference.‖ 
92MOFA, ―Ministerial Joint Statement between Japan and CARICOM,‖ Fourth Japan-CARICOM 
Ministerial-level Conference, November 15, 2014, accessed November 20, 2014,  
http://www.mofa.go.jp/files/000059793.pdf 
93
JIS, ―Important Appointment for Jamaican Permanent Rep. to UN,‖ November 11, 2014, accessed 
November 15, 2014, http://jis.gov.jm/important-appointment-jamaican-permanent-rep-un/ 
94Norman Munroe, ―Jamaica, Japan Pledge Support for World Heritage Dreams,‖ Jamaica Gleaner, 
September 9, 2011.   
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roles in the NAM and NIEO, discussed in Chapter 3. According to Maki Kobayashi, 
director of the Division of the Centre for Latin America and the Caribbean, MOFA, 
Caribbean representatives have proven to be quite eloquent in their speech and 
decorum, and as a result, show a higher ability to advocate in English.
95
  Moreover, 
Ken Shimanashi, current Advisor for Japan-CARICOM Friendship Year Committee 
and former director of the LA Bureau, MOFA asserts that there is a growing 
importance of Caribbean states in the international community as evidenced in the 
participation of nations in the COFCOR.
96
 CARICOM representatives, he opines, 
play a strong role in international advocacy. This is undoubtedly important to Japan, 
in the move to increase cooperation in promoting issues such as Climate Change and 
reform of the UN Security Council. 
 
4.3.3. Global Status 
China has recognized it‘s ascendancy in the international system and has been 
advocating for South-South cooperation in order to cultivate allies in the developing 
world . Japan has also recognized China‘s growing influence in not only the Asian 
region but internationally. China has been joining an increasing number of 
multilateral institutions both regionally and internationally. In 2009, China became 
the 48
th
 member nation of the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB), 
contributing $350 million to various programmes.
97
 Moreover, China is also a non-
regional member of the Caribbean Development Bank. One important component of 
                                                          
95Maki Kobayashi, ―Nihon-Karibu Kouryuu Nen ni (For the Japan-CARICOM  Exchange Year),‖ in 
Infomacion LatinoAmericana, 1406 (April 2014). 
96Ken Shimanashi, ―Waga Kuni no Karibu kai Shokoku Gaikou (Our Country‘s Diplomacy towards 
the Caribbean States),‖ in Infomacion LatinoAmericana, 1406 (April 2014).  
97See  IDB‘s Official Website, http://www.iadb.org/ 
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Chinese foreign policy is to develop more friendly relations with states so as to 
garner support in international fora.  
China has been actively trying to strengthen its political and diplomatic links 
within the international community so as to improve its image and further increase 
its influence. Deng argues that China places great emphasis on the concept of 
international status.
98
 As a rising power, an improved image and increased role of 
China in the developing world will help to give China more influence in the 
international system. Caribbean countries, though small in size, possess strong 
diplomatic power in their numbers and quality advocacy. Therefore, the 
development of its diplomatic and economic investments in the Caribbean may be 
considered as an important strategy to augment China‘s global status.  
Similarly, Japan‘s diplomacy serves to improve and maintain its global image 
and prestige. This is not limited to Japan‘s cultural diplomacy initiatives but extends 
to its support of common agenda on issues such as human security and climate 
change which project a positive image of Japan‘s principled diplomacy and 
increasingly important role in international fora.
99
 In the non-English speaking 
Caribbean, Japan‘s peace-keeping initiatives in Haiti resonated well with its 
Caribbean neighbours.
100
  
China and Japan hold differing views regarding East Asian cooperation and 
hence, there is a form of power rivalry between the two in the region. For example, 
with regards to membership in the East Asian summit, there was a clear difference 
                                                          
98Yong Deng, ―Better Than Power: International Status in Chinese Foreign Policy,‖ in China Rising: 
Power and Motivation in Chinese Foreign Policy, eds. Yong Deng and Fei-Ling Wang (Boulder: 
Rowman and Littlefield Publishers Inc., 2005). 
99
Interview with Person A, from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Foreign Trade,  Kingston, 
Jamaica, September 20, 2012. 
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This was consistent with all responses in all interviews conducted.  
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in opinion about the concept of the proposed East Asian community.
101
 China´s 
vision of a harmonious region called for the inclusion of the ten ASEAN states, 
China, Japan and South Korea; and excluded the US. Japan´s vision for the region, 
however, is one based on universal values such as democracy, freedom, and 
supported by a steady presence of the US in the region.   
As China‘s ―growing regional ascendancy‖ transpires, Japan is prompted to 
not only maintain but improve its prestige regionally and internationally. According 
to Dennis Trinidad, China‘s rise has resulted in anxiety and optimism in Japan‘s 
economic and security dimensions.
102
 Anxiety, he argues, is due largely to China‘s 
intentions, whether it will eventually seek power as a status quo power or seek to 
alter the rules under the existing international order. Ogoura argues that the 
strengthening of the Japan-US alliance and Japan-India relations can be seen as part 
of an effort to check and counter China.
103
 In the Caribbean context, this was seen 
during Koizumi‘s visit to Latin America and the move to strengthen relations with 
Caribbean states as it was also during this time that China‘s presence in the region 
begins to grow. Japan has been strengthening its foreign policy initiatives and 
attempts to cultivate and deepen ties not only in the Asiatic region but elsewhere, as 
in the Caribbean. Prime Minister Abe‘s most recent visit to Trinidad and Tobago 
during his Latin America and Caribbean tour in July 2014, just one year after the 
                                                          
101Iida Masafumi, ―Japan-China Relations in East Asia: Rivals or Partners,‖ in China’s Shift: Global 
Strategy of the Rising Power, ed. Iida Masafumi (Tokyo, National Institute for Defense Studies, 
2009). 
102Dennis Trinidad, ―China and Japan‘s Economic Cooperation with the Southeast Asian Region: The 
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103Kazuo Ogoura, ―Major Developments in Japanese Foreign Policy since the mid-1990s,‖ in A New 
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visit of China‘s XI Jinping, also sends a clear message regarding Japan‘s intention to 
maintain a presence in the region.   
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CHAPTER 5 
The Foreign Policy of Jamaica: Case Studies of  
the Growing Relationships with China and Japan 
 
 
5.1.  Overview of Chapter  
Jamaica has maintained long-standing relationships with both China and 
Japan, establishing diplomatic ties in 1972 and 1962 respectively. In fact, the 
relationship with China predates this; going as far back as the 1800s when the 
Chinese were brought to the Caribbean as indentured labourers after slavery had 
been abolished.
1
 Even after indentureship had ended, many Chinese settled in the 
island leading to generations later today that make up the Jamaican population. In 
this new millennium, faced with challenges to their economic development, Jamaica 
has been actively pursuing diplomatic and economic relations with China and Japan.   
This chapter explores the development of the relationships that Jamaica 
shares with China and Japan, in an attempt to locate the current relationships in 
Jamaica‟s political and economic history. In doing so, it also draws similarities with 
China and Japan‟s general relations with developing countries as highlighted 
previously in Chapter 4. The main purpose of these case studies is to show that 
China and Japan are sources of economic gain and that the foreign policies of 
Jamaica and the Caribbean at large, have always been focused on economic 
interests. This is consistent with Thorburn and Morris‟ argument that Caribbean 
                                                          
1See Thomas D. Boswell, “A Geographic Preface,” in Understanding the Contemporary Caribbean, 
eds. Richard Hillman and Thomas D`Àgostino (Boulder: Lynne Reinner, 2009). 
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foreign policy is “directly and or indirectly geared towards economic development 
in one way or another”.2   
 The chapter begins with a brief synopsis of Jamaica‟s foreign policy since it 
gained independence in 1962 and also highlights the ideological influence of its 
leaders on the country‟s foreign policy stance over the years. This trajectory is 
useful because it shows the importance of the domestic and individual in decision-
making as well as the link between foreign policy goals and economic development 
strategies. Jamaica‟s relationships with China and Japan are then examined in order 
to show the increasing level of interactions and subsequent development since the 
2000s. The Jamaican economy has been struggling in this harsh economic climate, 
and has relied on tourism, remittances, investments and aid as a source of economic 
means. Despite being endowed with natural resources, the country has over the years 
failed to effectively exploit them. Jamaica‟s current relationships with China and 
Japan show that it has been actively using all its resources to diversify its foreign 
policy strategies. 
 
5.2. Jamaica’s Foreign Policy and Ideology since the 1960s  
 
 Jamaica was one of the first English-speaking Caribbean countries to have 
gained independence from Great Britain, which it did on August 6, 1962.  This was 
a significant turning point for the country not only because it had now severed ties 
with its colonial master but also because it meant that the Jamaican government 
would now be charged with the responsibility of managing its own international 
affairs, and navigating and shaping its own foreign policy.  The decade of the 1960s 
                                                          
2
Diana Thorburn and Dana-Marie Morris. “Jamaica‟s Foreign Policy: Making the Economic 
Development Link.” The Jamaican Economy Project: Taking Responsibility, (Kingston: CaPRI, 
2007), 4. 
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represents the formative stages of the development of Jamaica‟s foreign policy 
objectives.  
According to Henke, there are three sets of factors which significantly 
influenced the foreign policy direction of Jamaica following its immediate post-
independence period. There are (1) the domestic dynamics, (2) the international 
environment which included the Cold War and the country‟s geostrategic location to 
the US, and (3) attempts by other Caribbean states to cultivate federation among 
newly independent nations in the region.
3
  
The activities and diplomatic initiatives pursued were influenced by the post-
colonial international environment as many nation-states were admitted as new, 
independent members of the international community. The international 
environment at this time was consumed by a power struggle between the “East” and 
the “West”.  As a newly independent state, Jamaica chose to adopt a pro-West 
stance first espoused by Bustamante and reaffirmed by acting Prime Minister 
Donald Sangster during an address to Parliament in 1965 
We are not a large country…In the eyes of a number of countries we are very 
small…(we have to) mind our own business and not interfere with people 
when they are misbehaving so that we do not get any blows in the conflict 
because we cannot afford to get into any conflict. We are not neutral. „We 
are with the West‟, the Prime Minister said three years ago and we do not 
propose to change…4 
The government embraced an “industrialization by invitation” model of 
development but by the late 1960s this showed limitations in achieving economic 
development.  
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Holger Henke, “Jamaica‟s International Relations: Between the West…and the Rest,” Jamaica 
Journal 34, no.1-2 (January 2013). 
4Prime Minister Donald Sangster‟s Speech to Parliament, 1965 cited in R.B. Manderson-Jones, 
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 Michael Manley and the People‟s National Party (PNP) gained power of the 
Jamaican government after winning the general elections in 1972, and embarked on 
a search for a new balance “between self-determination and dependency”.5 During 
his administration, Manley operated under the ideology of „Democratic Socialism‟, 
which he conceived as his „strategy of change‟ for Jamaica and for the rest of the 
Caribbean at large. Democratic Socialism “underpinned the policy making progress 
as it pertained to both the domestic and international spheres”.6 On a domestic level, 
Manley envisioned the creation of a more independent economy that would be free 
of foreign control; the development of a more egalitarian society; and the increased 
involvement of the population in the decision-making process.
7
 Manley‟s strategy 
had a “clearly articulated dimension”, wherein his view was that domestic change 
could only be accomplished and secured if the government could negotiate better 
terms with the international economy.
8
 
Manley saw this strategy as a „third path‟ for Jamaica and the rest of the 
Caribbean, which opposed the existing international order in so far as not being 
economically or politically dependent on neither the East nor West.  He proposed 
that Jamaica adopt an open foreign policy which involved extending relations to 
countries beyond Jamaica‟s traditional partners.  According to Manley, 
It is obviously important for Jamaica to retain its friendship with this (North 
Atlantic) part of the world, and if possible to extend and deepen its 
economic relations with the United States, Canada and Great Britain. 
However, the perpetuation of these three relationships is inimical to 
Jamaica‟s long term interests and is only favoured by those who remain 
frozen to the postures of yesterday.
9
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Manley‟s ideology of democratic socialism navigated the country‟s foreign policy 
whereby the government openly embraced new alliances with countries of the third 
world while shying away from the „closed policy‟ which according to him, only 
envisaged relations with traditional partners.
10
 
 Jamaica‟s participation in the international arena in multilateral organizations 
was vibrant and in many cases, the country assumed a leadership role.
11
 Henke 
highlights Jamaica‟s influence in international affairs during this time, stating that, 
the country‟s leadership position was “by virtue of Manley‟s charismatic stature as a 
political leader on the international stage, as well as through the positions Jamaica 
promoted in its multilateral and bilateral foreign relations.”12 The country played an 
active part in international fora and was vociferous in its advocacy for Third World 
solidarity. This is evidenced by the government‟s participation and support of the 
Non-Alignment Movement (NAM) in so far as even holding a seat on the 
Coordinating Bureau of the NAM.
13
  
 Manley‟s administration maintained a high profile in the NAM and on the 
international stage in general but on the local stage, the government suffered from 
numerous challenges such as a withdrawal of foreign capital which led to a 
shrinking economy and growing debt. Manley‟s increasingly leftist rhetoric along 
with his high profile in the NAM and growing relations with Cuba, “stirred 
profound suspicions among the private sector and translated into greater restrictions 
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Ibid, 128. 
11See Don Mills, “Jamaica's Foreign Policy,” In Jamaica in Independence, ed. Rex Nettleford 
(Kingston: Heinemann Caribbean, 1989).  For example, the country‟s representative to the UN was 
selected by the Secretary-General in 1975 to serve as a member of a group of experts charged with 
the restructuring of the economic and social sectors of the organization. Along similar lines, the 
Jamaican representative to the UN Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) was elected president of 
that council in 1978.  
12
Henke, “Jamaica‟s International Relations, 4. 
13
Thorburn and Morris, “Jamaica‟s Foreign Policy.” 
126 
 
and restraints” in relation to grants, loans and investments.14 The growing discontent 
among the Opposition and the public with Manley‟s approach eventually led to the 
loss of the 1980 election and the end of Jamaica‟s Democratic Socialist experiment.  
The defeat of Manley and his administration signalled the beginning of 
Jamaica Labour Party‟s, under the leadership of Edward Seaga, pursuit of Orthodox 
Liberal Development.
15
 Seaga saw that the return to neo-liberal premises was the 
global trend in economic management and openly rejected the democratic socialist 
ideology of the previous administration. The country‟s foreign policy perception 
remained consistent, however, in so far, Jamaica assuming a leading voice in the 
region and the developing world.  
 Seaga openly stressed the importance of the US to Jamaica and the 
Caribbean and placed great emphasis on establishing a close relationship with the 
US‟ Regan administration.16 Seaga‟s efforts to forge closer ties with the US were 
acknowledged by Reagan who praised Jamaica for „making freedom work‟, after 
Manley‟s time in power.17 The JLP administration worked actively to realign the 
country with the US. Jamaica also played an integral role in lobbying for the CBI, 
and thus highlighted that Jamaica was still indeed a leader in the region.
18
    
 Manley was once again re-elected to power in 1989 but he had abandoned 
his socialist rhetoric. Instead the ideas of his administration were more consistent 
with those of the prevailing international economic system such as free trade and 
liberalisation.
19
 During this time, the government has embarked on a program of 
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neoliberal reforms including the privatisation of state entities.
20
 This was largely 
because of the policy conditions associated with loans from the IMF- World Bank 
and IADB. During this period, the country also witnessed the erosion of preferential 
access to European markets. As such, the government still however, while 
embracing ideas of free trade, continued to advance the need for preferential 
treatment due to the vulnerabilities faced by their smallness.  
Since then the foreign policy stance of Jamaica and Caribbean states in 
general has been focused on diversifying its relationships with other powers. This 
dissertation argues that changes in the international system such as loss of 
preferential treatment are among the reasons behind Jamaica‟s increased relations 
with China and Japan. The rest of the discussion examines case studies of Jamaica‟s 
relationships with China and Japan. 
 
5.3. Jamaica-China Relations 
Jamaica established diplomatic relations with China on November 21, 
1972.
21
 This was in conjunction with Guyana, which based on the ideological 
standpoints of its elected socialist government, had chosen to rescind recognition of 
Taiwan.
22
 In 1973, the Chinese government opened its embassy in Kingston.
23
 
However, due to a lack of diplomatic resources, Jamaica was unable to do the same 
in Beijing. Instead, the Ambassador to Japan acted as its diplomatic representative in 
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China, as the country simply could not afford an independent embassy at that time.  
The first official delegation headed by Deputy Prime Minister David Coore, was 
sent to China on September 23-29, 1976.
24
 The visit resulted in the signing of a trade 
agreement and a commodity loan agreement pertaining to rice being sent to Jamaica 
and a protocol on a project of polyester cotton mill.
25
 The mill cost US$15 million 
and was financed by an interest-free loan spanning twenty years.
26
 
Table 5.1. Agreements Signed Between Jamaica and China 1974-1980 
Date Signed Agreement 
February 12, 1974 Technical Assistance Agreement 
September 26, 1976 Protocol on Construction of  a Cotton Polyester Spinning and 
Weaving Mill 
September 26, 1976 Trade Agreement 
September 26, 1978 Commodity Loan Agreement 
Source: Compiled by author. 
Manley‟s regime sought to expand Jamaica‟s relations beyond the Western 
hemisphere and towards socialist countries. According to Bernal, this was 
highlighted in Manley‟s party manifesto - the Principles and Objectives of the PNP, 
which stated explicitly that “the development of principled relations with socialist 
countries is also essential to the diversification of our foreign trade and the overall 
development of our economy”.27 Moreover, according to the National Planning 
Agency‟s “Emergency Production Plan of 1977”, democratic socialism entailed the 
construction of a self-reliant economy which required the diversification of 
economic relations through the “development of closer economic contracts with 
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25
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1980,” Development and Change 17 (1986). 
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1980), 59. 
129 
 
socialist countries...the strengthening of our relations with the People‟s Republic of 
China”.28 
In 1990, a Chinese delegation headed by the Minister of Textile Industry, 
Madame Wu Wenying visited Jamaica to attend the launch of the Polyester Cotton 
Mill, the first joint venture between China and Jamaica. High-level exchange visits 
during the 1980s had been at a standstill and it is only in the 1990s that they resume 
consistency.
29
 In 1991, Michael Manley was the first Prime Minister of Jamaica, to 
visit China, signing agreements on economic cooperation and the provision of 
loans.
30
 Jamaica has also received visits from its Chinese counterparts, notably from 
the Vice Premier of China in 1998, who signed an agreement for the first grant from 
the Chinese government to Jamaica and in that same year, the Prime Minister of 
Jamaica, PJ Patterson visited China and signed a preferential loan agreement.  
During his visit, Patterson explicitly expressed that in recognizing China‟s 
rapid economic growth and strength, Jamaica was interested in strengthening the 
relationship with China in order to further the country‟s economic development, 
stating that 
During the last two decades, Chinese industrial growth has been rapid and 
impressive…the Chinese government approved more than six thousand non-
financial investment projects outside China, with a cumulative investment of 
US$6 billion. My mission today is to secure for Jamaica, even a slice of that 
huge investment cake.
31
  
                                                          
28National Planning Agency, “The Emergency Production Plan,” (Kingston, April 1977), 115. 
29
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Since then, there has been a notable increase in government to government contact 
between Jamaica and China (see Figure 5.1.). At the invitation of the Jamaican 
Government, Vice President Zeng Qinghong paid an official visit to Jamaica in 
2005. During the visit, Vice President Zeng held talks with Prime Minister 
Patterson, who announced that the Jamaican government had recognized China's 
complete market economy status.
32
 Zeng also attended the first Ministerial 
Conference of the China-Caribbean Economic and Trade Cooperation Forum and 
the official Opening of the China-Caribbean Trade Fair held in Kingston. 
With China‟s growing ascendancy in the international arena and an 
increasing interest in Caribbean states, the Jamaican government felt that it was time 
to open an embassy in China but were stymied by the same lack of resources that 
had hindered its decision to do so in the 1970s.  However, on July 18, 2005, Jamaica 
was able to open its embassy with His Excellency Wayne McCook as the 
Ambassador. The Chinese government had offered to provide a building to house 
the Jamaican embassy in Beijing for three year rent-free use and in addition, the 
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government would not need to pay any utility bills and the Chinese Government 
would also provide some of the necessary staff.
33
   
Members of the Opposition in a meeting of the Standing Finance Committee 
of Parliament objected to this arrangement, however, arguing that it was 
“unbecoming of a sovereign nation” and that the government was essentially 
transferring some of its international diplomatic responsibility to China.
34
  This also 
outraged many other citizens, but the government insisted that it was the 
economically expedient thing to do.  In fact, Anthony Hylton, Minister of Foreign 
Affairs and Foreign Trade, argued that China had established similar arrangements 
with other developing countries.
35
  
More recently, Prime Minister Portia Simpson-Miller led a delegation to 
Beijing in August 2013. Jamaica has assigned great importance to its relationship 
with China as evidenced in Prime Minister Simpson-Miller‟s Budget Debate 
Presentation in April 2014, following her trip to China.  The Prime Minister in her 
address to the Jamaican Parliament asserted that 
Jamaica remains totally committed to the One China policy which has 
resulted in a vibrant and mutually beneficial bilateral cooperation programme 
and led to significant investment in the Jamaican economy...and we are 
working to deepen our relationships with strategic economic partners such as 
China.
36
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The Prime Minister‟s endorsement of the One China policy in a domestic arena is 
significant and emphasises the importance of China in Jamaica‟s economic 
development goals.  
Figure 5.1. High-Level Exchange Visits between Jamaica and China 
 
Source:  Compiled by Author 
Note: Names in bold letters represent Heads of State and Deputy Heads of State 
 
Jamaica‟s relationship with China has been intensifying since 2000. China‟s 
economic growth has provided for an increase its offering of loans, foreign direct 
Year Visits to China Visits to Jamaica 
1976-
1979 
 Deputy Prime Minister David 
Coore  
 Vice-Premier Geng Biao 
1980-
1989 
 Deputy PM and Min. of Foreign 
Affairs and Foreign Trade Hugh 
Lawson Shearer 
 Vice-Foreign Minister Han Xu 
 Vice-Minister Lu Xuejian 
1990-
1999 
 Speaker of the House of 
Representatives, Headly 
Cunningham 
 Deputy President of the Senate 
Courtney Fletcher,  
 Prime Minster Michael Manley 
 Min. of Foreign Affairs and 
Foreign Trade, Paul Robertson  
 Deputy PM and Min. of Foreign 
Affairs and Foreign Trade 
Seymour Mullings 
 Leader of JLP and former Prime 
Minister Edward Seaga 
 Speaker of the House, Carl 
Marshall 
 Prime Minister Percival James 
Patterson 
 Minister of Textile Industry 
Madame Wu Wenying 
 Vice-Chairman of the NPC, Wang 
Hanbin 
 Secretary-General of the State 
Council, LuoGan 
 Vice-Foreign Min. Liu Huaqiu 
 Chairman of the CPPCC National 
Committee, 
 Li Ruihuan 
 Vice-Premier QianQichen 
2000-
2012 
 Min. of Foreign Affairs and 
Foreign Trade Keith Desmond 
Knight 
 Prime Minister  P.J. Patterson  
 Prime Minister Bruce Golding 
 Min. of Foreign Affairs and 
Foreign Trade, Kenneth Baugh 
 Speaker of the House, Delroy 
Chuck 
 Ast. Foreign Min. Zhou Wenzhong 
 Vice-Min. of Finance,LuoJiwei 
 Vice-Chairman of NPC Foreign 
Affairs Committee, XuDengxin 
 State Councilor, Wu Yi 
  Foreign Min. Li Zhaoxing 
 Vice President ZengQinghong 
 Vice President Xi Jinping 
 Asst. Foreign Min. He Yafei  
 Vice Premier Hui Liangyu 
2013  Prime Minister  Portia Simpson-
Miller 
 Min.of Transport and Works, 
Omar Davies 
 Min.of Land, Water and 
Environment, Robert Pickersgill 
 Min. of Science, Technology and 
Mining, Phillip Paulwell 
 Min. of Education Ronald  
 Min. Sandrea Falconer 
 Min. of Finance and Planning, Dr. 
Peter Phillips 
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investment, and other aid. China has granted numerous loans to the Jamaican 
government which have included loans for infrastructural development such as 
highway construction and building of stadiums. The China Development Bank has 
financed the country‟s North/South Highway 2000 project with a loan of US$457 
million and a further $144 million in equity investment from the China Harbour 
Engineering Company (CHEC).
37
 In 2011, the cooperation programmes with China 
totalled up to US$729.6 million for assistance up to 12 projects with approximately 
US$252 million being disbursed which was an increase of US$167.7 million 
compared to the previous year.
38
 
As discussed in Chapter 4, China‟s soft use of power approach has 
manifested itself through cultural diplomacy initiatives such as the setting up of 
Confucius Institutes in many countries. This approach is consistent with China‟s 
engagement in Jamaica whereby in February 2009, the Vice-President of China, Xi 
Jinping officially handed over the Confucius Institute to The University of the West 
Indies at the Mona campus. The Institute is a partnership between the UWI and the 
Taiyuan University of Technology (TUT) and is sponsored by Hanban.
39
 The 
establishment of the Institute was born out of an agreement was signed between the 
Confucius Institute of China and the University of the West Indies for the 
establishment of a Confucius Institute at the Mona Campus for, inter alia, the 
teaching of the Chinese language, the provision of Chinese language teaching 
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resources, the training of Chinese language instructors and the conducting of 
language and cultural exchange activities. 
Jamaica‟s strengthening relationship with China is motivated by the 
country‟s need for economic restructuring, development assistance and the search 
for new markets. Interestingly, Michael Manley‟s vision of diversifying foreign 
policy strategies was ahead of his time and has come to light in the new millennium 
as Jamaica seeks to strengthen relations and expand trade with China and Japan. 
Under Manley‟s regime in the 1970s, his democratic socialism strategy entailed the 
diversification of economic development by “explor[ing] the possibilities for 
increasing our trade with the People‟s Republic of China and the possibilities for 
utilizing more assistance from that country”.40 This section continues with an 
examination of Jamaica and China‟s relationship since 2000.  
 
5.3.1. Trade and Investments:  Chinese Interest in Jamaica’s Bauxite 
Jamaica is one of three Caribbean countries endowed with natural resources 
and was the world‟s leading producer of bauxite in 1957.41 China has made several 
attempts to invest in Jamaica‟s bauxite industry, however, despite active and 
promising negotiations; they have been up until February 2014 unsuccessful. 
China‟s determination to invest in the bauxite industry highlights the drive to secure 
natural resources where possible. On June 20, 2005, an agreement was signed 
between the Chinese government, Jamaica Bauxite Institute, Jamaica Bauxite 
Mining Limited and China Minmetals Corporation aimed at the establishment of a 
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bauxite refinery in Jamaica that is projected to produce 1.4 million tons of bauxite 
per year.
42
 Additionally in 2010, the Jamaican government proposed to sell its 45 
per cent stake in the jointly owned Government of Jamaica-Alcoa-Jamalco alumina 
refinery to a Chinese company, Zhuhai Hongfan Non-ferrous Metals and Chemical 
Engineering Limited (Hongfan). However, the deal was eventually dismissed 
following concerns within the industry.
43
 
More recently, in February 2014, the Jamaican government announced that a 
Chinese owned company, Xinfa Group Company Limited - would be establishing a 
new alumina plant in the northern part of the island. The project includes the 
construction of an alumina plant with production capacity of two million tonnes per 
year and a coal-fired plant to provide energy for the alumina plant which will both 
involve foreign direct investment of approximately US$3 billion.
44
 This investment 
will allow the company to export up to 4.5 million tonnes of bauxite annually for 25 
years, in the first instance; construct a 2 million tonne per annum alumina plant to 
operate for 25 years, also in the first instance; and to construct a coal-fired power 
plant to support the alumina plant.
45
 Minister of Science, Technology, Energy and 
Mining, Phillip Paulwell stated that Cabinet appointed a negotiation team to pursue 
further negotiations to settle the terms of definitive agreements within six months. 
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Table 5.2.  Jamaica’s Trade with China in US$, 2006-2012 
Year Imports Exports  Balance of Trade 
2006 206,657,238 300,585,047 93,927,809 
2007 227,573,527 69,605,051 -157,968,475 
2008 317,921,434 1,527,959 -316,393,475 
2009 228,355,106 17,144,477 -211,210,629 
2010 242,896,231 1,801,002 -241,095,230 
2011 281,451,006 21,340,443 -260,110,563 
2012 310,772,687 11,628,151 -299,144,536 
Source: Compiled by author based on data collected from CARICOM Regional Trading                  
Information System, accessed June 27, 2014, http://www.caricomstats.info/tradsysonline. 
 
 
Figure 5.2. Jamaica’s Trade with China, 2006-2012 
 
   Source: Compiled by author based on data collected from CARICOM Regional   
Trading Information System, accessed June 27, 2014,    
http://www.caricomstats.info/tradsysonline. 
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In 2006, Jamaica notably had a trade surplus with China. However since 
then, exports to China have been decreasing significantly. By 2012, Jamaica‟s 
exports fell by approximately 96 per cent and the balance of trade was valued at 
US$-299 million. Chinese goods imported to the country, however, continue to 
increase steadily. While China‟s imports such as manufactured products offer the 
country cheaper and more attractive prices, the flooding of the market with these 
goods does present some cause for concern. For example, Jamaica relies heavily on 
tourism which presents a market for selling Jamaican souvenirs. However, even 
Jamaican souvenirs are manufactured in China due to cheaper manufacturing and 
labour costs and as such; this sidelines opportunities for local artists and businesses.  
 
5.3.2.   Construction Projects 
  
China provided the Jamaican government with a loan for the building of 
cricket stadium for the International Cricket World Cup which was held in 2007. 
This stadium diplomacy was applied across the Caribbean as is highlighted in 
Chapter 6 and is also consistent with China‟s engagement with African countries as 
well.  Though the country already had the well-known Sabina Park stadium in the 
capital city, Kingston; the Greenfield Stadium was constructed in a somewhat rural 
location at the other end of the island, Trelawny, to host the opening ceremony of 
the World Cup as well as practice matches.  
As discussed in Chapter 4, Chinese loans and grants for infrastructure projects, 
are usually associated with a supply of Chinese imported labour. This includes 
contracting Chinese construction companies as well as labourers. The Greenfield 
Stadium presents an example of such a case of conditions associated with Chinese 
138 
 
projects, when the construction of the stadium was temporarily halted due to a 
protest by local workers.
46
 The workers demonstrated against what they thought to 
too many Chinese workers on site, and argued that when they showed up for work 
that day, they had been displaced.
47
 There was no notice given to the local workers 
or the public at large, regarding a shortage of the requisite number of construction 
workers or even to displace the existing local workers. According to the project 
manager, Kevin Chin, the Chinese workers were brought in following fears that 
work schedule was falling behind and that the project would not be completed in 
time.
48
  
Bernal posits that one of the justifications for the use of Chinese labour on 
Chinese-funded projects is because they are often “lauded for the productivity”.49 
This sentiment was endorsed in an interview, whereby the official opined that while 
the importation of Chinese workers resulted in limited employment opportunities for 
locals, the Chinese work ethic was “far more impressive”.50 The Sligoville Stadium 
as well as the Montego Bay Convention Centre projects also highlight the inherent 
“strings” attached to Chinese funds. 
 In 2006, The Chinese government and the Minister of Foreign Affairs and 
Foreign Trade, K.D. Knight signed an agreement to build a multi-sports complex in 
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Sligoville, Jamaica.
51
 The Minister argued that the stadium would create job 
opportunities for local residents and serve as a community centre as well as a 
training base and sporting venue for both students and residents. The decision of 
Minister Knight to build another stadium in a remote location which not easily 
accessed may be criticised for its priority as a development project. Instead, the 
situation is one in which, yet again Parliamentarians make decisions in their own 
political interests as is evidenced here in the Minister‟s decision to build a multi-
million sports complex in his constituency.
52
 Shortly after the stadium had been 
completed, Chinese officials publicly expressed disappointment at the fact that the 
stadium had not been used.
53
   
The story is quite similar with the building of the Montego Bay Convention 
centre which was branded as a “major outlet to garner foreign exchange from the 
lucrative meetings and conventions market”.54  The complex was constructed at a 
cost of US$51.7 million and was expected to have an economic impact valued at 
US$122.3 billion.
55
  Instead, it was reported that 3 years later that US$1 million per 
month was being spent to maintain the centre and it was earning significantly less.  
This sparked much criticism as it marks yet another case of a „white elephant‟.  One 
prominent businessman in Montego Bay voiced his dissatisfaction and 
disappointment with the waste of resources, arguing that the government should 
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instead transform this white elephant into diamonds, lobbying for the centres to be 
used as university campuses. 
The Convention Centre was financed with Chinese loans with 2 per cent per 
annum interest for 20 years. The Sligoville and the Greenfield stadiums were 
similarly financed loans with interest rates of 3 per cent. Despite this attractively low 
interest, the Opposition and the wider public have raised concern relating to the 
efficacy of constructing buildings stadiums which seemingly offer little 
development opportunities.  
 
5.3.3.  COMPLANT Sugar and CHEC Logistics Hub 
 In 2011, the Jamaican Government divested its remaining state owned assets 
of the sugar industry to the Chinese owned company – COMPLANT. In an attempt 
to fuel investment into the failing sugar industry and to reduce and remove further 
accumulation of debt, the deal was made for three sugar factories; Frome, Bernard 
Lodge and Monymusk, as well as the land immediately surrounded them to be sold 
for $744 million.
56
 In addition, acres of government land which had been earmarked 
for growing sugar cane was leased to the company as a part of the deal.  
In discussion with the researcher, a Jamaican official opined that the deal 
was a relief for the government and was well-welcomed, as the sugar industry was 
not thriving, and as such, they were accumulating debt.
57
 Moreover the industry, he 
stated, needed revitalizing including the updating of machinery that the government 
simply could not afford. When questioned about the conditionalities associated with 
the deal, the official simply replied that they were “minimal”, in exchange for such a 
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great deal.
58
 The government argued that COMPLANT would be relieving them of 
future debt while potentially rebooting the industry, and by extension, providing 
more jobs for local workers.  
Interestingly, the details of the deal were disclosed to show that the 
government had in fact granted the Chinese company with several tax incentives, 
which included relief from corporate income tax, withholding tax, customs duty and 
stamp duty for 20 years.
59
 Moreover, the General Consumption Tax (GCT) would 
be waivered in respect of business, purchase of agricultural material and the likes. 
Members of the Opposition argued that other players in the industry felt they were 
being disadvantaged and that others in the divestment process claimed that their 
arrangements were much different. Issues surrounding the lack of transparency with 
the signing of these deals again became obvious as officials enter agreements 
without prior full disclosure. 
Jamaica‟s most recent agreement with China involves a project planned for 
Goat Islands.
60
 China Harbour Engineering Company (CHEC) plans to build a $1.5 
billion trans-shipment port and logistics hub there to take advantage of the 
expansion of the Panama Canal.
61
 However, the logistics hub has stirred great 
controversy in Jamaica. The Goat Islands is in the middle of the Portland Bight 
Protected Area and covers an area 1,900 sq km of mangroves, coastal swamps, cays 
and coral reefs. There is already some industrial activity and fishing in the area but 
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the Jamaica Environment Trust fears the port project will destroy the habitat of 
vulnerable species, such as the Jamaican iguana. 
Munroe argues that Chinese investment is both an opportunity and a 
potential disaster.
62
 He opines that while the country needs more investment, the 
government desperation could lead it to yield too much on environmental and labour 
standards. This sentiment is echoed across the development world where concern 
exists that due to the economic predicament of countries, they are desperate to 
accept aid without proper thought of conditionalities that may be associated with 
this aid. Minister Phillips, Jamaica‟s finance minister has argues that “we have to be 
mindful of our interests but also mindful of operating in a global world. There is no 
evidence of anything untoward in the Chinese presence here in Jamaica.”63 
The Goat Islands plan is yet another issue of the lack of transparency and 
complete disclosure associated with foreign policy making decisions and moreover, 
with agreements made with China. The agreement to fund this initiative was further 
negotiated and signed upon Prime Minister Simpson-Miller‟s recent visit to Beijing 
which emphasises the role of the individual at the levels of analysis.  Time and time 
again, decisions are made without full disclosure and discussion in Parliament. This 
project also highlights the environmental impact as unlike in the case of Japan 
(discussed later); Chinese investors do not hold environmental concern at the helm 
of development ventures.  
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5.3.4.  Consistent ‘One China Policy’ and Support in International Fora 
Jamaica‟s support of the One China policy has been unwavering since it first 
established diplomatic ties in 1972. In 2005, Prime Minister PJ Patterson during his 
visit to Beijing declared that the government would continue to firmly uphold the 
One China policy and would be willing to work with China to promote the 
development of bilateral relations and the cooperation between Caribbean countries 
and China.
64
 
The discourse on Jamaica‟s relations with China is loaded with rhetoric of  
South-South cooperation, common development, mutually beneficial cooperation 
and mutual trust. Jamaica‟s consistent diplomatic recognition has not gone 
unnoticed by its Chinese counterparts. In their speeches, Chinese officials have 
acknowledge Jamaica‟s staunch support. In 2004, Ambassador of China to Jamaica, 
His Excellency, Zhao Zheng expressed China‟s “high appreciation to the Jamaican 
government‟s strong support to the One China policy”.65 
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5.4.  Jamaica-Japan Relations 
Jamaica and Japan established diplomatic ties on March 16, 1964, shortly 
after the Caribbean country had gained its independence in 1962.  Since then, both 
countries have enjoyed 50 years of a “long-standing and time-honoured” friendship.  
On February 17, 1992, the embassy of Jamaica was opened in Tokyo with His 
Excellency, Derrick Heaven as ambassador. Three years later, the first resident 
ambassador of Japan was appointed in Kingston. Moreover, the Honorary Consulate 
of Jamaica in Kobe, Japan was opened on June 10, 1996, headed by the president of 
the UCC Ueshima Coffee Company Limited and chairman of the Association of 
Japanese Importers of Jamaica Coffee, Tatsushi Ueshima.
66
 
Jamaica and Japan‟s relationship has strengthened over the years with many 
high level exchange visits such as former Prime Minister of Jamaica, PJ Patterson to 
Tokyo in 1997 and Their Imperial Highnesses Prince and Princess Akishino to 
Jamaica in 1997.
67
 Most recently in November 2013, Prime Minister Portia 
Simpson- Miller visited Tokyo to  mark the 50
th
 anniversary of diplomatic relations 
between Jamaica and Japan and to pave the way for further strengthening of bonds 
of friendship, cooperation, trade and investments between both countries.
68
 Having 
visited China three months prior, Prime Minister Simpson-Miller, returned to the 
Asia-Pacific region to remind the Japanese Government, that in spite of Jamaica‟s 
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expanded relationship with China, Jamaica continues to assign importance to the 
relations with Tokyo and to value balance in their foreign policy.
69
 
 Japan has been a traditional friend of Jamaica for the past 50 years and has 
provided development cooperation and served as a market for Jamaica‟s Blue 
Mountain coffee and cultural goods and services.
70
 Since 1995, Jamaica has 
received some US$5 million in funding assistance from the Government of Japan's 
Grant Assistance for Grass-Roots and Human Security Projects (GGP).
71
 As Japan‟s 
ODA strategy started to evolve in the new millennium so did its relationship with 
Jamaica. Jamaica continues to benefit from Japanese aids and loans in the areas of 
disaster relief and Human Grass roots projects. Under the Grant Assistance for 
Grassroots projects, Japan has provided US$2.9 million to implement the Social and 
Economic Inclusion of Persons with Disabilities project as well as US$82,870 for 
Father Holung‟s Missionaries of the Poor charity.72 Moreover, Japanese investments 
in Jamaica‟s agricultural and energy sectors have been increasing. The remainder of 
this chapter will continue the discussion on Jamaica‟s use of natural and value-based 
resources in its foreign policy strategies towards Japan.  
 
5.4.1.  Trade and Investments 
Japan has been an important trading partner for Jamaica but the balance of 
trade has been heavily in favour of Japan. Table 5.2 shows that in 2006, imports 
from Japan were valued at US$212 million compared to US$29 million worth of 
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exports to Japan. In 2012, the trade imbalance was still significant with US$209 
million worth of Japanese imported goods as compared to US$11 million worth of 
exported goods to Japan.  
New and used motor vehicles represent the main items imported from Japan 
and accounts for around 90 per cent of the total imports from Japan. The main 
exported item from Jamaica to Japan is coffee.  
 
 
Table 5.3. Selected Imports from and Exports to Japan in US$ Million, 
2006-2012 
 
 Road Vehicles  Total   Coffee  Total  
2006 182 212 27 29 
2007 201 228 26 28 
2008 169 193 22 24 
2009 100 118 29 30 
2010 104 121 15 16 
2011 129 150 13 14 
2012 190 209 10 11 
Source: Compiled by author based on data collected from CARICOM Regional Trading 
Information System, accessed June 27, 2014, http://www.caricomstats.info/tradsysonline. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Year Imports Exports 
147 
 
5.4.1.1.  Blue Mountain Coffee 
Jamaica‟s coffee industry is the second largest income earner in its 
agricultural sector. The Japanese market has, over the years, accounted for 
approximately 80 per cent of Blue Mountain Coffee imports.
73
  However, by 2012, 
this was reduced to about 60 per cent and at depreciated prices due to the global 
economic slump.
74
 Previously, Japanese importers have provided advance payments 
to Jamaica for the purchase of cherry coffee and its processing into green beans for 
export. It has been customary for Japanese importers to keep approximately 1.5years 
of inventory of Jamaican Blue Mountain coffee.
75
 However, arising from the global 
recession, gourmet coffee sales have declined in Japan and therefore, existing 
inventories remain high. Moreover, Jamaican Blue Mountain Coffee has been facing 
strong competition in Japan from other premium coffees that are less expensive. 
Figure 5.1.below shows the decline in coffee exports to Japan since 2010.  In 2009, 
coffee exports to Japan were valued at US$29 million, however, in 2010 fell to 
US$15 million. 
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Figure 5.3. Coffee Exports to Japan, 2006-2012  
Source: Compiled by author based on Data collected from the Coffee             
Industry Board of Jamaica, accessed June 20, 2013,  
http://www.ciboj.org/index.php. 
 
 The Jamaican coffee industry has depended solely on the Japanese market 
over the years and has failed to tap into the other markets. With the recent decline, in 
demand from Japan, Jamaica has to find other strategies to generate resurgence in 
the Japanese market. One such measure is the expansion of marketing strategies by 
Japan‟s Ueshima Coffee Company (UCC).76 Such strategies include a million dollar 
campaign with television advertisements, point-of-sale material and brand messages 
within cafes. 
 
5.4.1.2. Marubeni Corporation and Nippon Light Metal 
 
Japan‟s private sector investment in Jamaica‟s energy sector is growing. 
Marubeni Corporation, a Japanese owned company became a major shareholder of 
the Jamaica Public Service (JPS) in 2007 when it purchased 80 per cent of the shares 
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of the company.
77
 However, in 2011, Marubeni sold 50 per cent of its shares to the 
Korea East-West Power Company Ltd. The Jamaican government retained 19.9 per 
cent stake and 0.1 held by private entities. The details of the transaction were not 
disclosed to the public. 
 More recently, in 2013 Japanese investors has shown interest in the Jamaica 
bauxite industry. Nippon Light Metal of Japan signed a Memorandum of 
Understanding with the Jamaica Bauxite Institute to set up a pilot project to extract 
rare earth elements from the country‟s red mud.  The goal is to extract 1,500 metric 
tonnes each year and both Jamaica and Nippon will each have 50 per cent share in 
the results of the project.
78
 The rare earth minerals, according to Jamaica‟s Mining 
Minister Phillip Paulwell, attracts rates of up to US$3500 kg compared to alumina 
which attracts only US$330 per ton.
79
 
Unlike with the case of China‟s interest in Jamaican bauxite, Japan shares an 
environmental concern along with its economic considerations. In the event that 
environmental concerns are overwhelming, projects are abandoned.
80
 The Nippon 
Light Metal company will first conduct a pilot plant study to identify any 
environmental implications and to see how best they can be managed. Mining 
Minster Phillip Paulwell was also a part of the Prime Minister‟s delegation to Tokyo 
in November 2013, where they met with the Nippon Light Metal Company to 
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continue talks about the programme. 
 
 
5.4.2. Cooperation in International Fora 
Japan has recognized the strength of Jamaica‟s diplomatic power and the leading 
role in which the country assumes on the regional and international level. According 
to Prime Minister Simpson-Miller, her recent visit to Tokyo “helped to cement the 
position of Jamaica in the eyes of Japan as the leader of the Caribbean region”.81 
The Japanese government has reiterated the need to realise as early as possible 
the reform of the UN Security Council with the expansion of permanent and non-
permanent membership. In speeches, they have voiced their appreciation to 
CARICOM states for the importance which it attaches to reform generally especially 
highlight the directive of CARICOM Heads of State and Government in February 
2013 which called for “greater urgency in achieving lasting Security Council 
Reform” as well as the initiative of CARICOM to reinvigorate the 
Intergovernmental Negotiation process.
82
 During Simpson-Miller‟s visit, along with 
Prime Minister Abe, she affirmed the role and importance of the United Nations in 
maintaining peace and security, and stressed the need for Security Council reform in 
order to improve its effectiveness, transparency and representativeness. The two 
prime ministers recalled the commitment by international leaders on early reform of 
the Security Council in the Outcome Document of the 2005 World Summit, and 
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stressed the need to intensify efforts to achieve concrete outcomes by 2015 at the 
latest.
83
 The two prime ministers reiterated their will to cooperate and enhance 
dialogue to achieve reform of the UN Security Council.
84
 
Japan has asked for the support of CARICOM Member States for Japan‟s 
candidature for election as a non-permanent member of the Security Council in 
2008, while appreciating the support already expressed by some CARICOM 
Member States, as well as CARICOM‟s support for Japan‟s candidature at other 
elections such as the UN Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) in 2008, the 
Human Rights Council in 2008 and the Advisory Committee on Administrative and 
Budgetary Questions (ACABQ) in November 2007. 
With regards to Security Council reform, Japan spares no effort to coordinate 
with CARICOM. In the 6th Meeting of the Council for Foreign and Community 
Relations (COFCOR) in Trinidad and Tobago, Parliamentary Vice-Minister for 
Foreign Affairs Minoru Kiuchi had a fruitful discussion with CARICOM Foreign 
Ministers on how to further advance the Japan-CARICOM relations, in particular on 
Security Council reform. Japan highly appreciates the active efforts of CARICOM 
toward early reform of the Security Council, based on the expansion in both the 
permanent and non-permanent categories.
85
 
Similarly, CARICOM has in the past, sought Japan‟s support for the 
candidature of Jamaica for a seat on the Council of the International Maritime 
Organization in November 2007. They have also received support for the 
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candidatures of Trinidad and Tobago for election to the Council of the International 
Civil Aviation Authority (ICAO) 2007, Saint Lucia‟s candidature for membership to 
the UN ECOSOC for 2008-2010, and the candidature of Guyana to the International 
Criminal Court in 2009 through the person of Judge Mohamed Shahabuddeen.
86
 
 
5.5. Explaining Jamaica’s Foreign Policy Behaviour  
Having presented specific cases about Jamaica‟s engagement with China and 
Japan, and highlighted certain aspects of these interactions, this section of the 
chapter will look at what motivates and explains the foreign policy behaviour of 
Jamaica towards China and Japan. This is also done in Chapter 6, in an attempt to 
highlight similarities and differences which can be use to make some conclusions on 
the general behaviour of Caribbean small states. This dissertation argues that all 
three levels of analysis can be used to examine the behaviour of Caribbean states in 
their foreign policy decision-making and strategies. 
 
The System Level 
System level variables, according to Braveboy-Wagner, are useful in 
explaining both the influences and the constraints on the behaviour of Caribbean 
states.
87
 In the earlier part of this chapter which examined the background of 
Jamaica‟s foreign policy, we saw how the structure of the international system 
during the Cold War for example impacted their behaviour, with constraints 
stemming from their political geopolitical closeness with the US. Jamaica has 
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attempted over the years to form alliances with the Third World as well as its 
Caribbean counterparts in order increase their overall power in the international 
system. 
Today, the constraints stem from the replacement of one-way preferential 
system by two-way free trade agreements which resulted in a loss of preferential 
market access treatment for Caribbean states. Consequently, they have faced some 
difficulties in readjusting themselves into the current international economic arena 
compounded by the fact that most of their economies have been heavily dependent 
on the agricultural sector and their products lack competitiveness in an open market.  
The effects of globalization and economic liberalization have pushed Jamaica to 
increase its diplomatic and economic activity with countries outside of US and 
Europe. 
 
The Individual Level 
The Prime Ministers over the years have been integral to Jamaica‟s foreign 
policy decision-making. This points to the importance of the individual level of 
analysis in the Jamaican context. We have seen where the ideological stance of the 
Prime Minister has influenced the foreign policy strategies pursued by Jamaica in 
the cases of Manley and Seaga for example. The latter leaders have been less 
ideological and mostly driven by domestic interests including economy as well as 
their own political interests. 
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The State Level  
 As seen in the literature reviewed in Chapter 2, the domestic level has been 
overlooked in explaining the foreign policy behaviour of small states. However, this 
dissertation argues, that all three levels are important and that they are linked in their 
influence on Caribbean foreign policy. In the case of Jamaica, the country‟s 
domestic interests motivate its foreign policy goals as the primary motivation is 
driven by the need for economic development.  
 From the case studies presented, we can observe how due to the nature of 
Jamaica‟s political system, agreements entered into with China for example, are 
often times done without full disclosure of the details. This lack of transparency 
resulted in issues regarding labour importation as well as unnecessary high-
maintenance infrastructural gifts. Here, the interplay between the state and 
individual levels is evident as the political system in place, gives the ruling party 
control over the country‟s legislative agenda.  
 Braveboy-Wagner argues that the emphasis of the individual and leadership 
suggests that there a limited role for Oppositions in small Caribbean states.
88
 
Theoretically, as discussed in Chapter 3, the main decision-making body, the 
Cabinet, is responsible to Parliament and due to the strong Parliamentary majority, 
the opposition has very little if any influence at all. The Opposition‟s role is 
seemingly to keep the government in check.  In the case studies, it is evident that the 
Opposition is not involved in the discussion of agreements prior to signing. 
However, the voice of the Opposition is growing increasingly loud and to some 
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extent, this has allowed for some amount of accountability on the part of the 
government. 
 In addition to the voice of the Opposition, has been the voice of NGO‟s 
regarding environmental considerations surrounding investments. For example, in 
the case of Japan‟s interest in the bauxite industry, there has been an expressed 
concern by environmental groups regarding the impact of mining on the Jamaican 
environment. However, consistent with Japanese investments, emphasis is placed on 
these considerations unlike in the case of China. There has been a campaign by 
environmental groups and the general public to lobby against the Logistics Hub port 
to be established by CHEC on the environmentally protected Goat Islands. The 
Caribbean Coastal Area Management Foundation has commissioned a study of the 
alternatives to the port development plans, stressing concern that there has been a lot 
of discussion on the issue but that the government has presented very little facts.
89
  
 With the widespread availability of news via the internet as well as the 
Access to Information Act, there has been growing coverage and in effect, interest 
among the Jamaican public regarding foreign policy issues. Jamaicans have been 
paying close attention to the government‟s relationship with China in the name of 
economic development and have raised concerns pertaining to issues of  
1) Government spending on diplomatic activities – for example, trips of 
Prime Minister to China and 
2) Issues relating to Investments such as environmental concerns and in the 
case of China, labour importation. 
                                                          
89
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The overarching question remains however, whether the opinion of the Opposition, 
NGO‟s, media and the general public are actually taken into account in policy 
formulation. While they are not a part of the decision-making process and this is 
partly attributed to the nature of the political system and shows the importance of 
domestic matters in Jamaica‟s behaviour, there is to some extent an influence in 
keeping the government in check and balance. In Chapter 6, we will observe a more 
direct role of political parties for example, on foreign policy motives. 
 The following chapter explores the foreign policy strategy of Grenada. It 
shows how Grenada and other Caribbean countries have been relying solely on their 
value-based resources for economic gains. The chapter explores Grenada‟s use of 
unorthodox strategies in its foreign policies towards China and Japan.    
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CHAPTER 6 
Grenada’s Use of Value-based Resources for Economic Gain 
 
6.1.  Overview of Chapter 
Grenada, with a population of only 105,483 and land size of 344 sq km, has 
had a notable political and economic history. Following the aftermath of the 
Grenadian revolution in 1983 and subsequent US invasion, the country has been 
seeking to revive and diversify its economy. However, Grenada has continued to 
encounter numerous setbacks in doing so. Among them is the drastic decline in 
tourist arrivals from the US following the 9/11 terrorist attacks. By 2002, the 
number of tourist arrivals was 271,571 which was a 13.6 per cent reduction from the 
year 2000.
1
  
Grenada‟s economy is also driven by its agricultural sector which provides 
20 per cent of the world‟s supply of nutmeg, making them the world‟s second 
largest producer.
2
  However, hurricanes Ivan and Emily in 2004 and 2005 caused 
extensive damage across the country thus severely hindering both its tourism and 
agricultural industries.
3
 The country is also well known for its offshore financial 
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industry but this too suffered a downfall in 2001 as a result of being blacklisted by 
the Paris-based Financial Action Task Force due to concerns of money laundering.
4
 
Grenada has been trying to boost its economy in this changing international 
relations especially in an attempt to reduce the economic vulnerability associated 
with its small size. As a result, the use of unorthodox development strategies may be 
considered as an important component of Grenada‟s economic adjustment strategy. 
This chapter examines Grenada‟s relationships with China and Japan; arguing that 
the increased engagement with both countries is rooted in the need for economic 
development. China and Japan have been providing the country with well-needed 
financial assistance. For example, in the aftermath of hurricanes Ivan and Emily, 
Grenada received technical assistance from the Japanese Social Development Fund 
to buy seeds, fertilizer and pesticide.
5
  
 The first section of this chapter provides a brief overview of Grenada‟s 
political and economic history. The discussion then continues with an exploration of 
Grenada‟s relationship with China and the country‟s decision to switch recognition 
from Taiwan to China. The relationship shared between Grenada and Japan, and the 
importance of Grenada‟s membership in the International Whaling Commission 
(IWC) to this relationship is also examined. The chapter wraps up by extending the 
analysis to include other small Caribbean countries in a similar position as Grenada.  
Grenada largely lacks the commodities that would be of high value to China 
and Japan as the country is not a major producer of raw materials or food. Thus, 
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generating much speculation about the reasons behind China and Japan‟s interest in 
this Caribbean state. Unlike, in the case of Jamaica which has bauxite for example, 
Grenada‟s main exports include nutmeg which is not a high value product for either 
Asian country, and for which Indonesia is an alternate and the largest producer. 
Hence, this chapter argues that China and Japan have other interests beyond 
economic development. These interests are related to political security and global 
status. The argument made in this chapter is that Grenada has been using its value-
based resources to diversify its economy and also in its foreign policy towards China 
and Japan.  
The case studies presented highlight that the loans and aid provided by 
China, for example, are associated with underlying conditions such as the use of 
Chinese labour. However, despite this the country still pursues an active relationship 
with China. The final section of this chapter shows that the trade deficit with both 
Asian countries is widening. While, China and Japan have been given increased 
access to Grenada‟s markets; Grenada, largely due to its limited resource base, has 
not been able to penetrate their markets.  
 
6.2.  Grenada’s Economic and Political History since Independence 
Grenada‟s political history is characterized by coup d‟états, a revolutionary 
regime and US invasion. The first coup occurred in 1979, when Eric Gairy who had 
been Prime Minister since the country gained its independence in 1974, was ousted 
out of power by Maurice Bishop, leader of the People‟s Revolutionary Government 
160 
 
(PRG).
6
 The Bishop administration operated under a „non-capitalist development‟7 
strategy which posited that  
the construction of socialism was not dependent on the prior emergence and 
full development of capitalism: the task could be begun before the material 
and productive prerequisites for socialist transition were available and the 
capitalist phase thereby effectively bypassed or interrupted.8 
This doctrine shaped the thinking and actions of the leading elements of the PRG in 
Grenada during this time. 
Bishop‟s government sought to establish a mixed economy. This, he 
explained was part of the country‟s development strategy which would “continue to 
draw on the skills, experiences, resources and connections of the patriotic elements 
within the Grenadian private sector”.9 What this meant essentially, was that though 
the state would lead the development process and plan the economy; it would also 
enlist the cooperation of the private sector, in an attempt to boost production and 
offset the limitations of the state sector. The government identified the areas of 
agriculture, tourism and manufacture as the key sectors of the economy. 
In acknowledging the country‟s lack of natural resources, the government 
sought to strengthen its tourism industry and as such, it was necessary to improve 
the facilities of the existing airport.  The Cuban government, according to Payne and 
Sutton, agreed to provide more than half the cost of the project, in a gesture of 
“revolutionary solidarity”.10 This gesture, however, came under significant criticism 
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such as Professor R. Ulyanovsky. The theory had a tendency to be associated exclusively with the 
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and opposition from the US as they feared that the airport could be used by the 
Soviet Union to infiltrate Latin America and the Caribbean.  In addition to that, the 
number of tourist arrivals began to decline and subsequently, the tourism industry 
instead had a disastrous impact on the wider economy. The government‟s attempt to 
boost the tourism industry was seemingly “incompatible with the anti-imperialist, 
pro-soviet and pro-Cuban character” of the PRG‟s foreign policy.11   
Grenada‟s development strategy proved to be too rigid amidst the external 
environment. In 1983, the county engaged in a violent internal conflict which 
escalated into a tragic and bloody end of the regime, and further resulted in the 
murder of Bishop and subsequent US invasion of the country. The collapse of the 
Grenadian revolution marked the end of the radical era in Caribbean economic and 
political development. 
                             
6.2.1.   Economic Adjustment and Offshore Banking 
In Chapter 3, the use of unorthodox strategies by Caribbean states such as 
the trading of value-based resources as a development strategy was discussed. 
Grenada is one such example, whereby the government of Grenada attempted to 
revive and diversify its economy in 1997 by establishing the country as an offshore 
financial centre12.  Offshore services offered in Grenada included offshore medical 
schools, offshore finance (offshore banks and insurance), international business 
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Caribbean countries in an attempt to shift their reliance on agriculture to tourism encountered 
challenges to sustaining growth in this industry such as their vulnerability to natural disasters. As a 
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companies, international trusts, economic citizenship, offshore gambling.13 There 
were 3400 international banks registered by 2004 and thus the offshore financial 
sector seemed successful in providing Grenada with a new development strategy.  
Among the benefits in establishing an off-shore sector are financial contributions to 
communities, sports, culture and civil society at large as well as job creation both 
directly within the sector and through linkages. In Grenada, offshore banks made 
substantial financial contributions in this regard and expenditure increased from 
US$26,000 in 1998 to US $92,600 in 1999.
14
 Moreover, over 200 jobs were created 
directly within the sector for Grenadians.
15
   
Grenada was, however, added to the non-cooperative list of the Financial 
Action Task Force in 2001 which was in part due to problems associated with the 
collapse of the First International Bank of Grenada collapsed where investors were 
reportedly cheated out of US$170million.16 This setback affected the Grenadian 
economy tremendously and later coupled with the effects from subsequent 
hurricanes left the country in a predicament and as such may be considered as one of 
the reasons for its increased engagement with China and Japan.  
In 2013, Grenada announced that it would be reviving a “citizen-by-
investment” program which allows investors to buy local citizenship.17 The country 
had previously engaged in the program before suspending it in October 2001, during 
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which passports were sold to investors for approximately US$40,000.
18
 This shows 
yet another case whereby Grenada uses its value-based resources for economic gain. 
The case studies below will illustrate that Grenada has been doing the same in their 
engagement with China and Japan. 
 
6.3.  Grenada-China Relations 
Grenada has had a fluctuating relationship with China, switching back and 
forth between China and Taiwan over the last 40 years. After gaining its 
independence in 1974, Grenada established diplomatic relations with Taiwan. 
During this time, several high level visits were exchanged between both countries. 
By October 1985, switched recognition to China which would, however, be severed 
just four years later, after the country re-established ties with Taiwan.  This was 
following the election of the Herbert Blaize, leader of the National Democratic 
Congress (NDC) as the party had forged close ties with the Taiwanese government.19 
This highlights the importance of domestic politics in the foreign policy decision-
making process.   
In 2004, following the economic downturn from their blacklisting, and the 
effects of Hurricane Ivan
20
 which caused severe damage to the island‟s 
infrastructure, Grenada established ties with China once more. 21 After the hurricane, 
the Taiwanese government had given immediate assistance even sending a 
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delegation from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to tour affected areas. Grenada was 
provided US$200,000 in supplies and turned a US$1.5 million fund for 
infrastructure projects into a disaster-relief fund.
22
 The destruction of the National 
Cricket Stadium, formerly known as Queen‟s Park which was originally built from 
proceeds of a Taiwanese loan in 1997 was probably the trigger of Grenada‟s 
decision to switch recognition. The International Cricket Council (ICC) World Cup 
was scheduled to be held in March 2007 in the Caribbean. Hence, the government 
needed to rebuild the stadium in order to keep its commitment to host matches. 
Taiwan offered $6million in aid and to rebuild the stadium. However, this package 
was unsatisfactory and following the case of Dominica23, the government turned to 
China.24  
 
6.3.1.  Switching Recognition from Taiwan to China 
On December 12-16 2004, Prime Minister Keith Mitchell and his foreign 
minister, Elvin Nimrod, made an official trip to China, which stirred great 
controversy and particular discontent with its Taiwanese counterparts since at that 
time, Grenada still officially recognized Taiwan.
25
 Prime Minister Mitchell‟s visit to 
China was therefore an indirect severance of diplomatic relations with Taiwan. 
China provided Grenada with monetary assistance to expand the national stadium in 
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time to host the Cricket World Cup in 2007, and the construction of 2000 housing 
units, thus resuming diplomatic relations between the two.
26
 In addition, China 
offered the Grenadian government a $6 million grant to compensate for the loss of 
support from Taiwan, $1million scholarship fund and $2.5 million financial grant.27 
 
Figure 6.1.  Timeline of Grenada’s Diplomatic Relations with   
  China and Taiwan  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Compiled by author. 
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On January 28, 2005, the government of Taiwan issued a strongly worded 
statement formally severing ties with Grenada, stating that it regretted that  
The government of Grenada, being lured through financial incentives from
 the People‟s Republic of China, has decided to establish diplomatic relations
 with China. In order to uphold our national interests and dignity, the
 government of the Republic of China has decided to sever diplomatic
 relations with Grenada.
28
 
Moreover, Taiwan likened the conduct of the Grenadian government with regards to 
its decision to switch recognition to that of “extortion-like behaviour”, asserting that 
Prime Minister Mitchell had incorrectly believed that “by his leaning towards the 
People‟s Republic of China, Taiwan can be pressured into significantly increasing 
the financial assistance we provide to Grenada”.29 
 The Taiwanese Export-Import Bank filed a lawsuit in December 2006 
against Grenada seeking the repayment of US$28.1 million loans given to the 
country before it broke ties in 2005.
30
 The suit was regarding the repayment of loans 
negotiated between 1990 and 2000 by Mitchell‟s administration which among them, 
were loans issued for the construction of the Queen‟s Park Stadium, and other 
infrastructure payments.
31
 The lawsuit was filed after the Grenadian government had 
decided to switch recognition to China few months prior and they Grenadian were 
unable to immediately pay back the loans in full. On June 15, 2005, shortly after the 
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breaking ties, the Taiwanese Ex-IM bank issued a written notice of default with 
regards to four loans that had been issued.32  
In January 2007, the court ruled that the Grenada government owed the 
Taiwanese government and was ordered to repay the loans in full. Grenada‟s 
defense rested on their inability to pay their debt due to the challenges faced by the 
hurricanes in 2004 and 2005. However, the judge found that this was not a sufficient 
excuse as the agreements had not provided for the delay or suspension of payments 
under these special circumstances. Based on the court‟s ruling, the Export-Import 
Bank had been collecting payments owed to Grenada by airlines and cruise ship 
companies.33 However, in 2012, a US court released Grenada from the earlier court 
order that had allowed the EXIM bank to seize tourism-related revenues to pay off 
the loans.34 
Grenada‟s decision to switch recognition in 2004 highlights the influence of 
the individual level in the foreign policy behavior of small states, whereby, the 
Prime Minister has the power to make decision. Moreover, the interplay of domestic 
and foreign is witnessed as early as 1989, when the NDC switches recognition due 
to its party alignment. Taiwan‟s law suit against Grenada is a concrete example of 
cases where leaders of small states make decisions without complete assessment or 
prior consultation. Rather, decisions are made based on immediate economic goals 
and the need for survival. In this case, Grenada needed to rebuild the cricket stadium 
and China presented a more attractive package. 
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6.3.2. Chinese Imported Labour  
The financing of infrastructural projects by China whether in the form of 
grants or loans is usually associated with conditions such as the supply of labour. 
This is consistent with Chinese support in developing countries in Africa and even 
closer to home, The Bahamas, as discussed previously in chapter 4. The case was 
similar in the rebuilding of Grenada‟s Queen‟s Park stadium which was gifted to the 
county by China. Approximately 500 Chinese workers were reportedly brought in to 
work on the stadium because the project had to be completed quickly in time to host 
the cricket World Cup.
35
 However, members of the opposition and public later 
argued that a protocol was needed to curb the mass importation of Chinese workers 
to even the playing field with opportunities for locals.36 
As discussed earlier, infrastructure projects funded by the Chinese 
government are executed by Chinese companies and workers. The case is the same 
regarding projects by Chinese investors whereby Chinese companies, workers and 
even equipment are used.  In December 2012, an agreement was signed for the 
construction of a $200 million resort complex in Grenada.
37
 The Bacolet Bay Resort 
and Spa was financed by the Chinese investors and built by the China Machinery 
Engineering Corporation. It was announced that 50 jobs would be provided for 
locals during the construction of the resort.
38
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6.3.3. Extension to other Caribbean States 
Grenada‟s fluctuating relationship with China bears a striking resemblance to 
that of Dominica‟s. The Dominican government switched recognition from Taiwan 
to China in March 2004 which was disclosed in a notable address to the nation by 
the country‟s Prime Minister Roosevelt Skerrit.39 This decision generated much 
skeptism from citizens as there had been no discussion in parliament or with the 
public regarding the decision to make the diplomatic switch in recognition. Skerrit, 
however, argued that while he was aware of the lack of public knowledge regarding 
the diplomatic switch, “confidentiality was required because at that time we had 
formal relations with Taiwan”.40  This is quite similar to the case of Grenada and 
stresses one of the main arguments of this dissertation which is the important role 
the state and individual level play in the foreign policies of Caribbean states. As 
illustrated in Chapter 3, the political system in the Caribbean is one which affords 
the leader power to make decisions without consultation with opposition or the 
public.  
The China-Taiwan dimension was also active in the Caribbean prior to the 
Grenada and Dominica cases. In 1997, diplomatic recognition of China and Taiwan 
in St. Lucia was polarized along political lines leading up to its elections. 
Recognition of the One China policy became closely linked to the country‟s 
domestic politics as was evident by the support of China by Dr. Kenny Anthony and 
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the St. Lucia Labor Party and support of Taiwan by Sir John Compton and the 
United Workers Party.
41   
Upon Dr. Anthony‟s election as Prime Minister, he immediately switched 
recognition of Taiwan to China. Under his administration, China provided assistance 
for the construction of a national stadium in time to host the ICC World Cup, 
consistent with China‟s activities in other Caribbean countries.  The China-Taiwan 
issue became once again pervasive in St. Lucia‟s domestic politics during their 
elections in 2007 when the newly elected Prime Minister Compton, re-established 
ties with Taiwan once more.
42
 The St. Lucia case is different from that of Grenada 
and Dominica in the sense that it still currently recognizes Taiwan. However, what 
is more important are the similarities among the cases which highlight how the 
China-Taiwan battle influences the domestic politics of Caribbean states and are 
grounded in their search for economic attainment.      
 Recognition of the One China policy is an important component in the 
relations of the Caribbean states and China. The luring of aids and investments in 
the cases presented in exchange for recognition of China further highlights the 
creative use of value-based resources by these small states without other resources to 
offer. Furthermore, the discourse by Caribbean and Chinese leaders on support for 
the One China policy also highlights its importance in the foreign policies pursued 
towards China.  
Moreover, as China‟s rise continues, it will need to strengthen its support 
from Caribbean states. The value-based resources of the Caribbean are seemingly 
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well sought after as they represent not only votes in the international arena but also 
quality votes and advocacy. China has acknowledged the leading role that Caribbean 
delegates play in multilateral organizations. For example, President Xi Jinping 
during his visit to the Caribbean in June 2013, stated explicitly China‟s interest in 
nurturing the support of these small states,  
as Antigua and Barbuda will hold the rotating chair of the 68
th
 session of the 
UN General Assembly, China is willing to strengthen coordination and 
cooperation with Antigua and Barbuda.
43
 
 
Moreover, he asserted that countries in the Caribbean region were an important 
force in the international community. 
 
6.4.  Grenada-Japan Relations 
The relationship between Grenada and Japan is longstanding and has been 
consistent since establishing ties in April 1975, shortly after gaining independence. 
Unlike, in the case previously highlighted with China, Grenada‟s relationship with 
Japan highlights time honoured relations shared with Caribbean countries. Several 
high level visits have been made by Prime Ministers of Grenada: Gairy in 1975 and 
Mitchell in 1996 and 2005.
44
 Likewise, Japan‟s Member of Parliament Yamashita 
and Vice Minister of Agriculture of Forestry and Fisheries, Kameya visited Grenada 
in 1994 and 1999 respectively.
45
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Grenada has been the recipient of Japan‟s ODA totaling US$58.99 million 
up to 2011.
46
 Noteworthy, Japan was Grenada's top bilateral donor from 1999-2002. 
Despite the absence of an embassy and resident ambassador, JICA has been very 
involved in the country with over 92 persons from the public sector having 
participated and benefited from training courses since 1989.
47
 
Japan has also made significant contributions to further the development of 
Grenada‟s Fisheries Sector among other sectors, in terms of infrastructure and 
Human Resource Development Fisheries. Several mega Fisheries Complexes on the 
Eastern and Western corridors have been constructed as well as roads, bridges and 
major retaining walls in the middle of the island through grant aid projects.
48
 
 
6.4.1.  Membership in the IWC and Support of     
  Japan’s Pro-whaling Stance 
Whaling is a widely controversial issue which generates mostly anti-
whaling sentiment in the international community. Japan has consistently 
maintained a pro-whaling stance, arguing that the act is necessary for scientific 
research purposes.
49
 Consequently, Japan has faced strong opposition for its pro-
whaling stance and has had to contend with strict anti-whaling regulations by the 
International Whaling Commission (IWC). 
                                                          
46
Ibid. 
47Government of Grenada, “JICA Alumui Association of Grenada Annual General Meeting,” March 
13, 2013, accessed October 17, 2013, 
http://www.gov.gd/egov/news/2013/mar13/13_03_13/item_1/jica_alumui_grenada_general_meeting.
html.  
48
Ibid. 
49
Japan began scientific whaling research in 1987,  carrying out its program in the Antarctic under the 
Japanese Antarctic Research Program (JARPA). See Keiko Hirata, “Japan‟s Whaling Politics,” in 
Norms, Interests and Power in Japanese Foreign Policy, eds. Yoichiro Sato and Keiko Hirata (New 
York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2008). 
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The IWC is the major international forum on whaling and was established 
to ensure the proper conservation of whale stocks and hence, see to the orderly 
development of the whaling industry.
50
 The anti-whaling bloc within the IWC, 
consisting of countries such as Britain and the US, oppose whaling altogether and 
have condemned Japan‟s consistent claim to whaling rights in the name of science.51 
Despite this strong opposition, the Japanese government has continued to focus its 
efforts on capturing a large number of whales through its scientific research 
program, pressuring the IWC to provide four Japanese coastal communities with the 
same aboriginal subsistence whaling rights that some indigenous peoples are given, 
and on lifting the ban on commercial whaling.
52
       
From the 1980s onwards, both the pro and anti- whaling camps within the 
IWC began to inveigle other countries to join the organization in a bid to seek 
sympathizers for their cause. The pro-whaling camp led by Japan, for example, 
began luring countries from the Caribbean and Pacific Islands.  Grenada, like a 
number of other Eastern Caribbean countries, is a member of the IWC.
53
  Over the 
years, these countries have been the subject of great criticism for trading their voting 
power in order to maintain good relations with Japan, and subsequently, securing 
economic assistance.                                                                                             
In 2006, Japan and the pro-whaling camp succeeded in passing a non-
binding resolution to oppose the moratorium on commercial whaling. The St. Kitts 
                                                          
50
The IWC was established under the International Convention for the Regulation of Whaling which 
was signed in Washington D.C. on December 2, 1946. See International Whaling Commission, 
http://www.iwc.int. 
51
The Pro-whaling camp in the IWC is led by Japan, Iceland and Norway. 
52Hirata, “Japan‟s Whaling Politics,” 187. 
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Grenada became a member in 1993. However the other Caribbean members joined earlier such as  
Antigua and Barbuda in 1982; Dominica in 1992; St. Kitts and Nevis in 1992; St. Lucia, and St. 
Vincent and the Grenadines in 1981.  Jamaica was a member 1981-1984 and Belize re-joined in 
2003, having left in 1984. See International Whaling Commission, http://www.iwc.int. 
174 
 
and Nevis Declaration was passed by 33-32 votes. The resolution argues that this 
IWC has failed “to meet its obligations under the terms of the ICRW” and declares 
the signatories commitment to normalizing the functions of the IWC based on the 
terms of the ICRW.
54
 The resolution states that the moratorium on commercial 
whaling was unnecessary as the IWC‟s scientific committee identified many species 
as abundant.
55
 As seen in Table 6.1. all Caribbean member states voted in favour of 
the resolution. Moreover, Japan hosted the Conference for the Normalization of the 
International Whaling Commission in 2007 to further promote the anti-moratorium 
campaign. Notably, while most anti-whaling members of the IWC did not attend, 
representatives from the six Caribbean member countries were present. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
54International Whaling Commission, “St. Kitts and Nevis Declaration,” International Whaling 
Commission/58/16, Agenda Item 19, June 2006, accessed July 28, 2014, 
http://www.unesco.org/csi/smis/siv/Forum/SKNdeclaration06.pdf 
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Table 6.1.  Signatories to the St. Kitts and Nevis Declaration, 2006 
 Grenada 
 St. Kitts and Nevis 
 Antigua & Barbuda 
 Dominica 
 St. Lucia 
 St.Vincent and the Grenadines  
 Benin 
  Cambodia 
 Cameroon 
 Cote d‟Ivoire,  
 Gabon 
 Gambia 
 Republic of Guinea 
 Iceland 
 Solomon Islands 
 Japan 
 Kiribati,  
 Mali 
 Republic of the Marshall Islands 
 Mauritania 
 Mongolia 
 Morocco 
 Nauru 
 Nicaragua 
 Norway 
 Republic of Palau 
 Russian Federation 
 Suriname 
  Togo 
  Tuvalu 
Source: International Whaling Commission, “St. Kitts and Nevis Declaration,” International
 Whaling Commission/58/16, Agenda Item 19, June 2006, accessed July 28, 2014,
 http://www.unesco.org/csi/smis/siv/Forum/SKNdeclaration06.pdf 
 
Following, the passing of the St. Kitts and Nevis Declaration, Grenada and 
its other Caribbean member countries have been criticized for selling their votes in 
the IWC in exchange for loans and grants from Japan.
56
 This criticism is not 
unfounded and derives from the fact that these Caribbean countries stand to benefit 
from whale watching activities. Taking into consideration that tourism is the leading 
industry in terms of employment, revenues, and source of foreign exchange, there is 
no clear line of reasoning as to why they would adopt a pro-whaling stance. 
Moreover, with an increase in awareness about whaling issues, the decision to 
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However, this claim was refuted by a Japanese embassy spokesperson who stated that Japan does 
not buy votes and their aid was not tied to policy. 
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support Japan‟s stance in the IWC is dangerous to the whale watching industry in 
the Caribbean.
57
  
Japan has sent experts in the field of fisheries to Caribbean state and has 
additionally, instituted a Development Study for the Formulation of a Master Plan 
for Development and Management of Fisheries and Aquaculture in the Caribbean.
58
 
This money is described by the Fisheries Agency of Japan as fisheries aid grants but 
Prime Minister Lester Bird of Antigua and Barbuda in 2006 proclaimed that the 
money was given to his country in return for voting with Japan on whaling issues at 
the International Whaling Commission (IWC).
59
 
This was corroborated by the statements of a senior official of the Fisheries 
Agency of Japan, Maseyuku Komatsu, who openly expressed that a number of 
countries had accepted aid in return for backing Japan's efforts to get commercial 
whaling restarted and described aid as “a major tool”.60  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
57Eric Hoyt and Glen T. Hvenegaard, “A Review of Whale-Watching and Whaling with Applications 
for the Caribbean,” Coastal Management, 30:381–399, 2002 
58Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Japan, “Japan's Official Development Assistance White Paper 2006,” 
December 2006, accessed June 25, 2014, 
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59Third Millennium Foundation, “Japan‟s „Vote Consolidation Operation‟ at the International 
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60Sanders, Ronald, “Dominica: A whale of a pride,” March 30, 2009, accessed February 2, 2012, 
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6.5. Trade Deficit with China and Japan  
Grenada has a widening trade deficit with both China and Japan. Over a ten 
year period, the value of Chinese and Japanese imports to the country has 
significantly increased; however, the country does not export any products to China 
or Japan. The value of goods imported from China increased by 160 per cent in 
2005, after Grenada declared recognition of China once again. In 2007, the value of 
imports from Japan peaked at approximately US $18 million (see Table 6.2.). 
Table 6.2. Grenada’s Imports from China and Japan, US$ 
Year China Japan 
2002 2,308,524 6,443,995 
2003 3,255,910 11,356,357 
2004 4,183,407 12,504,233 
2005 10,841,251 13,400,955 
2006 15,689,878 11,822,595 
2007 10,096,683 17,941,634 
2008 12,479,558 12,866,466 
2009 9,607,216 10,183,766 
2010 13,623,834 8,424,192 
2011 11,606,617 8,089,202 
2012 6,297,067 5,602,519 
Source: Compiled by author based on data collected from CARICOM Regional 
Trading Information System, accessed June 27, 2014, 
http://www.caricomstats.info/tradsysonline  
The relationship with China and Japan and the use of value-based resources 
is an important component of Grenada‟s attempt at economic development and at 
situating itself in the current international economic system. With the loss of 
preferential treatment and the challenges posed by environmental factors such as 
hurricanes, Grenada has had to resort to using its value-based resources in 
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establishing offshore financial centres and the selling of citizenship as well as a tool 
in its foreign policies towards China and Japan.  
 
6.6.  Explaining Grenada’s Foreign Policy Behaviour 
Having presented specific cases about Grenada‟s engagement with China and 
Japan, and highlighted certain aspects of these interactions, this section of the 
chapter will look at what motivates and explains the foreign policy behaviour of 
Grenada vis-à-vis China and Japan. This is also done in an attempt to highlight 
similarities and differences which can be use to make some conclusions on the 
general behaviour of Caribbean small states. This dissertation argues that all three 
levels of analysis can be used to examine the behaviour of Caribbean states in their 
foreign policy decision-making and strategies. 
 
The System Level 
System level variables, according to Braveboy-Wagner, are useful in 
explaining both the influences and the constraints on the behaviour of Caribbean 
states.
61
 In the earlier part of this chapter which examined the background of 
Grenada‟s foreign policy, we saw how the structure of the international system 
during the Cold War for example impacted their behaviour, with constraints 
stemming from their political geopolitical closeness with the US. Grenada‟s socialist 
tendencies on the domestic forefront dictated their policies and activities in the 
international system.  
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Today, the constraints stem from the replacement of one-way preferential 
system by two-way free trade agreements which resulted in a loss of preferential 
market access treatment for Caribbean states. Consequently, they have faced some 
difficulties in readjusting themselves into the current international economic arena 
compounded by the fact that most of their economies have been heavily dependent 
on the agricultural sector and their products lack competitiveness in an open market.  
The effects of globalization and economic liberalization have pushed Grenada to 
find creative ways of devising their foreign policy strategies in order to improve 
their economic wellbeing. This was seen in the establishment of offshore financial 
centres and with regards to China and Japan, with the exchange of their votes in 
international fora.  
 
The Individual Level 
The individual level of analysis is useful in explaining the foreign policies of 
Grenada. The perception of Bishop navigated the policies and strategies pursued by 
the country and would eventually lead to the economic and political downturn of the 
country.  Leaders today are less ideological; however, as seen in the case studies, 
they play a key role in the decision-making. This is even more visible than in the 
case of Jamaica. Here, we can observe an explicit case whereby the decision to 
change alliance rested solely or rather was made solely by the prime minster. Again, 
this ties in with the nature of the political system which facilitates the role of the 
prime minister. 
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The State Level  
 As seen in the literature reviewed in Chapter 2, the domestic level has been 
overlooked in explaining the foreign policy behaviour of small states. However, this 
dissertation argues, that all three levels are important and that they are linked in their 
influence on Caribbean foreign policy. In the case of Grenada, the country‟s 
domestic interests motivate its foreign policy goals as the primary motivation is 
driven by the need for economic development.  
 From the case studies presented, we can observe how the decision to switch 
allegiance from Taiwan to China was made on the basis of the size of the economic 
assistance package. Grenada was in a predicament following the hurricane and with 
the upcoming Cricket World Cup. As such, the government chose to align itself with 
the power in which it could most benefit from.   
 Braveboy-Wagner argues that the emphasis of the individual and leadership 
suggests that there a limited role for Oppositions in small Caribbean states.
62
 
Theoretically, as discussed in Chapter 3, the main decision-making body, the 
Cabinet, is responsible to Parliament and due to the strong Parliamentary majority, 
the opposition has very little, if any influence at all. The Opposition‟s role is 
seemingly to keep the government in check.  In the case studies, it is evident that the 
Opposition is not involved in the discussion of agreements prior to signing.  
The case studies highlight occurrences where political interests of officials 
interfere with foreign policy agendas as this was observed in Grenada‟s recognition 
of China being tied to the political promises of the political party. The decision to 
switch recognition from Taiwan was done solely by the Prime Minister.  Again, this 
                                                          
62
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shows the importance of domestic matters in foreign policy decision-making as 
politicians have used these issues even on a local campaigning platform. 
This case study shows that Grenada‟s foreign policy strategy towards China 
and Japan is somewhat different from that of Jamaica‟s. The is due to Grenada‟s 
limited resource base as the country lacks raw materials and food commodities that 
can be traded with both countries. In the absence of those resources, Grenada has 
been using it value-based resources such as its support of the One China policy to 
receive aid and investment from China. Support of the One China policy has been 
tied to provision of economic assistance. Likewise, Japan‟s provision of aid may be 
linked to issues such as voting in the IWC and UN Security Council Reform. 
Additionally, it shows that this use of value-based is consistent with the strategies 
that have been previously employed by the country to establish its offshore financial 
industry, and sell economic citizenship. The exchange of votes and recognition with 
China and Japan is therefore another value-based resource being used by Grenada.  
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 CHAPTER 7 
Conclusion  
 
This concluding chapter provides a comprehensive examination of the main 
arguments of this dissertation, beginning with a discussion of the research questions 
presented in Chapter 1. To recall, the research questions for this dissertation are as 
follows: 
1) What are the opportunities and challenges for Caribbean states to deepen
 relations with China and Japan?  
From the case studies presented in Chapter 5 and Chapter 6, we can conclude that 
while there are advantages and opportunities for Caribbean states vis-à-vis China 
and Japan, there are also challenges to be contended with. The following discussion 
explores the opportunities that Caribbean states have seized in relation to economic 
assistance, investments, diversification of trading partners and infrastructural 
development. However, it also shows that with these benefits, are certain 
disadvantages which relate to strings attached to economic assistance, a widening 
trade deficit and on a more internal level, challenges to regional integration which 
can hinder the extent and direction of these relationships.   
2) To what extent do the attributes of Caribbean countries influence the 
different foreign policy strategies pursued towards China and Japan?  
One of the main arguments of this dissertation is that Caribbean states have different 
foreign policies towards China and Japan. This is related to the attributes possessed 
by the different Caribbean states. This is shown in the case studies, whereby Jamaica 
and Grenada pursue different foreign policies. This has to do with the fact that 
Grenada, for example does not have resources such as bauxite, oil and natural gases 
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as in the case of Jamaica and Trinidad and Tobago, nor does it have a large 
agricultural or tourism industry. As such, the country has to use its other resources, 
which are value-based in devising its foreign policies strategies. This is seen 
especially with regards to recognition of the One China policy, for example. 
3) What are the primary motivations behind China and Japan‟s interest in
 the Caribbean region?  
In Chapter 4, three primary motivations were presented as factors explaining China 
and Japan‟s attraction to the Caribbean region which are based on economic 
development, political security and global status. The case studies presented in 
chapters 5 and 6 have presented valuable information about the relationships that 
Caribbean states have with China and Japan as well as on the foreign policy 
behaviour of small states. In addition, the case studies demonstrated that China and 
Japan‟s foreign policy behaviour with Caribbean states is consistent with their wider 
foreign policy with developing countries as briefly discussed in Chapter 4. Though, 
I argue that the economic motivation is much less in the Caribbean as it relates to 
securing natural resources and access to markets. The growing influence of China in 
the international community has not gone unnoticed by Japan and as such, a sort of 
power rivalry between the two for global status is an important dimension in their 
interest in Caribbean states. 
4) How can the Caribbean‟s foreign policies towards China and Japan help
 to explain and develop the study of small states in international
 relations? 
The theoretical discussion of this research is grounded in the study of small states 
and the levels of analysis framework. This dissertation aims to point out that small 
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state foreign policy behaviour cannot be explained by using only the system level 
variable as has been the case in previous foreign policy analyses on small states 
which locate casualty at this level. As shown in the case studies presented in 
chapters 5 and 6, the state and individual levels are also important as domestic 
variables play a key role in determining the foreign policy direction of these 
Caribbean states. This discussion also shows that the domestic politics of Caribbean 
states interplay with their foreign policies to influence their interactions with China 
and Japan. This is largely due to the weaknesses inherent in the existing political 
system and political culture in the Caribbean. From the case studies we have seen 
where politicians are more concerned with the short term agenda of attracting aid 
and capital flows and in many instances, neglect to take into consideration the long 
term consequences of their decisions.  
This research is entering into an area of a somewhat unchartered territory in 
the scholarship on International Relations and Foreign Policy Analysis. While China 
and Japan‟s relationship with other developing regions such as Southeast Asia, 
Africa and Latin America have been widely documented, there is a lacuna in the 
literature on interactions with Caribbean states.  In the case of Caribbean and China 
relations, there have been few studies to date; whereas Japan‟s relationship with the 
Caribbean, to the best of the researcher‟s knowledge, has thus far been 
undocumented. Moreover, often times studies are done on Latin America and the 
Caribbean, however, the Caribbean context is either just a passing mention or none 
at all. In addition to contributing to the academic work on the Caribbean‟s 
relationship with China and Japan, this research will also add to the existing yet 
limited body of work on the general foreign policy of Caribbean states. The 
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discussion stresses that the economic development of Caribbean states is the focal 
point of the region‟s foreign policy motives and strategies towards China and Japan. 
This is consistent with the Caribbean‟s foreign policy since the 1960s whereby their 
economic survival has been at the helm. Moreover, as it relates to the overarching 
topic of small state foreign policy behaviour, one of the main arguments of this 
research is that small states do not practice a generic foreign policy. Instead, there 
are differences in the foreign policies pursued and this is tied to the attributes of the 
states.  
 
 
7.1.   Opportunities and Challenges for Caribbean States  
The first research question of this study investigates the opportunities and 
challenges for Caribbean states in expanding their relations with China and Japan. 
Table 7.1. presents the opportunities that Caribbean states are seizing but also the 
challenges that simultaneously and resultantly arise. 
 
Table 7.1. Opportunities and Challenges arising from Increased Relations with
        China and Japan 
Opportunities Challenges 
Economic assistance 
Strings attached to  aid such as labour 
importation, diplomatic support  
Diversification of trading partners Widening trade deficit 
Infrastructural development  Regional approach 
    Source: Compiled by author 
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 One of the arguments emanating from previous chapters is that the 
reorientation of the Caribbean‟s foreign policies towards China and Japan is rooted 
in their need for economic adjustment. In Chapter 3, we saw how Caribbean states 
have consistently felt that they are dependent on some form of external assistance, 
whether it is in terms of aid or preferential trade agreements. Caribbean states have 
been grappling with the changes in the international economic system and hence, 
their engagement with China and Japan is one such way to adapt to these changes. 
China and Japan are among countries willing to provide economic assistance to 
these Caribbean states.   
Japan has augmented its efforts to strengthen its relations with Caribbean 
states by pledging to assist them with financial and technical assistance despite the 
regional countries being graduated to middle-income countries and therefore no 
longer eligible for concessionary loans on the basis of per capita income. During 
Prime Minister Shinzo Abe‟s speech at the first Japan-CARICOM summit in 
Trinidad and Tobago in July 2014, in outlining the three pillars of Japan‟s 
CARICOM foreign policies, also indicated the intention to revise this basis.
1
 Maki 
Kobayashi-Terada, the director of the Caribbean Division, Latin American and 
Caribbean Affairs at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, reiterated this promise 
following the Prime Minister‟s trip stating that “we promised that we are going to 
extend cooperation and we have already increased six fold compared to the past few 
years. We are going to work together in order to have meaningful cooperation even 
                                                          
1MOFA, Japan, “Press Release on Japan – Caribbean Community (CARICOM) Summit Meeting: 
Japan„s CARICOM Policy,” July 28, 2014, accessed July 29, 2014, 
http://www.mofa.go.jp/files/000047229.pdf. See Appendix C. 
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though some of the Caribbean countries have a higher standard of living in terms of 
per capita income”.2 
In the case of Caribbean-China, Chinese loans have been deemed more 
attractive than those offered by international financial institutions and banks such as 
the IMF and World Bank. This is based on the fact that they do not impose policy 
conditions that require the borrowing state to execute any organizational or policy-
related reform.
3
 Brautigam, writing on China‟s engagement with Africa, contends 
that Chinese loans are given based on the principle of non-intervention in the 
domestic affairs of other states and hence, does not force them to comply with 
traditional conditionalities such as those attached to western lending institutions.
4
 In 
the Caribbean context, the case is the same as Chinese economic assistance is given 
under a principle of non-interference in the governance of countries and hence, this 
is particularly appealing to Caribbean states.
5
  Caribbean states are therefore drawn 
to China because it is much easier to secure loans and access development 
assistance. Furthermore, due to this no conditions approach, distribution of Chinese 
loans and aid to countries is done in a relatively short period of time. This is more 
favourable than having to deal with the institutional bureaucracy associated with 
loans from multilateral agencies. 
Another advantage of increasing engagement with China and Japan is that 
these two Asian powers represent another source of partners for trade and 
                                                          
2
Jamaica Observer, “Japan offers technical, financial assistance to Caribbean,” November 13, 2014, 
accessed November 20, 2014, http://www.jamaicaobserver.com/news/Japan-offers-technical-
financial-assistance-to-Caribbean_17923589    
3
Kevin P. Gallagher, Amos Irwin, and Katherine Koleski, The New Banks in Town: Chinese Finance 
in Latin America, (Washington D.C.: Inter-American Dialogue, 2012).  
4
Brautigam, The Dragon’s Gift. 
5
Interview with Person A, from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Foreign Trade, Kingston,  
Jamaica, September 20, 2012. 
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investments. Caribbean governments are eager to find not only new sources of 
economic assistance but trade as well in the current economic climate and are keen 
to diversify their diplomatic relations. While Caribbean countries have a trade 
imbalance with China and Japan, there are still advantages to increasing trade. Such 
advantages include access to less expensive imports. For example, imports of 
manufactured goods from China and automobiles from Japan are more attractive to 
Caribbean states because of their relatively low prices when compared to traditional 
partners.  
Despite the unimpressive value of exports to China and Japan, there are still 
some opportunities which countries like Jamaica have been able to seize.  In Chapter 
5, it was shown how Japan has consistently provided a market for Jamaica‟s Blue 
Mountain coffee over the years. Jamaica is dependent on this market having almost 
80 per cent of its produce exported to Japan. Bernal contends that despite the trade 
imbalance, there are prospects for Caribbean exports to China to increase.
6
 This 
opportunity may be seen in the cases of both China and Japan and their interest in 
resources such as bauxite, oil and natural gas in the region. Whereas in Africa and 
Latin America, the exploitation of resources is rife in the discourse; with regards to 
the few natural resources in Jamaica, for example, the concern is not the same as on 
its own, the state would not be able to tap into its resources. Hence, this is a 
welcoming venture and it is for this reason that often times, leaders are quick to sign 
agreements without proper scrutiny of the strings attached which is discussed later 
on.  
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China and Japan‟s assistance in the Caribbean‟s infrastructural development 
has been noteworthy. Projects have been executed to build roads and highways and 
to improve facilities such as basic and primary schools, among others. As discussed 
in Chapter 5, the highway project in Jamaica was contracted by CHEC, a Chinese-
owned company. The first phase of the Highway 2000 project linked the north and 
south of the island and covered 62.7km. Currently, CHEC is undertaken the second 
phase of the project. An increase in projects relating to infrastructural development 
generates employment in the Caribbean; for example, major projects such as the 
Highway 2000 project in Jamaica create employment for its citizens. However, this 
is not always the case as often times, there are discrepancies surrounding labour on 
Chinese projects for example, which is later discussed as a disadvantage associated 
with China‟s economic assistance. 
With the financial support of infrastructural projects whether by grants or 
loans, often times comes exclusive supply of imported labour. This is consistent 
with Chinese support in developing countries in Africa and closer to home, the 
Bahamas for example. African countries have had a noticeable experience in relation 
to Chinese loans for infrastructure which though intended to reduce the high costs of 
production, also resulted in contracts being tied to Chinese firms through biddings 
that were not very transparent and moreover, an overwhelming number of Chinese 
workers.
7
 Similarly, problems emerged in 2010 over the number of Chinese workers 
being used on a tourist project in the Bahamas, Baha Mar. The project to build a 
3,800 room resort was funded in part by the Chinese Export-Import Bank of the 
People‟s Republic of China, and saw the employment of a rough estimate of 5000 
                                                          
7
See Brautigam, The Dragon’s Gift. 
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non-Bahamian workers.
8
 This was also evidenced in the cases of the Greenfield 
Stadium in Jamaica and the Queen‟s Park Stadium in Grenada. Discontent over 
imported Chinese labour has been popular in the discourse of Caribbean citizens and 
politicians. This may be a reflection of the strong bargaining position of those who 
are paying for the projects.This has pushed Caribbean governments to negotiate 
more rigid stipulations regarding labour use.
9
 Moreover, Caribbean states may be 
able to improve their bargaining strength if this is done collectively. 
While the diversification of trading partners and markets was earlier 
highlighted as a positive for Caribbean states, the widening trade deficit that has 
been accruing is, however, a cause for concern. The trade deficit between Caribbean 
states and China has expanded significantly since 2006 from EC$-952,000 to       
EC$ -3,653,000 in 2012 (see Figure 7.1.). This was highlighted also in the case 
studies presented on Jamaica and Grenada as well. This increase in imports from 
China may be attributed to China‟s rapid economic growth which has outpaced that 
of Caribbean exports. Moreover, Chinese goods offer cheaper more attractive prices 
than traditional partners such as the US. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
8Sir Ronald Sanders. “Chinese Take Away?” November 2010, accessed February 2, 2012,  
http://www.sirronaldsanders.com/viewarticle.aspx?ID=204 
9
Interview with Person B, from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Foreign Trade, Kingston,  
Jamaica, September 20, 2012. Interviewee proclaimed that governments have been pushing for use of  
local labour on projects and that this was unique to negotiations with Chinese. 
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Figure 7.1. Value of Trade with China, 2001-2012 
 
    Source: Compiled by author based on data collected from CARICOM Regional       
    Trading Information System, accessed June 27, 2014,     
     http://www.caricomstats.info/tradsysonline. 
 
 
A similar trade imbalance is seen between Caribbean states and Japan, where the 
value of imports far outweigh the value of exports from the region (see Figure 7.2.). 
The value of imports from Japan has been consistent over the years and can be 
attributed to the importation of automobiles to the region.  However, during this 
time, Caribbean states have still face difficulties, as in the case with China, to 
penetrate the market. In 2012, the value of goods imported to the region from Japan 
was EC$ 1,796,000 compares to EC$ 108,000 that was exported to Japan. In 
Chapter 5, it was highlighted that the only goods of substantial value that Jamaica 
was exporting to Japan was the Blue Mountain coffee. However, even exports of 
coffee started to experience a decline. 
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Figure 7.2. Value of Trade with Japan, 2001-2012 
 
    Source: Compiled by author based on data collected from CARICOM Regional       
    Trading Information System, accessed June 27, 2014,     
     http://www.caricomstats.info/tradsysonline. 
 
Caribbean states have not been adequately exploiting their opportunities to 
export products to Chinese and Japanese markets. Products such as coffee and rum 
which are considered high quality goods in the region need to be marketed better so 
that they can penetrate these markets to a greater extent. There are however, 
prospects for increasing export of raw materials such as bauxite and natural gas but 
this also depends on how well Caribbean states push this agenda. 
I have highlighted the attempts at regional integration as a challenge for 
Caribbean states in expanding their relations with China and Japan. In reviewing the 
literature on small states in Chapter 2, it was highlighted that small states have 
tended towards alliance formation to give themselves a better advantage or footing 
in the international system against larger more powerful states.  Regional integration 
can therefore be highlighted as one such way for Caribbean states to improve their 
position in order to maximise the opportunities to be seized and reduce the 
0
500
1,000
1,500
2,000
2,500
2
0
0
0
2
0
0
1
2
0
0
2
2
0
0
3
2
0
0
4
2
0
0
5
2
0
0
6
2
0
0
7
2
0
0
8
2
0
0
9
2
0
1
0
2
0
1
1
2
0
1
2
Imports
Exports
Year
EC
$
 '0
0
0
193 
 
challenges posed. However, as highlighted in Chapter 3, attempts at regional 
integration have proved somewhat unfulfilling. While CARICOM represents the 15 
member states of the region, the extent to which the organization is effective is 
questionable. This is in large part due to the own internal division amongst member 
states where domestic interests are priority for each state. Agreements with Japan 
are done with CARICOM however activities are still seemingly conducted on a 
state-to-state basis as each member states seeks to advance its own national interests. 
In the case of China, interactions are not done with CARICOM as a whole because 
not all member states have recognized the One China policy.  In order to negotiate 
better terms of agreements signed especially with regards to possibly an 
institutionalised trading agreement where Caribbean goods can be guaranteed a 
market, Caribbean states may be prove stronger as a whole rather than as 
individuals. However, internal challenges will first have to be addressed within the 
institution.  
One major criticism often espoused in relation to projects in the Caribbean 
relates to the lack of transparency in the awarding of contracts and the terms of the 
agreements signed.  In an interview with one government official, it was revealed 
that often times, Caribbean officials are only made aware of the major points of the 
actual agreements signed between their government and the Chinese government, 
for example.
10
 In 2013, Jamaica‟s Prime Minister Simpson-Miller made two 
separate visits to Asia; one to China in August and the other to Japan in November. 
The announcement of the Prime Minister‟s trips was made few days prior to her 
                                                          
10
Interview with Person E, formerly from the Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries. Kingston,  
Jamaica, October 1, 2012. 
194 
 
departure.
11
 Moreover, the details of her visits, where she met and signed 
agreements with the heads of government of both Asian countries, were not 
immediately reported. As noted in the case studies, not only are the terms of 
agreements not debated, but also the projects embarked on are proving to be of 
limited benefit to Caribbean people.  
Considering these challenges, the question of why Caribbean states are 
intensifying their relations with China and Japan arises. It is possible to argue that an 
answer to this may lie in the fact that Caribbean states are currently in an economic 
predicament and have been searching for ways to improve their national fiscal 
situation. As such, Caribbean governments are often times more focused on the 
immediate goal of aid and investments.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
11It should be noted that the schedule of the Prime Minister‟s trip was indicated on MOFA, Japan‟s 
calendar on their website in advance. However, on the Jamaican side, the public was not made aware 
beforehand. 
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7.3.  Foreign Policies of Caribbean States   
One of the primary arguments in this thesis revolves around the use of value 
resources for economic gain. According to Cooper and Shaw, “what small states 
lack in structural clout they can make up through creative agency”.12 As Chapter 6 
demonstrated, Grenada, prior to its recent engagement with China, had used its 
value-based resource as a means of attaining economic adjustment. This is primarily 
seen in their establishment of offshore financial centres that were characterized by 
low tax rates and secrecy. As discussed by Palan and later Prasad, these strategies 
have been seen primarily in microstates with populations well under one million. 
This, Prasad argues, indicates that these are the states more prone to using this 
strategy given their lack of other natural resources.  The smaller Eastern Caribbean 
countries are not endowed with natural resources and it is therefore this lack of 
natural resources that leads smaller states in the Caribbean to be more creative. 
As noted before, this creative use of value-based resources includes the sale 
of economic citizenship and flags of convenience, and the setting up of offshore 
financial centres. This dissertation argues that this is similar to Grenada‟s use of its 
votes and recognition in devising its foreign policy towards China and Japan, as we 
have seen in Chapter 6. 
 In the case of Jamaica, as highlighted in Chapter 5, China and Japan are 
interested in the country‟s resources such as bauxite and agricultural products such 
as coffee. However, because of the limited resource based as compared with Latin 
American countries for example,  foreign policy strategies toward China and Japan 
                                                          
12Andrew F. Cooper and Timothy Shaw, “The Diplomacies of Small States at the Start of the 
Twenty-first Century: How Vulnerable? How Resilient?” in The Diplomacies of Small States 
Between Vulnerability and Resilience, eds. Andrew F. Cooper and Timothy Shaw (London: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2009). 
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involve the use of its natural resources complemented by its value-based resources 
in particular the country‟s quality advocacy and support in international fora.  
 
 
7.4.  Motivations behind China and Japan’s interest in the Caribbean region 
 The third research question relates to the reasons behind China and Japan‟s 
interest in this region of small states with limited natural resource. This research 
proposes that their motivations are rooted in the advancement of their economic 
development, political security and global status. 
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Table 7.2. Summary of Key Features of China and Japan’s Relations  
       with Caribbean States 
 China Japan 
Motivations 
 Economic 
Development 
 
 Political 
Security 
 
 Global  
Status 
 
Search for natural resources, 
transportation routes and 
markets for exports. 
 
One China Policy 
 
 
Rise of  China as a superpower 
 
 
Search for natural resources, 
transportation routes and 
markets for exports 
 
United Nations Security Council 
Reform, IWC 
 
Maintain prestige 
“Rivalry” with China  
Strategies Soft Use of Power 
- building hard infrastructure 
-provision of conditionality-free 
loans 
- cultural diplomacy 
ODA 
-Infrastructure development 
-Social and human development 
Approach Pragmatic Approach 
 
- Economic cooperation and 
trade  
- Cultural Diplomacy 
- Improve relations based on the 
One China Policy 
Policy-based Approach 
 
- Support of Shared 
vulnerabilities  
- Mutual cooperation and 
friendship 
- Cooperation in international 
arena 
Principles Win-Win 
Cooperation 
Self- Reliance 
South-South Cooperation 
Non-interference 
Shared vulnerabilities 
Environmental Concerns 
Cooperation 
Social development 
Democracy 
 Non-interference 
Result Recognition of One China 
Policy 
Votes in International Fora 
Widening trade surplus 
Investments in bauxite, lng 
industry 
Votes in International Fora 
Quality advocacy 
Widening trade surplus 
Investments in bauxite, lng 
industry  
Source: Compiled by Author 
  
Economic development relates to the need to secure existing natural resources 
wherever they exists while also broadening access to export markets. As highlighted 
in previous chapters, there is interest in the bauxite in Jamaica and Guyana as well 
as the oil and natural gas in Trinidad and Tobago. In Chapter 4, the value of Chinese 
and Japanese imports to the region was also presented to highlight that Caribbean 
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states do provide a worthwhile market.  The strategic location of the Caribbean 
region is also of some importance. Caribbean states “offer the advantage of being a 
neighbour to the US and having access to that market”.13 Also of importance is the 
regions location vis-à-vis the Panama Canal. Access to shipping lanes especially 
with the expansion of the Canal is crucial for China and Japan.  
The dimensions of political security and global status motivations are based 
on the trading of the Caribbean‟s value-based resources. These small states have 
assumed high-profile diplomatic roles in international fora For example, Trinidad 
and Tobago was a forerunner in promoting the agenda of the ICC, Antigua and 
Barbuda was the Chair of the 68
th
 session of the UN General Assembly and more 
recently, Jamaica was appointed Chair of the UN First Committee. Caribbean states 
do not solely represent a single sovereign vote but also quality vote. While their 
votes in international organizations are important to China and Japan, of equal 
importance is their support and promotion of common agenda. Japan‟s bid for UN 
Security Council reform and a non-permanent member seat requires the support of 
Caribbean countries and helps to explain increased interest in strengthening ties with 
the region.
14
 
The recent visit of Japanese Prime Minister Abe to the Caribbean just one 
year after that of Chinese President Xi Jinping, generated much attention in the 
media both locally and internationally. Thus prompting discussion among citizens 
and academics questioning the motives behind Japan‟s maintaining a presence in the 
                                                          
13
Interview with Person D, formerly from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Foreign Trade.  
Kingston, Jamaica, September 27, 2012. 
14
The Yomiuri Shimbun, “Reciprocal, sustainable long-term ties with Latin America Important,” 
August 3, 2014.  
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Caribbean.
15
 While Japan‟s motivations in the Caribbean region are related to their 
long-standing relationships with Caribbean states, they can also be viewed as a 
strategy to counter check China‟s presence in the region. China‟s presence in the 
Caribbean surpasses that of Japan. This can be attributed to China‟s rapid and 
growing economy as well as the fact that China can give economic assistance 
without conditions attached to development assistance as in the case of Japan. 
Japan‟s decision to consider the basis of aid giving to developing countries shows 
that the country is taking the necessary steps to maintain its presence in the region. 
As China economic and diplomatic presence deepens, Japan is struggling to stay 
relevant.   
Table 7.2. presents a summary of the key features of China and Japan‟s 
relations with Caribbean states based on discussions in previous Chapters. Chapter 4 
highlighted that while motives for a presence in the region may be of a similar 
nature, conduct and strategies show differences. China‟s approach towards the 
region is less ideological and asserts to be more pragmatic one which is consistent 
with their relations with other developing countries. While espousing rhetoric of no 
conditionalties and non-interference, we have seen in the case studies, that there are 
in fact some strings attached to its aid.  Japan‟s strategies elucidate the difference in 
approach from China in dealing with these countries. 
 
 
                                                          
15
Jamaica Observer, “Japan not leaving it all to China in the Caribbean,” July 30, 2014, accessed 
September 20, 2014, http://www.jamaicaobserver.com/editorial/Japan-not-leaving-it-all-to-China-in-
the-Caribbean_17264684 
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7.5.  Small States and the Levels of Analysis Question 
As highlighted in Chapter 2, the literature on small states in international 
relations is generally preoccupied with discussions about conceptualising 
“smallness”, and later about the weaknesses and vulnerabilities of small states and 
their viability. The new wave of literature burgeoning proposes that despite these 
vulnerabilities, small states are in fact quite resilient and in many cases have 
performed quite well. Payne argues that resilience is not a quality but a strategy of 
small states.
16
 Hence, the concept of vulnerability should not be discarded for that of 
resilience as they both mutually constitute the policies of small states.
17
  
This research similarly argues that due to the perceived vulnerabilities of 
Caribbean states, they have been forced to find ways of adapting to changes brought 
on from globalisation and trade liberalisation. Their resilience is shown in the way in 
which having acknowledged their vulnerabilities, they have been utilising their 
positive attributes to devise ingenious strategies to help them adjust and survive in 
changing international relations. This is seen in the case studies presented, whereby 
Jamaica and Grenada have been using their value-based resources in the foreign 
policies pursued towards China and Japan 
Another aspect of small state foreign policy behaviour that this dissertation 
highlights pertains to the variations in the behaviour. Despite the similarities shared 
by these states, there are in fact differences in their foreign policies pursued. Payne 
has similarly hinted at this divergence in small state phenomenon, asserting that it is 
necessary to recognize the multiple natures of small states and the variations in their 
                                                          
16
Payne, “Afterword: Vulnerability as a Condition, Resilience as a Strategy.” 
17
Ibid. 
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practices.
18
 This research contributes to the field in this area, by showing that (1) 
there are differences and (2) that these differences are related to the attributes they 
possess. Chapter 5 highlighted the case of Jamaica and how the possession of 
bauxite and rare earth minerals as well as a prosperous coffee industry is essential in 
determining the foreign policies pursued towards China and Japan. This is 
complemented by a use of its value-based resources such as quality advocacy in 
international arenas. The case of Grenada is however, different, as the countries 
strategies are created based on their value-based resources seen in the recognition of 
the One China policy and support in the IWC, and even much earlier, in the 
establishment of offshore financial centres and selling of citizenship as a means of 
economic adjustment. 
Foreign policy analyses of small states have typically been focused on using 
the system level of analysis to as the explanatory variable. In Chapter two, the 
literature reviewed also cited the individual level as the most important level in 
explaining the foreign policies of Caribbean states. However, the role of the state 
level of analysis has been downplayed.  Hence this dissertation argues that all three 
levels of analysis are useful in order to explain and understand the foreign policy 
behaviour of Caribbean states.  
The system level of analysis is useful in explaining how the changes in the 
structure of the economic system have impacted the economies of Caribbean states 
and as such, influenced the reorientation of their foreign policies. The state level of 
analysis highlights how the domestic economic conditions influence the actions of 
Caribbean states which are driven by their national interests. The case studies 
                                                          
18
Payne, “Afterword: Vulnerability as a Condition, Resilience as a Strategy.” 
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highlighted the importance of the political system of the Caribbean‟s foreign policy 
decision-making. This is compounded by the political culture which reveres the 
Prime Minister and his Cabinet as overarching power figures.  
With the widespread availability of news via the internet there has been 
growing coverage and in effect, interest among the wider Caribbean public 
regarding foreign policy issues. Interestingly, at the most recent, Japan-CARICOM 
Ministerial Meeting held on November 15, 2014 in Tokyo, Caribbean journalists 
chosen from The Bahamas, Haiti, Trinidad and Tobago, Barbados, and Jamaica had 
been invited by the Japanese Government to cover the event. This shows greater 
efforts to keep the Caribbean public informed about the international affairs of the 
region. On the part of Japan, the move to invite foreign journalists to cover the event 
may also be interpreted as a strategy to make its presence in the region more visible 
and audible.  
At the individual level of analysis, we observe the important role played by 
the leader or the Prime Minister in foreign policy decision-making. Previous 
chapters have shown the extent of the leaders influence on decisions taken, for 
example in the cases of Manley and Bishop whose socialist ideology were pinned to 
the foreign policies of their countries. Later leaders are less ideological, however 
their influence is still significant and this is in large part due to the political system 
which affords power to the Prime Minister. 
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The case studies therefore indicate that all three levels of analysis may be 
used to explain the foreign policies of Caribbean states as small states in the 
international system. The interplay among the levels is evident as we see (1) how 
changes in the international system affect the domestic economic conditions of the 
state; and (2) how the political system of the state awards power and importance to 
the leader. 
 
7.6.  Caribbean Outlook 
In tying up the main arguments of this dissertation, it may also prove 
constructive to include in this conclusion one possible limitation of this research due 
to my limited language abilities. This language barrier has resulted in the exclusion 
of sources written in Chinese and Japanese which could have potentially enhanced 
the quality of this research. However, I have the added advantage of writing this 
dissertation at Japanese institution and under the supervision of advisors who have 
guided me towards reference materials not subjected to western bias. More 
importantly, however since this research is focused on the Caribbean‟s perspective, 
this limitation should not prove worrisome. 
This research has argued that the Caribbean‟s increased relationship with 
China and Japan is driven by their economic needs. As discussed in previous 
chapters, Caribbean states have traditionally been dependent on both aid and non-
reciprocal trade agreements with developed countries. With the decline in ODA and 
the loss of preferential access to the European market, Caribbean states have been 
searching for ways to diversify their economies and partners. They have been 
reorienting their foreign policies in order to find new ways for economic adjustment.  
204 
 
As has been demonstrated throughout this dissertation, the foreign policies of 
Caribbean states are driven by their need for economic development and security. 
Moreover, the case studies have highlighted that despite their similar vulnerabilities 
at small states and their current economic predicament, there are in fact differences 
in their foreign policies. This is related to the attributes possessed by each state.   
The decision to increasingly engage with China and Japan is rooted in the 
economic adjustment of Caribbean states. The case studies presented have also 
pointed to significant disadvantages or limited benefits associated with Chinese and 
Japanese loans and investments. The identified disadvantages relate to the widening 
trade deficit among others.  
China and Japan‟s engagement with the Caribbean at the moment are 
relatively modest in comparison to Latin America. However, as China continues to 
grow as a leading economic power, trade and investment ties with the region are 
expected to increase. Ellis argues that the resumption of China and Taiwan‟s 
diplomatic competition would substantially increase China‟s political ties globally.19 
In the Caribbean context, this would yield greater impact on the regional integration 
efforts of the region. Currently, four members of CARICOM diplomatically 
recognize Taiwan. In the event that the competition for diplomatic recognition 
resumes and China‟s manages to gain the support of these four countries, then an 
institutional arrangement could be established between CARICOM and China, 
similar to that with Japan.  
                                                          
19R. Evan Ellis, “The Strategic Dimension of Chinese Engagement with Latin America,” Perry 
Paper Series, no. 1.Washington DC: William J. Perry Center for Hemispheric Defense Studies, 2013, 
accessed January 11, 2014, http://chds.dodlive.mil/files/2013/12/pub-PP-ellis.pdf. 
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With the changes in the current international economic system, the 
Caribbean region has evidently become less important to its more traditional 
partners. However, it is obvious that the region sparks interest for its Asian partners 
– China and Japan. Despite concerns about use of imported labour for buildings, 
flooding of markets with Chinese and Japanese goods etc. the relationship so far 
may be considered as a mutually beneficial one whereby, China and Japan, in return 
for their interests, provide the region with investments, aid and technical assistance 
well needed and well received.  
In order to maximize on the benefits to be gained from this relationship with 
Asia and moreover, to ensure that it remains mutually beneficial, Caribbean states 
need to strengthen regional integration and work more actively as CARICOM rather 
than as members of CARICOM. Interestingly, in discussing the future of 
CARICOM in a changing global environment some ten years ago, Brewster posited 
that the region needed to stop neglecting the potential opportunities for formalizing 
economic relations with Japan.
20
 He argued that there could be substantial 
advantages of such relationships and apart from filling the attention void of Europe 
and America, it could provide competition for the region.  
 
                                                          
20Havelock Brewster, “The Future of CARICOM in a Changing International Environment,” in 
Caribbean Community: The Struggle for Survival, eds. Kenneth Hall and Myrtle Chuck A. Sang, 
386-413, (USA: Trafford, 2012). 
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Appendix A 
“China's Policy Paper on Latin America and the Caribbean” 
The Central People’s Government of the People’s Republic of China,   
 November 5, 2008, accessed December 20, 2010, 
http://www.english.gov.cn/pfficial/2008-11/05/content_114-347.htm. 
 
Foreword 
The world today is undergoing major transformation and adjustment. Peace 
and development are the trend of the times. The move toward multi-polarity is 
irreversible and economic globalization is gaining momentum. World peace and 
development are facing new opportunities as well as various challenges. It is in the 
fundamental interest of people of all countries and also their common aspiration to 
share development opportunities, jointly address challenges and promote the noble 
cause of peace and development of mankind. 
As the largest developing country in the world, China is committed to the 
path of peaceful development and the win-win strategy of opening-up. It is ready to 
carry out friendly cooperation with all countries on the basis of the Five Principles 
of Peaceful Coexistence and build a harmonious world of durable peace and 
common prosperity. 
Latin American and Caribbean countries are an important part of the 
developing world and a major force in the international arena. Under new 
circumstances, the development of relations between China and Latin American and 
Caribbean countries is faced with new opportunities. In issuing this policy paper on 
Latin America and the Caribbean, the Chinese Government aims to further clarify 
the goals of China's policy in this region, outline the guiding principles for future 
cooperation between the two sides in various fields and sustain the sound, steady 
and all-round growth of China's relations with Latin America and the Caribbean. 
 
I. The Status and Role of Latin America and The Caribbean 
Latin America and the Caribbean have a long history, vast territory and abundant 
resources, and the region enjoys a good foundation for economic and social growth 
and huge development potential. 
Countries in the region have been actively exploring development paths suited to 
their national conditions. They have maintained political stability and continued 
economic growth, and the life of the people is steadily improving. Latin American 
and Caribbean countries cherish a strong desire for self-development through unity 
and the commitment to promoting regional peace, stability and development. The 
region on the whole is growing in strength and its international influence is rising. 
Latin American and Caribbean countries have taken an active part in international 
affairs and contributed significantly to world peace and common development. They 
are playing an increasingly important role in regional and international affairs. 
 
II. China's Relations with Latin America and the Caribbean 
Though China and Latin America and the Caribbean are far from each other, the two 
peoples enjoy a time-honored friendship. The two sides are at a similar stage of 
development and face the common task of achieving development. Both sides 
cherish the desire for greater mutual understanding and closer cooperation. 
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During the twenty years or so after the founding of New China in 1949, China and 
Latin America and the Caribbean mainly conducted people-to-people exchanges. In 
the 1970s and 1980s, China established diplomatic ties with most countries in the 
region. Friendly cooperation between the two sides in various fields registered 
momentous growth in the 1990s. Since the beginning of the 21st century, the two 
sides have enjoyed more frequent high-level exchanges, stronger political mutual 
trust and closer cooperation in economy, trade, science and technology, culture and 
education, and mutual support and close coordination in international affairs. New 
progress has been made in relations between the two sides in an all-round way at 
various levels and across a broad spectrum of areas. 
Friendly cooperation between China and Latin America and the Caribbean serves 
the fundamental interest of the two peoples. Future growth of relationship between 
the two sides enjoys great potential and broad prospects, and will contribute more 
significantly to peace and development of mankind. 
 
 
 
III. China's Policy on Latin America and the Caribbean 
To enhance solidarity and cooperation with other developing countries is the 
cornerstone of China's independent foreign policy of peace. The Chinese 
Government views its relations with Latin America and the Caribbean from a 
strategic plane and seeks to build and develop a comprehensive and cooperative 
partnership featuring equality, mutual benefit and common development with Latin 
American and Caribbean countries. The goals of China's policy on Latin America 
and the Caribbean are: 
-- Promote mutual respect and mutual trust and expand common ground. Based on 
the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence, China and Latin America and the 
Caribbean will treat each other as equals and respect each other. They will 
strengthen dialogue and communication, enhance political mutual trust, expand 
strategic common ground, and continue to show understanding and support on 
issues involving each other's core interests and major concerns. 
-- Deepen cooperation and achieve win-win results. The two sides will leverage their 
respective strengths, tap the potential of cooperation, and seek to become each 
other's partner in economic cooperation and trade for mutual benefit and common 
development. 
-- Draw on each other's strengths to boost common progress and intensify 
exchanges. The two sides will carry out more cultural and people-to-people 
exchanges, learn from each other and jointly promote development and progress of 
human civilization. 
-- The one China principle is the political basis for the establishment and 
development of relations between China and Latin American and Caribbean 
countries and regional organizations. The overwhelming majority of countries in the 
region are committed to the one China policy and the position of supporting China's 
reunification and not having official ties or contacts with Taiwan. The Chinese 
Government appreciates such a stance. China is ready to establish and develop state-
to-state relations with all Latin American and Caribbean countries based on the one 
China principle. 
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IV. Strengthen China's Comprehensive Cooperation with Latin American and 
Caribbean Region 
1. In the Political Field 
(1) High-Level Exchanges 
China wishes to maintain the momentum of close exchanges with leaders of Latin 
American and Caribbean countries to increase mutual understanding and trust, step 
up exchange of experience on governance and consolidate the political basis for the 
growth of relations with Latin American and Caribbean countries. 
(2) Exchanges Between Legislatures 
The National People's Congress of China wishes to strengthen friendly exchanges 
with parliaments of Latin American and Caribbean countries, the Latin American 
Parliament, the Mercosur Parliament, the Andean Parliament, etc. at multiple levels 
and through various channels on the basis of respecting each other, deepening 
mutual understanding and promoting cooperation so as to enrich and invigorate 
relations with Latin American and Caribbean countries. 
(3) Exchanges Between Political Parties 
The Communist Party of China wishes to carry out friendly exchanges of various 
forms with political parties and organizations of Latin American and Caribbean 
countries on the basis of independence, full equality, mutual respect and non-
interference in each other's internal affairs to learn from each other, increase mutual 
understanding and friendship, and strengthen mutual trust and cooperation. 
(4) Consultation Mechanisms 
Relevant agencies of the Chinese Government wish to establish and improve the 
mechanisms of standing committee, high-level committee, high-level mixed 
committee, strategic dialogue, political consultation, mixed committee on economy 
and trade, consultation on economy and trade, high-level working group, business 
cooperation forum, cultural and education mixed committee, and science and 
technology committee with their counterparts in Latin America and the Caribbean to 
increase consultation and promote exchanges and cooperation. 
(5) Cooperation in International Affairs 
The Chinese Government will continue to strengthen coordination and cooperation 
on international issues with Latin American and Caribbean countries, and maintain 
regular consultation with them on major international and regional issues. The two 
sides will continue to support each other on such important issues as sovereignty and 
territorial integrity. China stands ready to work with Latin American and Caribbean 
countries to strengthen the role of the United Nations, make the international 
political and economic order more fair and equitable, promote democracy in 
international relations and uphold the legitimate rights and interests of developing 
countries. China supports a greater role of Latin American and Caribbean countries 
in international affairs. 
(6) Local Government Exchanges 
The Chinese side highly values exchanges at the local government level with 
countries in Latin America and the Caribbean. It supports the twinning of 
provinces/states or cities between China and Latin American and Caribbean 
countries, and exchanges and cooperation in business, science and technology, 
culture and other fields to increase mutual understanding and friendship. It attaches 
great importance to cooperation with Latin American and Caribbean countries in 
international local governments organizations. 
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2. In the Economic Field 
(1) Trade 
The Chinese Government will continue to work with its Latin American and 
Caribbean counterparts in the spirit of equality and mutual benefit to expand and 
balance two-way trade and improve the trade structure to achieve common 
development. At the same time, it will work with these countries to properly settle 
trade frictions through consultation and cooperation. China will, on the basis of 
mutual benefit and win-win cooperation, give positive consideration to concluding 
free trade agreements with Latin American and Caribbean countries or regional 
integration organizations. 
(2) Investment Cooperation 
The Chinese Government encourages and supports qualified Chinese companies 
with good reputation in investing in manufacturing, agriculture, forestry, fishing, 
energy, mineral resources, infrastructure, and service sector in Latin America and 
the Caribbean to promote the economic and social development of both sides. The 
Chinese Government will continue to welcome investment by Latin American and 
Caribbean businesses in China. 
(3) Financial Cooperation 
The Chinese Government supports China's monetary and financial regulatory 
authorities and financial institutions in stepping up consultation and professional 
exchanges and cooperation on macroeconomic situation and economic and financial 
policies with their counterparts in Latin American and Caribbean countries. It 
encourages Chinese commercial banks to set up branches in Latin America and the 
Caribbean. It will push for the conclusion of banking regulatory cooperation 
agreements with Latin American and Caribbean countries as appropriate, and work 
with them to jointly combat money laundering and terrorist financing. 
(4) Agricultural Cooperation 
The Chinese Government will promote exchanges and cooperation in agricultural 
science and technology with Latin American and Caribbean countries through 
holding agricultural technique training programs and dispatching technicians to the 
Latin American and Caribbean region. An information exchange mechanism will be 
established to discuss issues of common interest. Cooperation in flora and fauna 
inspection will be intensified and agricultural trade will be expanded to jointly 
uphold food security. 
(5) Industrial Cooperation 
The Chinese side wishes to strengthen exchanges with Latin American and 
Caribbean countries in industry. It is desirable to establish and improve relevant 
cooperation mechanisms, share best practices in each other's industrialization 
process, and promote and deepen practical cooperation. 
(6) Infrastructure Construction 
The Chinese side will strengthen practical cooperation with Latin American and 
Caribbean countries in transport, information and communications, water 
conservancy and hydropower and other areas of infrastructure development, scale up 
project contracting in the region, and conduct mutually beneficial cooperation in 
various ways so as to contribute its share to further infrastructure development in the 
region. 
(7) Resources and Energy Cooperation 
210 
 
The Chinese side wishes to expand and deepen mutually beneficial cooperation with 
Latin American and Caribbean countries in resources and energy within bilateral 
cooperation frameworks. 
(8) Customs Cooperation 
The Chinese side wishes to strengthen exchanges and cooperation with Latin 
American and Caribbean countries on customs by increasing exchanges between 
customs officers of the two sides and promoting trade security and facilitation. 
Exchanges and consultation will be increased on issues of mutual concern, such as 
smuggling and business fraud. Negotiations aimed at concluding documents on 
mutual administrative assistance with customs authorities of relevant countries will 
be held in due course. 
(9) Cooperation on Quality Inspection 
The Chinese Government wishes to step up exchanges and cooperation with Latin 
American and Caribbean countries on quality inspection, technical barriers to trade 
(WTO/TBT) and sanitary and phytosanitary measures (WTO/SPS), and establish 
and improve consultation mechanisms on quality inspection to ensure product 
quality and food safety. The two sides will strengthen exchanges and consultation on 
issues of mutual interest such as product quality, food safety, and quarantine of entry 
animals and plants, leading to the signing of protocols on quarantine of entry 
products. They will also conduct active exchanges and cooperation on measurement 
and standardization. 
(10) Tourism Cooperation 
The Chinese side will expand tourism cooperation with Latin American and 
Caribbean countries to enhance mutual understanding and friendship between the 
two peoples. The Chinese side will make vigorous efforts to promote visits by 
Chinese tourist groups to Latin American and Caribbean countries. It also welcomes 
citizens of Latin American and Caribbean countries to visit China. 
(11) Debt Reduction and Cancellation 
The Chinese Government will, based on its consistent policy on debt reduction and 
cancellation, discuss with relevant Latin American and Caribbean countries ways to 
relieve their debts as China's ability permits. The Chinese Government will also 
continue to call upon the international community, developed countries in particular, 
to take more concrete steps to reduce and cancel debts owed by Latin American and 
Caribbean countries. 
(12) Economic and Technical Assistance 
The Chinese Government will, according to its financial capability and level of 
economic and social development, continue to provide economic and technical 
assistance to relevant Latin American and Caribbean countries without attaching any 
political conditions. The Chinese Government will work within its ability and 
gradually increase its assistance to Latin American and Caribbean countries to meet 
their needs. 
(13) Multilateral Cooperation 
The Chinese Government is ready to strengthen consultation and coordination with 
Latin American and Caribbean countries in multilateral trade and financial 
institutions and regimes, with a view to promoting South-South cooperation, 
bringing about a more just and equitable multilateral trading regime and ensuring a 
bigger say and greater role in decision-making for developing countries in 
international trade and financial affairs. 
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(14) Chamber-of-Commerce Cooperation 
The Chinese side will deepen its cooperation with chambers of commerce of Latin 
America and the Caribbean and push forward exchanges between business 
communities of the two sides through the China-Latin America Entrepreneur 
Summit, China-Caribbean Entrepreneurs Meeting and other mechanisms, in an 
effort to achieve win-win results. 
3. In the Cultural and Social Aspects 
(1) Cultural and Sports Exchanges 
The Chinese Government will work actively to follow up on cultural cooperation 
agreements and relevant implementation programs signed with Latin American and 
Caribbean countries, maintain regular exchange of visits between cultural authorities 
of the two sides, and strengthen interaction and cooperation between cultural and art 
institutions and professionals of the two sides. To meet the needs for cultural 
exchange and market demand, the two sides will provide guidance for and push 
forward a variety of cultural exchange programs among various communities of the 
two sides. 
The Chinese side will keep the momentum of exchanges between the sports 
authorities and national Olympic committees, and encourage direct contacts between 
sports associations of the two sides. Guidance and encouragement will also be given 
to bilateral sports exchanges in various forms. 
(2) Cooperation in Science, Technology and Education 
The Chinese side is ready to enhance scientific and technological exchanges with 
Latin American and Caribbean countries through the mixed committee on bilateral 
science and technology cooperation and high-level coordinating mechanism. The 
Chinese side will also strengthen cooperation with Latin America and the Caribbean 
in aeronautics and astronautics, bio-fuel, resources and environment technology, 
marine technology and other areas of shared interest. The Chinese side will promote 
wider application of Chinese technologies on energy-conservation, digital medical 
treatment, small hydropower and other results of scientific research and advanced 
applied techniques in Latin America and the Caribbean. The Chinese side will 
provide Latin American and Caribbean countries with technical training, services 
and demonstration, and step up cooperation and exchanges on the educational front 
with Latin American and Caribbean countries through bilateral and multilateral 
cooperation mechanisms. The Chinese side will work for the conclusion of the 
agreement on mutual recognition of diplomas and academic degrees, and increase 
the number of Chinese government scholarships for Latin American and Caribbean 
countries. 
(3) Cooperation in Medical and Health Care 
The Chinese Government will vigorously promote exchanges and cooperation in the 
medical and health care sector with Latin American and Caribbean countries, and 
share experience and carry out cooperation in such areas as disease control, response 
to public health emergencies, and control of HIV/AIDS and bird flu. The Chinese 
Government will continue to send medical contingents equipped with necessary 
medicines and medical equipments to relevant countries to help improve local 
medical facilities and train local medical professionals. 
(4) Consular Cooperation and Personnel Exchanges 
The Chinese Government will develop and deepen consular relations with Latin 
American and Caribbean countries, and strengthen and expand exchanges and 
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cooperation between the consular departments of the two sides. The Chinese 
Government will carry out bilateral or multilateral friendly discussions with Latin 
American and Caribbean countries on consular issues of shared interest to address 
each other's concerns through the establishment of a consular consultation 
mechanism. The Chinese Government will take effective measures to promote and 
safeguard regular personnel exchanges between the two sides, facilitate normal 
trade, investment and business activities and uphold the lawful rights and interests of 
people of the two sides. 
(5) Media Cooperation 
The Chinese Government encourages and actively promotes exchanges and 
cooperation between the media of the two sides at multiple levels and in various 
forms to increase mutual understanding and ensure comprehensive and unbiased 
reports of each other. It will work to increase communication and cooperation 
between government information departments of the two sides and provide 
convenience for media interaction and cooperation between the two sides. 
(6) People-to-People Exchanges 
The Chinese Government encourages exchanges between non-governmental 
organizations and academic institutions of the two sides and gives full play to the 
role of the mechanism for people-to-people friendly interaction in advancing 
friendly relations between China and Latin American and Caribbean countries. It 
will strengthen interaction with youth organizations and institutions of Latin 
American and Caribbean countries, and deepen friendly cooperation with women's 
organizations at the national, regional and non-governmental levels in Latin 
American and Caribbean countries, so as to build up mutual understanding and 
mutual trust and work together for gender equality and the advancement of women. 
(7) Cooperation in Environmental Protection 
The Chinese side will strengthen exchanges with Latin American and Caribbean 
countries in laws, regulations and policies related to environmental protection and 
promote cooperation in personnel training, education and capacity building in the 
fields of biodiversity conservation, as well as prevention and treatment of pollution 
and desertification. 
(8) Cooperation in Combating Climate Change 
The Chinese Government highly values its cooperation with Latin American and 
Caribbean countries in combating climate change and is ready to develop and 
consolidate bilateral cooperation under the United Nations Framework Convention 
on Climate Change and other relevant mechanisms. It will actively promote 
consultation and communication between the two sides on combating climate 
change and cooperation in related projects. 
(9) Cooperation in Human Resources and Social Security 
The Chinese side will strengthen exchanges and cooperation with Latin American 
and Caribbean countries in employment promotion, establishment of good labor 
relations, improvement of the social security system, human resources development 
and reform of the civil service system. It will, through the signing and 
implementation of memoranda of understanding on bilateral cooperation, deepen 
and expand bilateral exchanges in social aspects, and enhance coordination and 
cooperation between the two sides in international organizations such as the 
International Labor Organization. 
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(10) Disaster Reduction, Disaster Relief and Humanitarian Assistance 
The Chinese Government will enhance information sharing, experience exchanges 
and technological cooperation in disaster reduction and relief with Latin American 
and Caribbean countries and facilitate the establishment of regular bilateral and 
multilateral meeting mechanisms between relevant departments of the two sides. It 
will continue to respond positively to the need for urgent humanitarian assistance of 
Latin American and Caribbean countries. It will encourage non-governmental 
organizations such as the Red Cross Society of China to conduct exchanges and 
cooperation with relevant Latin American and Caribbean organizations in this 
regard. 
(11) Cooperation in Poverty Alleviation 
The Chinese Government will strengthen exchanges and cooperation with Latin 
American and Caribbean countries in reducing poverty and narrowing the gap 
between the rich and the poor, and will encourage poverty alleviation institutions of 
the two sides to establish broad cooperative relations to share information and 
conduct joint research. More training programs designed for poverty alleviation 
personnel in Latin American and Caribbean countries will be launched, while more 
interaction on poverty reduction with inter-state or regional organizations in Latin 
America and the Caribbean will be strengthened. The two sides will also enhance 
exchange of visits and mutual participation in conferences and for a on poverty 
alleviation held by the other side. 
4. On Peace, Security and Judicial Affairs 
(1) Military Exchanges and Cooperation 
The Chinese side will actively carry out military exchanges and defense dialogue 
and cooperation with Latin American and Caribbean countries. Mutual visits by 
defense and military officials of the two sides as well as personnel exchanges will be 
enhanced. Professional exchanges in military training, personnel training and 
peacekeeping will be deepened. Practical cooperation in the non-traditional security 
field will be expanded. The Chinese side will, as its ability permits, continue to 
provide assistance for the development of the army in Latin American and 
Caribbean countries. 
(2) Cooperation in Judicial and Police Affairs 
The Chinese side will steadily expand its cooperation with Latin American and 
Caribbean countries in judicial affairs, judicial assistance in criminal and civil 
matters and extradition in particular. Cooperation in information sharing, penalty 
enforcement and legal services will be strengthened. Concerted efforts in law 
enforcement involving the interior and police departments of relevant countries will 
be stepped up to jointly combat transnational organized crimes including drug 
crimes and economic crimes. Intelligence and technological exchanges will be 
strengthened, with bilateral and multilateral exchange mechanisms put in place, so 
as to share information on illegal immigration and improve the capacity for its 
prevention. 
(3) Non-traditional Security Issues 
The Chinese Government will further its exchanges and cooperation with Latin 
American and Caribbean countries on non-traditional security issues by increasing 
information sharing and personnel exchanges and explore effective ways to deepen 
cooperation on non-traditional security issues such as combating terrorism, so as to 
jointly improve the capacity to respond to non-traditional security threats. 
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V. China's Relations with Latin American and Caribbean Regional Organizations 
The Chinese Government appreciates the important role of Latin American and 
Caribbean regional and sub-regional organizations in safeguarding peace and 
stability in the region, and promoting regional solidarity, development and 
integration. It supports these organizations in exerting their influence in regional and 
international affairs. The Chinese side will continue to strengthen communication, 
consultation and cooperation with relevant organizations in various fields. 
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Appendix B 
 
"A New Framework for Japan-CARICOM Cooperation  
for the Twenty-First Century" 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Japan, November 8, 2000, accessed November 20, 
2010, http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/latin/latin_e/caricom0011.html 
 
The Minister for Foreign Affairs of Japan and the Ministers responsible for Foreign 
Affairs of the Member States of the Caribbean Community (hereinafter referred to as 
"CARICOM"), i.e. Antigua and Barbuda, the Commonwealth of The Bahamas, 
Barbados, Belize, the Commonwealth of Dominica, Grenada, the Co-operative 
Republic of Guyana, the Republic of Haiti, Jamaica, Saint Christopher and Nevis, 
Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, the Republic of Suriname and the 
Republic of Trinidad and Tobago, meeting in Tokyo on November 8, 2000, 
discussed a framework for future cooperation between Japan and the CARICOM 
Member Countries and developed "A New Framework for Japan-CARICOM 
Cooperation for the Twenty-first Century." 
1. Partnership for Stability and Development 
 In light of the deepening interdependence in international relations and the 
consequences of globalization, the Ministers renewed their determination to further 
strengthen relationship between Japan and the CARICOM Member Countries, while 
the CARICOM states are also seeking to further enhance their relations with other 
Asian and Pacific countries. The Ministers resolved to make every effort to further 
develop Japan-CARICOM relations under a framework of "Partnership for Stability 
and Development" with particular emphasis on: 
1. cooperation for the economic and social development of the CARICOM 
Member Countries, 
2. cooperation for integration into the global economy; active economic 
interaction and exchanges between Japan and the CARICOM Member 
Countries, involving their respective private sectors, and 
3. cooperation in international fora such as the United Nations and the 
World Trade Organization. 
1-1 Cooperation for Economic and Social Development 
The Ministers took note of the economic, social and environmental vulnerability 
of the Caribbean states and the variety of opportunities and challenges brought 
by a rapid process of globalization. They reaffirmed their common view that 
development cooperation should be further promoted to support the efforts of 
the CARICOM Member Countries to pursue sustainable economic and social 
development, centering on poverty reduction and other areas as follows: 
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Good Governance 
 In view of the fact that political stability is a prerequisite for the smooth 
implementation of development programmes, the Ministers will promote 
domestically and internationally the elaboration of processes built on the principles 
of democracy, justice and respect for human rights. The Ministers recognize that the 
international community needs to provide assistance in the capacity building of 
states while respecting their sovereignty. They will also cooperate in building of 
capacity of judicial institutions in the Region, including human resource 
development, taking into account progress made in the establishment of the 
Caribbean Court of Justice. 
Poverty Reduction 
Trade liberalization and globalization of economies have exposed the widening gaps 
of income within countries and between countries and are contributing to the 
increase in the population of the poor. In light of this, the Ministers resolved to 
cooperate in the creation of job opportunities for the socially disadvantaged, 
including women, to increase access to primary health care services, basic 
education, potable water, and to improve the capacity for the prevention and 
treatment of HIV/AIDS and other infectious diseases. 
Environment and Disaster Prevention 
The preservation of the environment and the mitigation of natural disasters are of 
vital importance to the sustainable development of the Caribbean countries, as they 
are to Japan. With respect to the environment, the Ministers expressed their 
determination to cooperate in the prevention of marine pollution, management and 
treatment of waste disposal and other measures to prevent environmental 
degradation. They also decided to promote cooperation in human resource 
development, improvement of regulatory systems and enhancement of 
administrative capabilities in this regard. As regards natural disasters, the Ministers 
decided to promote cooperation for the provision of adequate resources to cope with 
natural disasters and to establish machinery for preventative action and 
rehabilitation. It was also decided that international cooperation should be promoted 
to strengthen the institutional capacity of the regional and national agencies 
concerned with disaster prevention, emergency response and management. 
Development of Small and Medium Enterprises 
Recognizing that the development of small, medium and micro-enterprises 
contributes to a more diversified industrial structure and to the promotion of rural 
development and poverty reduction, the Ministers decided to cooperate in vocational 
training and other human resource development programmes in such areas as 
marketing, the development of manufacturing skills, standards and quality control, 
entrepreneurship, business accounting and other management skills. 
1-2 Cooperation for Integration into the Global Economy 
The Ministers shared the view that the expansion of trade in goods and services, 
increased inflows of foreign investment, and the greater access to information and 
communications technology are of vital importance for ensuring sustainable growth 
of the Caribbean economies and their integration into the global economy. They 
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therefore reaffirmed the need to encourage interaction and exchanges between Japan 
and the CARICOM countries involving their private sectors and to intensify 
cooperation to support infrastructure and human resource development, especially in 
the following areas: 
Tourism, Fisheries and Agriculture 
Both sides will explore the possibility of convening, as soon as possible, an 
appropriate forum involving both Japanese and CARICOM tourism industries, in 
collaboration with the Caribbean Tourism Organization, for the purpose of 
promoting interaction and exchange in tourism and identifying possible areas of 
cooperation for tourism development, including cooperation by the private sector, in 
the Caribbean Region. They will pursue closer cooperation in the area of 
infrastructure development, the provision of equipment, human resource 
development and technical assistance with a view to further strengthening the 
fishing industries in the CARICOM Member Countries. They will also pursue the 
possibility for collaboration in agriculture. 
Trade and Investment Promotion 
Both sides will continue to pursue contacts at public and private sector levels with a 
view to stimulating trade and investment between Japan and the CARICOM 
Member Countries. With this in mind, they decided to organize a Caribbean Trade 
and Tourism Fair in Japan not later than 2002. 
Information and Communications Technology 
Both sides will pursue cooperation in human resource development in the area of 
information and communications technology, thereby supporting the efforts by the 
CARICOM countries to achieve the active introduction and wider diffusion of 
information and communications technology throughout the Region. In this regard, 
they decided to organize a regional seminar at an early date with a view to 
strengthening Japan-CARICOM cooperation in the promotion of the use of 
information and communications technology. 
1-2 Cooperation in International Fora 
Recognizing the importance of enhancing mutual understanding and 
strengthening cooperation in international fora between Japan and the 
CARICOM Member Countries, the Ministers discussed current international 
issues of common concern. In so doing, they emphasized the necessity of an 
early achievement of the United Nations reform such as the Security Council 
reform including the expansion of both permanent and non-permanent 
membership. They underlined the importance of multilateral trade negotiations 
under the auspices of the World Trade Organization, and further expressed the 
need to address the special circumstances of small and vulnerable states and to 
intensify efforts to implement debt relief initiatives. They also stressed the 
importance of global environmental issues including climate change, 
transnational organized crimes and international tax issues. The Ministers 
resolved to further encourage multilateral dialogue on these issues. 
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2. Promotion of Mutual Understanding through Dialogues and Exchanges 
between Japan and CARICOM 
The Ministers shared the view that the foundation of relationship between Japan and 
the CARICOM Member Countries should be further consolidated through the 
promotion of broad-based exchanges of peoples involving the private sector, civil 
society and youth, as well as the promotion of cultural exchanges to enhance the 
mutual understanding of both peoples. 
2-1 Enhancing Cultural Exchanges 
Recognizing the importance of cultural interaction between Japan and CARICOM, 
the Ministers expressed the need to encourage the introduction of the Caribbean 
culture to Japan and the Japanese culture to the Caribbean. They affirmed their 
intention to closely cooperate in promoting and implementing cultural activities. The 
Ministers of the CARICOM Member States welcomed the proposal of the 
Government of Japan to explore the possibility of supporting the efforts by the 
CARICOM Member States to preserve the cultural heritage of the Region. 
2-2 Promoting Exchanges of Peoples at Various Levels 
The Ministers recognized the importance of promoting exchanges involving the 
private sector, civil society, and youth. In light of this, the Ministers of the 
CARICOM Member States welcomed the proposal of the Government of Japan to 
invite from CARICOM countries in 2001, a group of youth who are expected to play 
a leading role in the field of information and communications technology in their 
respective countries. 
 
3. Framework and Mechanisms for Dialogue and Communication between Japan 
and CARICOM 
The Ministers decided to establish the following mechanisms for promoting 
dialogues and communication between Japan and the CARICOM Member 
Countries: 
The next Japan-CARICOM Ministerial Conference will be held at a date of mutual 
convenience in 2003 or soon thereafter. The Japan-CARICOM Consultation 
Meeting at senior officials level will be held annually in the intervals between the 
Ministerial Conferences. For purposes of follow-up, technical meetings on 
cooperation projects will be held as necessary. 
The Japanese side proposed the establishment of a Japan-CARICOM friendship and 
cooperation fund to support friendship and cooperation projects/programmes. The 
CARICOM side welcomed this Japanese initiative. Both sides will consult on this 
matter in due course. 
As a supplement to official communication through diplomatic channels, an e-mail 
network will be established as soon as possible among the Foreign Ministries of 
Japan and the CARICOM countries as well as the CARICOM Secretariat. To 
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establish the network, preparatory work will be commenced through the CARICOM 
Secretariat. 
 
Tokyo, November 8th, 2000 
Minister for Foreign Affairs of Japan 
Chairman of the Council for Foreign and Community Relations of the Caribbean 
Community 
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Appendix C 
 
Japan’s CARICOM Policy  
excerpted from “Press Release  
Japan – Caribbean Community (CARICOM) Summit Meeting  
~Japan’s CARICOM Policy~”, 
MOFA, Japan, July 28, 2014, accessed July 29, 2014, 
http://www.mofa.go.jp/files/000047229.pdf. 
 
-First Pillar: Cooperation towards sustainable development including overcoming 
vulnerabilities particular to small island states; 
-Second Pillar: Deepening and expanding bonds founded on exchanges and 
friendship; 
-Third Pillar: Cooperation in addressing challenges of the international community. 
 
First Pillar: Cooperation towards sustainable development including overcoming 
vulnerabilities particular to small island states.  
 Japan will actively engage in international discussions concerning 
vulnerabilities particular to small island states, including those at the 
International Conference on Small Island Developing States (SIDS) and at 
the UN Climate Summit along with CARICOM Member States and other 
small island states. 
 Japan has extended cooperation towards overcoming vulnerabilities 
particular to CARICOM Member States utilizing Japanese technologies and 
expertise nurtured through its similar experience, in the fields of disaster risk 
reduction, counter measure against environment, climate change, energy, 
waste management and fisheries amongst others. The total amount of our 
grant aid to CARICOM Member States, not including Haiti, for this fiscal 
year is expected to increase six-fold compared to the annual levels of the past 
three years. With regards to Haiti, we are carrying out assistance towards 
post-earthquake reconstruction and stabilization. We will continue to 
enhance our assistance to these states. 
 Considering the “vulnerabilities particular to small island states” of 
CARICOM Member States, Japan recognizes the importance of assisting 
them from perspectives other than those based on per-capita income. For 
future cooperation, we will first conduct field surveys: possible areas of 
assistance, for example, include disaster risk reduction and environment, 
with concrete arrangements of cooperation to be considered based on the 
survey results. 
Second Pillar: Deepening and expanding fraternal bonds of cooperation and 
friendship  
 CARICOM Member States boast a proud heritage in academia, literature, 
the arts, music and sports as exemplified amongst others by three Nobel 
laureates. Japan looks to dramatically expand the reach of our exchanges, 
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already elevated through the Japan-CARICOM Friendship Year 2014, to 
further foster mutual understanding and respect. 
 More than 300 participants from the CARICOM Member States have 
engaged in English language education in Japan. Japanese language 
education has likewise taken root in the University of the West Indies. 
Japan will promote Japanese language education through strengthening 
cooperation with the Japan Foundation and through the utilization of 
tools such as Information and Communication Technologies (ICT). 
 We will also promote tourism between Japan and CARICOM. 
CARICOM Member States will be participating in the “Tourism EXPO 
JAPAN” to be held in September 2014 utilizing the Japan-CARICOM 
Friendship Fund. 
 We wish the best for the athletes of CARICOM Member States at the 
2020 Olympics and Paralympics Games in Tokyo. We look to work with 
the CARICOM Member States in fostering friendship and mutual 
understanding towards 2020 and spread the value of sports and the 
Olympic and Paralympic Movement through the international 
cooperation scheme “Sport for Tomorrow”, amongst others. 
Third Pillar: Cooperation in addressing challenges of the international community 
 Japan, from the policy of “Proactive Contributor to Peace” based on the 
principle of international cooperation, will engage more proactively in 
strengthening our UN diplomacy, urging disarmament and non-proliferation, 
promoting international peace cooperation, addressing development issues 
and challenges of global concern, ensuring human security, amongst others. 
Japan places importance in our policy dialogues with CARICOM Member 
States which share fundamental values and looks to strengthen its diplomatic 
structure. 
 Japan will strengthen dialogue and cooperation with CARICOM Member 
States concerning various challenges faced by the international community, 
such as: United Nations reform including concrete progress on UN Security 
Council Reform; cooperation on climate change towards an agreement on a 
new, fair and effective international framework with the participation of all 
countries; achievement of the Millennium Development Goals and 
formulation of a post-2015 development agenda; and disaster risk reduction. 
Japan will work with the CARICOM Member States in promoting the three 
principles of the rule of law at sea (①making and clarifying claims based on 
international law，②not using force or coercion，③ seeking to settle 
disputes by peaceful means.) in the international community. 
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Appendix D 
Statement from Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Taiwan 
“In order to uphold our national interests and dignity, the government of the 
Republic of China has decided to sever diplomatic relations with 
Grenada as of today.” January 28, 2005.1 
  
The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of China hereby solemnly makes 
the following statement: The government of the Republic of China regrets that the 
government of Grenada, being lured through financial incentives from the People’s 
Republic of China, has decided to establish diplomatic relations with the People’s 
Republic of China. In order to uphold our national interests and dignity, the 
government of the Republic of China has decided to sever diplomatic relations with 
Grenada as of today. Since the establishment of diplomatic relations between the 
Republic of China and Grenada on July 20, 1989, the Republic of China has actively 
assisted Grenada in various infrastructure and development projects that have 
benefited the general welfare of that country. The successive governments and 
people of Grenada have found the assistance provided by the Republic of China to 
be satisfactory. In addition, both have worked closely together in international 
cooperation. When Grenada was severely devastated by Hurricane Ivan on 
September 7, 2004, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of China 
provided immediate humanitarian aid. The Minister of Foreign Affairs also led a 
delegation to disaster-struck areas, provided US$200,000 in supplies to Grenada and 
turned a US$1.5 million fund for infrastructure projects into a disaster-relief fund 
that was endowed without any preconditions. Furthermore, this ministry granted a 
substantial part of a US$ 8 million package for damage reconstruction work in 
Grenada. Nevertheless, the incumbent Prime Minister Keith Mitchell, lacking 
foresight, incorrectly believes that by his leaning towards the People’s Republic of 
China, Taiwan can be pressured into significantly increasing the financial assistance 
we provide to Grenada, pay that country’s national debt on its behalf and increase 
the Five-year Cooperation Plan to as high as US$245 million. Despite the fact that 
the government of the Republic of China considered Grenada’s requests to be 
insatiable and beyond our capacity, we still made our best efforts to assist the 
government of Grenada by way of the Financial Bail-out Package, the Stadium 
Expansion Project and other major projects. Regrettably, Prime Minister Mitchell 
still found our assistance unsatisfactory. The Ministry is fully aware that Prime 
Minister Mitchell has been in contact with China and has been lured by Beijing. We 
have done everything possible to dissuade Prime Minister Mitchell from such 
behavior, but he has continued to act against our advice. He visited Beijing to 
negotiate issues concerning the establishment of diplomatic ties with China, and 
even sent a letter to our government stating that the government of Grenada intended 
only to retain informal relations with us. As a result, the Ministry recalled our 
ambassador to Grenada on December 22 last year and expressed our most serious 
protest to Prime Minister Mitchell. In Beijing, the Foreign Minister of Grenada, 
                                                          
1
Accessed June 23, 2014,  
http://www.mofa.gov.tw/EnMobile/News_Content.aspx?s=5DF19A0B8D18E2DB 
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Elvin Nimrod, signed a joint communiqué with the Foreign Minister of People’s 
Republic of China, Li Zhaoxing, announcing the formal establishment of diplomatic 
relations. On January 27 the government of Grenada formally notified the ROC 
Embassy of the decision to withdraw its diplomatic recognition of the Republic of 
China. In order to safeguard our national interests and dignity, our government has 
decided to sever diplomatic relations with Grenada. The government of the Republic 
of China regrets Prime Minister Mitchell’s lack of foresight. We have stated 
sincerely our intention of not participating in a meaningless game of “dollar 
diplomacy” with China, and will never let Grenada waver between the two sides of 
the Strait in order to seek profits. The government of the Republic of China 
expresses its serious protest against, and condemns, the People’s Republic of China 
for its use of “dollar diplomacy” to drive us out of the international community. The 
Republic of China conducts cooperation projects with friendly allies based on a 
spirit of mutual economic prosperity. In the future, we will continue to expand our 
international presence based on established policies and goals, and protect the 
highest interests and welfare of our people with firm resolve and pragmatism. 
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